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Combatting corruption in Cameroon has become a primary policy focus for the 
government and the civil society; yet, the success on that front has been modest. The 
literature on anticorruption efforts in the country is scant. Using Rothstein and Santiso’s 
conceptualization of anticorruption strategies as the guide, the purpose of this case study 
of government’s anticorruption policy and practice was to explore and contextualize the 
anticorruption strategies in Cameroon to fill the gap in the literature and potentially 
contribute to solving the problem. Data were collected through interviews with 20 
government employees working with the government’s main anticorruption agency –the 
National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), and through documents obtained from 
government published archives and expert publications. The data were inductively coded 
and organized in themes, then an integrated content analysis was conducted on the 
themes. The key finding of the study is that the government’s anticorruption strategies 
faced major challenges due to their poor design, formulation, and implementation. 
Potential approaches to addressing these challenges were also identified by participants to 
include leadership/political solutions such as regime change, institutional reforms such as 
granting NACC institutional autonomy, and conceptual solutions such as reforming 
NACC into an organization with judicial status. This study will impact positive social 
change through the recommendations it makes for good governance, which if 
implemented by the Cameroon government, would improve systems, institutions, and 
services to the citizens of the country. Another benefit is the improvement in government 
revenue, better investment budgets, and greater economic activity to alleviate poverty.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
Introduction 
Corruption is one of the prevalent work-related and social behaviors that hamper 
the efficient and effective functioning of governments, organizations, and societies. 
Practices such as “bribery, fraud, embezzlement, kickbacks, cronyism, and extortion” 
(Berlinski, 2009, p. 74) represent corruption, which has emerged in recent decades as a 
critically important issue in developing countries and a major barrier to good governance, 
especially in Africa. Most developing democracies have been plagued by this 
phenomenon, while their governments are still aspiring to fully join the contemporary 
global markets that set high ethical standards for corporate business operations as a 
deterrent to both domestic and international corrupt practices in business (Kolk & van 
Tulder, 2005).  
The global consequences of corruption are dire because corruption basically 
inflates the cost of goods and services without added value, thus undermining the 
microeconomy of nations. It has been argued that corruption serves as a breeding ground 
for social, economic, and political unrest, undermining democracy and the rule of law 
while distorting national and international trade. Furthermore, as argued, corruption 
jeopardizes sound governance and ethics in the private sector, threatens domestic and 
international security and the sustainability of natural resources, reinforces gender 
discrimination, and compounds political exclusion (Berlinski, 2009). Corruption also 
promotes nepotism and misappropriation of funds in the public and private sectors, 
creates a conflict of formal institutions and informal standards, sustains secrecy and 
inequality which contradict the creation and existence of democratic institutions, 
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decreases national productivity and increases inflation, worsens trade deficits, and 
generally hinders investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation (Shahabuddin, 2002). 
Transparency International (TI), a German based and renowned international 
anticorruption nongovernment organization (NGO), has rated Cameroon more than once 
as the most corrupt nation in the world (Berlinski, 2009; TI, 2016). The first time 
Cameroon was rated as the most corrupt country of the world was in 1998 (TI, 1998). 
Then, Cameroon appeared at the bottom of TI’s corruption perception index (CPI) chart, 
which rates countries from highly clean to highly corrupt, with 10 representing the 
cleanest nation and 0 representing the most corrupt nation. On this scale, Cameroon 
scored 1.4 and ranked the worst of the 85 countries that participated in TI’s survey for 
that year (TI, 1998). In the second year (i.e., 1999), Cameroon scored 1.5 on TI’s CPI and 
ranked 99th out of the 99 countries surveyed (TI, 1999). Since then, the country has 
developed several anticorruption programs and made strides towards combating 
corruption; yet, much work is still to be done. Presently, Cameroon still ranks with some 
of the most corrupt countries of the world even though it is no longer at the very bottom. 
For instance, recently in 2017, TI’s CPI ranked Cameroon in 153rd place out of the 180 
countries surveyed. And the country’s score remained low—at 25 on the scale of 100 (TI, 
2017).  
Corruption is a global problem. In 2010, TI noted that many governments were 
committing huge budgets to tackle the world’s most pressing problems, ranging from the 
instability of financial markets to climate change and poverty (TI, 2010). Regardless, 
corruption remained an obstacle to achieving much needed progress in those areas. TI’s 
CPI for the year 2010 showed that nearly three quarters of the 178 countries surveyed 
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(mostly developing countries) scored below 5 on a scale of 10, thus indicating a serious 
worldwide corruption problem, and specifically in developing societies (TI, 2010). To 
address these challenges, TI (year) held that governments needed to integrate 
anticorruption measures in all spheres, including the countries’ responses to the financial 
crisis, climate change and commitments by the international community to eradicate 
poverty. At that time, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) was 
considered the only global initiative that provides a framework for putting an end to 
corruption (TI, 2010).  
In the effort of combating corruption, Cameroon has developed different 
anticorruption approaches, which are being implemented and managed by a government 
agency, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), also known as the CONAC 
(Commission Nationale Anti-Corruption) in French. Created in March 2006, NACC’s 
activities against corruption in Cameroon are usually paired-up with different presidential 
policies and mechanisms geared towards the same goal (NACC, 2008). The most recent 
campaign launched against corruption in Cameroon by the head of state and managed by 
NACC was named Operation Epervier (French appellation), which means Operation 
Sparrow Hawk in English (NACC, 2006). This operation led to the incarceration of 
several government officials in February 2008 (Cameroon Today, 2011; Freedom House, 
2011; NACC, n.d; Ndoumbe, 2008).  
The people of Cameroon wish that corruption be eradicated from their society, with the 
government making significant strides toward the goal (Freedom House, 2011). 
However, there is a concern as to how soon this goal can be achieved and what it would 
take to attain such a goal considering the viability of mechanisms put in place to support 
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government anticorruption policy. Concerns of this nature provide the impetus for this 
study.  
Background 
Combating corruption in Cameroon has been among the fundamental governing 
policies of the current president of the country since his ascension to power in 1982 
(Ngomba, 2006). Accordingly, he announced in that year that his guiding philosophy as 
Cameroon’s head of state will be rigor, integrity, and moralization (Ngomba, 2006). By 
this pronouncement, the president meant that he would not tolerate corruption in the 
country. But coming back after 3 decades to assess the situation on ground, it seemingly 
could be said that the president fell short of this vision, as public corruption is still wide 
spread in the civil service in Cameroon and the country still ranks amongst some of the 
most corrupt countries of the world (TI, 2017). The outstanding question that continues to 
linger is, what kind of anticorruption policies has the government agency responsible 
been implementing and what are their weaknesses? This is one of the background pillars 
upon which this study was constructed.  
The need to combat corruption in Cameroon became more apparent between the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, the period during which the toll of corruption on the society 
appeared to have accelerated (Fombad, 2003). Author argued that corruption was 
prevalent in Cameroon’s public services before the 1980s but that it was not widespread, 
generalized, or as deep-rooted as it became evident in the 2000s (Fombad, 2003). In 
another study, the author dubbed corruption in Cameroon endemic, explaining that 
corruption has permeated almost every aspect of Cameroonian daily life, meanwhile, 
public officials seem to have either severely underestimated, or completely ignored, the 
5 
 
consequences of this epidemic (Fombad, 2000). According to Fombad (2000), high levels 
and vast scales of corruption remain among the main causes of Cameroon’s economic 
and political problems. In response, the government launched its first open national 
initiative against corruption in the country in 2006 with the creation of a NACC (NACC, 
2008). This agency would now champion government’s anticorruption policy across the 
nation, leading the implementation of such policy, giving feedback to the president and 
the legislature for the crafting of laws that will enhance the agency’s activities, and also 
mandating and facilitating the prosecution of culprits of corruption in criminal courts 
(NACC, 2008). 
The Cameroon government’s anticorruption policy since the beginning of the 
2000s was generally marked by complacency (Fombad, 2000). According to author, 
corruption in Cameroon was officially dismissed as nothing more than occasional acts of 
dishonesty and indiscretion by civil servants. However, the problem was much more 
serious, with a gravity that could only be compared to the devastation caused by AIDS on 
any fragile and depressed economy (Fombad, 2000). Developments in the fight against 
corruption in Cameroon by January 2018 included the continuation of Operation Sparrow 
hawk that was launched in the country about 11 years earlier by Biya—head of state 
(Bechem, 2018).  
Although several top-ranked government officials were arrested and incarcerated 
through this operation, such as the arrest of the former prime minister on April 16, 2012 
(Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, 2012), the Cameroonian population still harbored 
mixed feelings on how successful government anticorruption efforts had been in 
Cameroon. The approach to prevent corruption in Cameroon was said to be limited to the 
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application of Article 66 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, which 
demanded that top-ranking government officials declare their assets before and after 
serving in a public office (Houmfa, 2012). The strict reliance on the preceding article as 
the sole major legal measure for curbing public corruption appeared to be insufficient to 
treat the corruption disease that had been rooted into the culture of the entire society. 
The Cameroon head of state created a special criminal court that would try 
officials accused of embezzling public funds amounting to a minimum value of 50 
million CFA francs (Houmfa, 2012). This action was being implemented alongside other 
anticorruption laws, some of which were dubbed defective by public opinion, especially 
parliament’s decision in December 2011, which stipulated that charges against 
individuals found guilty of corruption would be dropped if they paid back missing funds 
to the government (Houmfa, 2012). On the one hand, this measure sent a positive 
message to the public in the fight against corruption, as it might had entailed that the 
government wanted by all means to retrieve public funds from citizens who might have 
embezzled them by reason of the devil’s temptation or without premeditation and as such 
were willing to repent (Houmfa, 2012). On the other hand, this measure could result in 
serious negative consequences for the anticorruption effort in general, as it incentivized 
public officials to orchestrate embezzlements through money laundry and other 
investment schemes granted that their liability was now limited by the legislature to the 
starting capital misappropriated. The financial gain made from investing embezzled state 
funds was not censored in a piece of legislation rendered hapless by the absence of a 
preceding government white paper that would have enabled the public to identify 
loopholes and closure mechanisms.  
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Problem Statement  
Combating corruption through different anticorruption approaches such as 
government structural adjustment, systematic strategies, and specific mechanisms put in 
place by governments and international organizations is an issue of global significance. 
Cross-national cooperation in the fight against corruption has become a major means for 
tackling the issue, especially in developing countries (Carr, 2007; Udombana, 2003). 
Nevertheless, most developing countries, including Cameroon, have not been able to 
substantially reduce their levels of corruption even after employing universal 
anticorruption strategies such as structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which are now 
considered as the way forward for most developing countries engaged in a serious 
anticorruption fight (Nguemegne, 2011; Udombana, 2003). For example, after being 
declared the most corrupt country in the world in 1998 and 1999 respectively (TI, 1998, 
1999), Cameroon in the most recent CPI results of 2017 still performed poorly, scoring 
25/100 and ranking 153 out of 180 participating countries (See Table 1, Appendix A). 
Doig and Riley (1998) argued that universal anticorruption strategies still needed to be 
set according to the political, economic, legal, and sociocultural contexts of the 
developing countries to achieve real success. This is a perspective that is yet to have 
substantial empirical support in the corruption/anticorruption literature.  
The literature on corruption/anticorruption contains different theoretical opinions 
on the nature of an effective governmental anticorruption strategies. Universalist and 
particularistic theorists differ in their views on how to curb corruption, especially in 
developing nations. Universalist and particularistic theorists differ in their views on how 
to curb corruption, especially in developing nations. Universalists such as Santiso (2001), 
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for example, see a transplantation of international measures, especially from the Western 
world, through global cooperation and development programs and institutions, such as 
the World Bank and IMF, into developing nations based on different economic and 
sociopolitical objectives set for each country. Proponents of particularistic approaches, on 
the other hand, hold the view that at the root of systemic corruption is a particularistic 
political culture, which is defined as a system in which the treatment of citizens by 
government depends on status or position in society, and people do not expect to be 
treated fairly by the state. What people expect is similar treatment to everybody with the 
same status. As such, anticorruption strategies must be adapted to address specific 
contextual differences for real success to be attained (Rothstein, 2007, p. 13). 
This study sought to locate a spot in the preceding argument for Cameroon’s 
anticorruption policy in order to achieve a clear understanding of the country’s 
anticorruption practices. The study aimed at gaining a better understanding of the context 
and the nature of the anticorruption strategies adopted in Cameroon as practiced by 
NACC. It also probed into the reasons for the weaknesses embedded in these strategies, 
because this problem needs to be solved, as it is apparent that high levels and vast scales 
of corruption remain among the main causes of Cameroon’s economic and political 
problems (Fombad, 2000). 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to explore the Cameroon government’s policy 
toward combating corruption in Cameroon by examining its anticorruption approaches 
and their implementation. In this study, I examined the anticorruption strategies in place 
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and endeavored to expose some of the particular reasons for the government’s negligible 
achievement in its 3-decade combat against corruption in the Cameroonian context. 
I examined the circumstances that led to the launch of the different anticorruption 
campaigns by the current Cameroonian head of state since the mid-1990s until today and 
explored the underlying context of corruption and the fight against it. I also sought to 
identify and assess the government’s anticorruption policy and mechanisms, measure the 
extent to which these policies satisfy good governance principles, and look for potential 
reasons why the policies have not achieved much success over 3 decades.      
In the absence of fundamental elements of anticorruption practice, those that 
satisfy tested and proven good governance principles such as accountability, 
transparency, rule of law, responsiveness, equitability and inclusiveness, effectiveness 
and efficiency, and participative governance, a government is bound to face drawbacks in 
its effort to combat corruption. Substantial effort and resources could be spent toward 
anticorruption projects, but so long as the policies and processes are not properly 
formulated, effectively debated in a democratic atmosphere, legislated into law, and 
implemented in the light of the above-mentioned good governance principles, such 
efforts could achieve less in terms of results. It is evident that little success has been 
achieved in the country’s anticorruption struggle. As such, I first explored how 
anticorruption strategies and approaches implemented by the government related to 
universal working concepts of anticorruption which are also integral components of good 
governance, and secondly how these strategies were adapted to the particular policy 
context of the country. With this goal in mind, I was able to identify to some tangible 
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propositions and developed answers connected to the lack of plausible success in 
anticorruption practice by the NACC since inception.  
Research Questions  
This study was guided by one overarching question and four subquestions. The 
main question was: What anticorruption strategies are perceived as effective in helping 
the government of Cameroon curb systematic public corruption? The subquestions were:  
1. What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon’s NACC?  
2. What can be learned from NACC’s experience of working with anticorruption 
policies and programs?  
3. What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the government to implement 
effective anticorruption policies?  
4. How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially improve the 
development and implementation of anticorruption strategies at NACC? 
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
The specific theories of universalism and particularism in anticorruption 
approaches as constructed in Rothstein (2007) and in Santiso (2001) provided a 
theoretical framework for this study. Universalists see a transplantation of international 
measures, especially from the western world into developing nations (Santiso, 2001). 
Particularistic opinions hold unto specificity and originality of approaches (Rothstein, 
2007). I explored these views, while endeavoring to examine the concept of adaptability 
(contextualization) of anticorruption approaches as a middle ground where these existing 
theories could be retried and settled for improved performance. This conception was 
based on the premise that imported anticorruption strategies from other examples around 
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the world, especially from developed and industrialized nations, may not work effectively 
in the setting of developing countries like Cameroon unless they are adapted to the policy 
context of the country. 
The universal or particularistic theories of anticorruption approaches must build 
on the foundational theory of good governance, which measures the effectives of 
anticorruption policy and practice. The good governance theory holds the premise that 
there are certain government practices that if put into place, one would have a more 
effective, efficient, and successful democratic government (Elahi, 2009). The theory, as 
expounded in Elahi (2009), projects the control of corruption as one of the indicators of 
good governance, including practices such as legitimacy and voice; direction; 
performance; accountability and transparency; fairness (rule of law and equity) (Graham, 
Amos, & Plumptre, 2003, p. 3). This theory, in explaining the dynamics of the 
relationship between corruption/anticorruption and the realization of effective 
governance, receives support from related theories such as that of global governance, and 
development (Elahi, 2009; Nanda, 2006). If the control of corruption is an indicator of 
good governance, then good governance principles could be employed to ensure effective 
anticorruption policy making and practice. Theoretically and conceptually, the study built 
on universalistic and particularistic competing theories of anticorruption, the foundation 
of which is the theory of good governance, while endeavoring to explore a possible 
balance through the concept of adaptability of anticorruption strategies.   
Nature of the Study 
This section of the study states the design of the study in terms of design 
paradigm, inquiry approach, and the rationale for the choice of design. Secondly, it states 
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the methodology in terms of participants, site, role of the researcher in data collection 
procedures, and sampling. Thirdly, it states potential weaknesses associated with the 
methods and how they are addressed. And finally, it outlines some of the ethical concerns 
that may surround the study. 
The study sought to gain an in-depth understanding of Cameroon’s government 
anticorruption strategies as implemented by its NACC. This study was conceived and 
conducted as a qualitative study, making use of the case study approach to scientific 
inquiry. A research design can either be qualitative or quantitative in nature, or a 
combination of both (mixed methods). The choice of design usually depends on the 
nature of the inquiries the researcher intends carrying out. Research design itself is a plan 
or proposal to conduct research, involving the intersection of philosophy, strategies of 
inquiry, and specific methods (Creswell, 2009, p. 5). The researcher’s philosophical 
worldview plays a considerable role in determining the suitability of each of the 
approaches. Positivism, constructivism, advocacy/participatory, and pragmatism are 
some of the major worldviews espoused in Creswell (2009). Each of these worldviews 
influences the thinking pattern and design approach adopted in the research. The nature 
of the research problem, the researcher’s personal experiences, and the audience are also 
determining factors in choosing a specific design (Creswell, 2009).  
The primary worldview held in this study is constructivism, which entails 
interaction between researcher and participants in the study (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). This 
is one of the main reasons why the study is best suited to a qualitative design. The study 
was designed to investigate anticorruption which is a behavior that cannot be counted or 
quantified, but can only be assessed, evaluated, and to some extent valorized depending 
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on the specificity of analysis conducted. According to Creswell (2007), the qualitative 
researcher is identified with activities that locate him/her in real world problems that 
require extensive and thorough exploration, interaction with participants, developing 
assumptions, collecting pertinent data and inductively analyzing and interpreting them.  
With regards to the particular approach to qualitative inquiry that was adopted in 
the study, the case study method was the research design of choice. Case study is defined 
as “the study of an issue explored through one or more cases within a bounded system” 
(Creswell, 2007, p. 73). Yin (2014) characterized it as an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the case) in depth and within its real-world 
context. The encompassing nature of case study expounded by Yin makes the approach 
more fitting to study complex phenomena, as it tends to provide the researcher with a 
more simplistic platform and tools to carry out inquiries. It is on this definition that this 
study situates its inquiry into Cameroon’s anticorruption strategies as implemented by 
NACC.  
Another reason that accounted for the selection of the case study method was the 
argument that case study is familiar to social scientists because of its popularity in 
psychology, law, and political science (Creswell, 2007). Therefore, approaching this 
study as a public policy analyst was more disciplinary relevant. Perception of sampling 
unit drew on the conclusions made by Tellis (1997) on unit of analysis for case study 
research. The unit of analysis is said to be a critical factor in case study, and it is typically 
a system of action rather than an individual or group of individuals (Tellis, 1997). And 
case studies tend to be selective, focusing on one or two issues that are fundamental in 
understanding the system being examined. The population sample for the study primarily 
14 
 
consisted of a group of civil servants (public agents) working within the government 
agency – NACC. The site was the capital city of Cameroon, Yaoundé, which is the 
headquarters of all governmental agencies, including the NACC.  
I employed purposeful random and critical case sampling strategies as the main 
sampling method for the study, in line with the established approaches to sampling in 
qualitative studies (see Patton, 2002). The focus on critical case strategy permits logical 
generalization and maximum application of information to other cases (Creswell, 2007).  
In terms of sample size and data collection procedure, 20 participants 
(knowledgeable public servants in the area of corruption/anticorruption) working at 
NACC were interviewed. Additionally, documents from NACC and other applicable 
sources were consulted.  
Interviewing constituted the principal procedure for data collection in this study. 
However, I also consulted available government documents on the subject so as to enable 
triangulation of the data collected. The main advantage of interviewing in comparison to 
other data collection methods is the ability it offers the researcher to enter into other 
persons’ perspectives of what is going on. Qualitative interviewing varies in strategies. 
Patton (2002) put forth three basic approaches to collecting qualitative data through open-
ended interviews: the informal conversational interview, the general interview guide 
approach, and the standardized open-ended interview. A combination of approaches may 
be employed to maximize potential feedback (Patton, 2002). However, I focused on the 
general interview guide approach for logistic reasons. Virtual interviewing by telephone 
or online chats were the only means of interviewing available at the time due to ongoing 
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political crisis in Cameroon, which drastically narrowed the window for a field visit due 
to safety concerns.  
In terms of data analysis procedures and strategies, I developed a data collection 
protocol that established the basis for a comprehensive analysis. Content analysis was 
operated manually with the help of coding and organization of the patterns of information 
derived from the data.  
For the role of the researcher, potential weaknesses of the methods, and ethical 
concerns, each preceding the outlined method indicated points of weaknesses but with 
more focus on the strengths that mitigated and enabled each approach to remain viable 
for the study. Personal experience played an important role in facilitating data collection 
and increasing trustworthiness in the judgments and analysis made on data collected. I 
also avoided biases by balancing data collection techniques and analyses with 
objectivism and triangulation between applied methods.  
Operational Definitions 
Anticorruption: This constitutes  comprehensive, systematic, and knowledge-
based strategies to curb corruption (Czepil, 2016). 
Anticorruption Approaches or Strategies: These are measures employed by 
governments and organizations to discourage, curb, and sanction corruption (Czepil, 
2016). These include anticorruption campaigns, administrative or public ethics, legal 
sanctions, and moral or ethical political rhetoric (Desta, 2004).  
BRICS: Acronym for an association of five major emerging economies, which are 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (brics.org).  
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Contextualization: Haleblian (1983) defined the concept of contextualization as 
the interrelated conditions (environment) in which something exists or occurs. Thus, to 
contextualize as deemed in this study, is to put an element or an action in a particular 
environment, taking into consideration the different factors existing in the said 
environment, that impact the element or action. Contextualizing anticorruption therefore, 
would refer to putting the elements of anticorruption being studied into a country-specific 
context.  
Corruption: Corruption is defined as any behavior that violates non-
discrimination norms governing the access to the political process and the allocation of 
rights and resources (Kurer, 2005), and as well as behavior that can impair fair treatment 
in transactions between individuals.  
Particularism: Particularism refers to public servants making decisions based on 
the interests of particular individuals or groups (Melchior and Melchior, 2001).  
Political, economic, legal, and sociocultural realities of Cameroon (Policy 
Context): These are facts concerning the organization and the functioning of the 
Cameroonian state within its societal contexts (Shahabuddin, 2002).  
Public, Systematic, or Political Corruption: This is the misuse of public office for 
private gain (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000).  
Universalism: Universalism is defined as the practice of government remaining 
open to lessons from elsewhere (Gaylord, 2002). Relying on this background, this study 
perceives universalism as a range of knowledge, interests, or practices applicable across 
the globe. As such, universal anticorruption approaches should apply to any country or 




Assumptions in a study are things that are somewhat out of control, but necessary 
to be in the study because if they disappear the study would become irrelevant (Simon, 
2011). As such, the first assumption held for this study was that anticorruption 
approaches differ in type, application, and relevance or effectiveness. Therefore, the 
Cameroon government practiced particular sets of anticorruption strategies that could be 
identified with its governance policies. Also, it was assumed on the preceding basis that 
every society fighting corruption could achieve greater outcomes by formulating and 
applying strategies that specifically address their own socioeconomic and political 
realities irrespective of all other influences. This is due to the prevailing cultural 
differences between societies, thus affecting individual and group behavioral patterns and 
how fundamental institutions are established and how they operate. Secondly, I assumed 
that low levels of corruption, be it systematic, public, sporadic, petty, or grand is a strong 
indicator of good governance. Therefore, effective anticorruption strategies should 
directly signify the presence of good governance principles as identified in the 
subsequent literature review. Consequently, the absence of anticorruption strategies that 
tie with good governance principles would mean fundamental weakness of such 
strategies for the purpose of combating corruption. In addition, I assumed that 
participants would be helpful in explaining the anticorruption strategies implemented in 
the society being studied, from which subsequent analyses were made as appertaining to 
their effectiveness in combating corruption. Lastly, I assumed that the government of 
Cameroon exercised the full responsibility in matters of combating corruption in the 
country and that private agencies would follow government policy in this matter.  
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Scope and Delimitations 
Delimitations are characteristics that limit the scope and define the boundaries of 
the study (Simon, 2011). Considering the role given to NACC as the government agency 
charged with the task of administering the anticorruption policy in Cameroon, I focused 
on gaining an understanding of how this agency functions. I therefore looked at 
perceptions of effective policy implementation in this organizational context. To this end, 
different notions and theories such as particularistic and universalistic views, the 
adaptability notion of public policy implementation, and the good governance theory 
were used as a framework for assessment of specific anticorruption strategies adopted.  
Data for the study was gathered from two main sources: publicly available 
documentation and open-ended interviews with selected participants from NACC. 
Limitations  
Limitations in a scientific study are potential weaknesses found in the study itself 
(Simon 2011). These weaknesses should be identified and examined in the light of the 
conceptual and theoretical foundations of the study so as to strengthen the reliability of 
the study. The main limitations of this study were those inherent to case studies, 
especially generalizability. Not all government agencies in Cameroon were studied; 
instead, inquiries were obtained from one major agency, Cameroon’s NACC, from which 
generalizations were made. Private agencies were not studied. I assumed that the 
government was fully in charge of anticorruption operations in the country. Therefore, 
generalizability might be limited.  
A scientific assessment of a behavior such as corruption/anticorruption is a task 
that is liable to scientific errors, since the causes of the act of corruption itself might be 
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misjudged; discrepancies might exist between the legal connotations of the act and what 
policy analysts judge to be an act of corruption. The sensitivity (political nature) of the 
object of this research was considered an element that could also impact the collection of 
trustworthy information from participants.  
Time was also a limiting factor that was addressed before engagement into field 
work. Collecting data from government participants in this context and making quality 
analyses demanded a considerable amount of time. The Cameroonian civil service has a 
problem of accessibility, in terms of collecting information, especially due to the fact that 
the system is not yet computerized and standardized. It took a considerable length of time 
to find individuals willing to participate in a sensitive inquiry like this.  
Finally, the purposeful sampling method employed in selecting participants for 
this study could also be seen as a limiting factor to the openness and generality of the 
study. Following this method, only specific candidates who possessed the knowledge 
requisite to understand the subject matter of the study were selected. They had to meet 
specific criteria in order to pass recruitment. This process itself could be perceive as a 
weakness to the study in terms of the ability to gather the thoughts of the studied 
population or information that was fully representative of the said population. However, 
this approach remains a strong qualitative case study tradition (Creswell, 2007), and the 
deep interviews conducted on the few selected participants revealed a wealth of 





Firstly, this study will add to the information and knowledge resources that could 
conceivably contribute to the effectiveness of implementing the government’s 
anticorruption policy in Cameroon and potentially in other nations plagued by the same 
phenomenon. The study will also add to an existing body of literature that describes how 
different governments tackle corruption, using different or similar tools and strategies, 
and obtaining results that reflect their applications. 
Secondly, effective anticorruption mechanisms entail a reduction in corruption 
and social challenges to good governance. Such outcome would favor political stability 
and foster socioeconomic prosperity for the targeted society and those that would draw 
lessons from this study. According to Elahi (2009), the control of corruption is one of the 
strong indicators of good governance. If this study succeeds in proposing 
recommendations that will help in finding a solution to the problem of corruption in 
Cameroon, the impact will be felt in the society in terms of changed attitudes to 
governance by public officials and improved political climate. 
Thirdly, the study was unique in its timing, as it was conducted at the very time 
that the government renewed its commitment to pursue greater success in the fight 
against corruption in Cameroon. The purpose of fighting corruption is to lead the nation 
on the path of economic prosperity and good governance, hoping that it becomes an 
emerging democratic and united country in diversity by 2035 (Ministry of the Economy, 
Planning, and Regional Development, 2009). The study coincided with renewed interest 
in the battle against corruption in Cameroon. Another significance of the study could be 
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seen in the different government anticorruption strategies it identified, that might be 
perceived as effective, and thus would better address the needs of the people. 
Additionally, this study explored the basis for understanding anticorruption 
approaches in Cameroon in terms of their effectiveness in solving the problem of 
corruption in the country. As such, future research can build on the study, particularly 
focusing on the progress in achieving anticorruption policy goals and implementing 
specific policy mechanisms.  
Finally, the study will serve as a potential resource for the United Nations, TI, and 
other international organizations that are involved in corruption mitigation programs 
around the world. It will become a resource to future studies in this discipline (public 
policy and administration). It should delineate the strengths and weaknesses in the 
development, legislation and enforcement of policy by the government to counter corrupt 
practices, based on different instruments and strategies that can be contextualized. These 
lessons may be transferable to the situation in other countries, especially those that are 
willing to consider the experience of Cameroon.       
Summary  
For the past decade, the government of Cameroon has turned the need to reduce 
corruption in the country into one of its major policy priorities (NACC, 2008). In this 
effort, different anticorruption approaches have been developed and have been 
implemented by NACC. Significant research is yet to be conducted on the successes 
achieved through this effort. However, this study is one of the steps taken toward 
addressing the significance and impact of government activity in Cameroon as an effort 
towards reducing or possibly eradicating the corruption cankerworm from the society.  
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This chapter laid the foundation for the study by exposing the problem, research 
questions, purpose, conceptualization, the nature of the study, scope and delimitations, 
limitations, and significance of the study. Chapter 2 will examine pertinent literature that 
provides the basis of the theoretical framework of the study and examines what previous 
researchers have discovered thus far on the specific case of anticorruption policies in 
Cameroon. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
This chapter consists of pertinent literature on corruption and anticorruption, 
focusing on the instruments and strategies with which the problem of corruption can be 
tackled and curbed, especially for developing democracies. It also underscores some of 
the current corruption and anticorruption issues faced by researchers and practitioners in 
the field. Finally, I present identified gaps in the literature for future research. The 
chapter is organized into four general subject areas: definitions and conceptualizations of 
corruption and anticorruption, theoretical foundations of anticorruption approaches, 
instruments for anticorruption practice, and contexts, which include the adaptation of 
strategies for effective anticorruption practice. 
Literature Search Strategy  
The main databases I consulted included ProQuest Central, Academic Search 
Complete/Premier, Political Science Complete, CQ Researcher, ScienceDirect, 
EBSCOhost, ProQuest Dissertation and Theses, Expanded Academic ASAP, Business 
Source Compete/Premier, and Sage Premier. The Google Scholar search engine was also 
a key to access some scholarly information reviewed in this chapter. My search included 
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the following keywords: corruption, history of corruption, corruption in Cameroon, 
corruption in developing countries, corruption in Africa, anticorruption strategies, 
anticorruption strategies for developing countries, anticorruption in Cameroon, and 
history of anticorruption campaigns. Other keywords included combat against 
corruption, effective anticorruption measures, global anticorruption, contextualizing 
anticorruption, leadership and anticorruption, ethics in government, good governance 
and anticorruption, corruption and the law, corruption and morality, corruption and 
democratic institutions, transparency, accountability, and corruption, integrity in 
government, public performance and anticorruption, and public responsibility.  
Theoretical Foundation 
Universalist and particularistic theories of anticorruption expressed through 
operational theories such as good governance, global governance, big-bang, and program 
theories as expounded in the works of Rothstein (2007), Santiso (2001), Elahi (2009), 
Graham, Amos, and Plumptre (2003), Nanda (2006) formed the theoretical foundation of 
this study. These theories shall be discussed subsequently. However, before then, it 
would be good to explore the definition of corruption and anticorruption, so as to create a 
comprehensive nexus between the different theories, concepts, and findings of the study.  
The common definition of corruption held by researchers across the field of social 
sciences is the one that perceives corruption as the misuse of public power for private 
gain (Goldsmith, 1999; Johnston, 1996; Kurer, 2005; Philp, 1997; Sandholtz & Koetzle, 
2000; Xin & Rudel, 2004). Social science researchers will always face the challenge of 
establishing a universal consensus on the definition of corruption, as it has been the case 
in the history of corruption studies. According to Sandholtz (2000), such difficulty is due 
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to the fact that practices considered by one society as corrupt, are considered harmless or 
even appropriate in another society or cultural context. However, the difficulty in 
establishing general concepts and definitions of corruption should not erode the keenness 
to fight corruption worldwide. Regardless of all definitions and societal contexts, corrupt 
acts are wrong, improper, and illegitimate (Berlinski, 2009). Settling corrupt acts on this 
broad base offers three dimensions through which policy studies can identify corrupt 
behaviors in society: public interest, public opinion, and legal norms (Sandholtz, 2000).  
Generally, research on corruption can be conducted at two levels—at the 
individual level and the national level (Connelly & Ones, 2008). According to Connelly 
and Ones (2008), research at the individual level should ask the main question, “What 
characteristics of individuals and situations cause some individuals to behave in corrupt 
ways?” (p. 354), while research at the national level would ask the question, “What 
characteristics of nations cause greater rates of corruption at the national aggregate?” (p. 
354). For studies focused on the causes of corruption, the variables examined covered a 
wide spectrum of economic, political, social, cultural, and politico-historical (such as 
colonialism) causes. Some of the prominent studies published on corruption in Africa, 
consulted for this study, included the works of Temple (2012), Solima and Cable (2011), 
Bah (2011), Kiser and Sacks (2011), Pillay and Dorasany (2010), Kusiak (2010), Fraser-
Moleketi (2009), and Levi, Sacks, and Tyler (2009). Those specifically addressing the 
case of Cameroon included the works of Nguemenge (2011), Phe and Drori (2010), and 
Tanga and Dzemua (2009).  
Focusing on the concept of anticorruption, this study analyzed mostly the 
literature that dealt predominantly with anticorruption measures and their surrounding 
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dynamics, rather than seeking to discover what the causes of corruption were, as it was 
the case with most of the published research on corruption issues. Drawing on the 
definition of corruption, anticorruption was defined in this study as the action and effort 
by government or any other organization endowed with the required authority to 
discourage and sanction the misuse of public power for private gain (Nguemenge, 2011). 
In addition, since corruption is not limited to public corruption, the definition of 
anticorruption could equally be expanded to include any effort taken by government, 
groups, and individuals to discourage corruption in all forms (Czepil, 2016).  
Research on anticorruption strategies includes the works that discuss 
anticorruption measures having global application and measures that can only be 
applicable to specific cultural contexts. However, this position is yet to be widely 
considered by researchers in this field, most studies settle on the interplay between 
international and domestic anticorruption efforts (Beblavý, 2009; Moroff & Schmidt-
Pfister, 2010; Smilov, 2010). In this regard, the literature on anticorruption efforts 
generally identifies three levels of anticorruption measures: international level 
(international legal mechanisms), national level (governmental political machines), and 
the civil society or community level (domestic social movements) (Moroff & Schmidt-
Pfister). Policy makers could develop more contextual strategies by considering the 
preceding distinction.   
Conceptual Foundation 
The concept of adaptability of anticorruption strategies derived from the work of 
Santiso (2001) is the guiding idea that founded the platform upon which the other 
anticorruption notions were explored. This concept shall be discussed in detail in an 
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integrated analysis of the major ideas of the study. An account of a general scientific 
conception of anticorruption helped established the base for scholarly review of the topic.  
Anticorruption is generally conceived in the field of social sciences as an effort 
toward achieving morality, ethical behavior, public performance, and simply being able 
to carry on life and engaging in human affairs, respecting legal and moralistic 
consideration in day to day transactions (Schmidt, 2007). Based on this conception, 
different labels have been attributed to the anticorruption concept for the purpose of 
research and practice. Labels such as accountability, transparency, good governance, 
public service ethics, business ethics, global governance, and ethical globalization are 
used as the operational terms for anticorruption studies and practice (Carr, 2007). The 
works of Schmidt (2007), Carr (2007), Benito and Bastida (2009), and Moynihan (2009) 
were some of the pertinent writings I selected to explain the preceding concepts. Most 
recently, research in this area have expanded and other authors have explored these 
topics, explaining government experience with anticorruption policies in developing 
countries and the challenges that still exist despite considerable efforts that have been 
made for more than 2 decades now both at domestic and international levels to bring 
lasting solutions to the problem of corruption in these countries, including Cameroon. 
Some of these works included those of Majila et al. (2014); Neupane et al. (2014); 
Ramanujam and Caivano (2016); Spector (2016); Walton (2016); Ocheje (2017); and 
Fedran et al. (2018).  
According to Schmidt (2007), anticorruption debates witnessed an increase, with 
a historical evolution that can be traced back to pre-1990s. In a study conducted on 
selected Central Eastern European (CEE) countries, Schmidt distinguished four different 
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chronological phases in the modern history of the anticorruption debates. The first phase, 
witnessed during the pre-1990 era, considered a period of “earlier scholarly debates on 
corruption;” the second phase was the early 1990s which marked the period of “initial 
anti-corruption debates;” the third occurred in the early-2000s, which is considered the 
period of “reorientation;” and finally, the mid-2000s marks a period of the “latest anti-
corruption debates” (Schmidt, 2007, p. 202). Two major anticorruption conceptions 
include the transnational anticorruption strategy and the domestic anticorruption strategy 
(Schmidt, 2007). 
Examining the case of the postcommunist world, which refers to the era after 
1990 when communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, Schmidt (2007) analyzed the 
development of the anticorruption practices in the countries of CEE. Revealing that the 
anticorruption literature in the West has had a more stable development than that in the 
East, Schmidt examined a situation where the proliferation of the Western ideas of the 
free market greatly influenced the landscape of anticorruption studies in the communist 
world. The literature has had that same kind of influence on the developing nations, 
including Cameroon. According to Schmidt, in the early 1990s corruption emerged as a 
major problem in the new independent states of the global south. It is this awareness that 
would give a new impetus to governments, organization, and groups fighting corruption 
both domestically and internationally.  
In another study, Carr (2007) discussed the legal framework of anticorruption 
efforts at regional and international levels. This framework is defined by legislations and 
conventions drafted by member-governments and organizations. While Schmidt’s (2007) 
writings examined the politico-economic and global nature of anticorruption practices 
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and studies, Carr’s study revealed the legal aspect of the concept. Anticorruption cannot 
be studied or practiced without the understanding that it has legal foundations, support, 
and instruments. Discussing legislations and conventions as the major legal frameworks 
for anticorruption practices at regional and international levels, Carr explained how these 
approaches would likely produce fewer effective results if they lack uniformity in their 
conception and application, and are not enforced robustly through solid mechanisms set 
in place (p. 122). 
Carr (2007) discussed the use of varied regulations within the legal framework 
against corruption, including fines, loss of freedom, and incentives. Conventions usually 
include sanctions, preventive measures, mutual assistance, and cooperation (Carr, 2007). 
Carr outlined several conventions that have been established worldwide to foster 
anticorruption, some of which included the Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption (1996), the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (by Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 1997), and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 
(1999). Other conventions include the Southern African Development Protocol Against 
Corruption (2001), African Union Convention of Preventing and Combating Corruption 
(2003), and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003) (Carr, 2007). 
These are some of the legal instruments that are used to encourage anticorruption 
practices in signatory countries.   
The social factor was the third major aspect considered in the literature when 
conceiving an approach for studying or practicing anticorruption. Anticorruption is 
perceived as a cure to corruption which is a social problem, needing curative and 
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preventive measures that are deeply rooted in sociology, anthropology and morality of 
every society (Carr, 2007). Carr used the term resocialization to explain the need to 
create considerable social awareness about the dangers of corruption as a measure of 
fighting this endemic disease.  
The last theoretical basis for anticorruption studies and practice was revealed in 
systematic administrative studies of corruption in governments, corporations, and other 
forms of public organizations. From this theoretical basis came the concepts of good 
governance, public service ethics, business ethics, accountability, transparency and all the 
operational concepts that ensure proper and productive system functioning (Benito & 
Bastida, 2009). The works of Benito and Bastida and Moynihan (2009) discussed some 
of the recent ideas developed in this area. The work of Benito and Bastida covered a wide 
array on concepts in systemic public administration, including fiscal procedures, budget 
performance, budget transparency, and accountability in general within the public sector. 
The findings of Benito and Bastida related to some of the policy issues resulting from the 
relationship between budget transparency, fiscal situation, and political turnout, using a 
comparative international approach, all in the effort to create and run systems that lessen 
the loopholes for corrupt practices within the public sector.   
According to results derived from a comparative budget transparency index 
developed by Benito and Bastida (2009), encompassing 40 budget features based on 
international standards for a sample of 41 countries, a positive relationship was found 
between national government fiscal balance and budget transparency. This implied, 
according to authors, that the more information the budget disclosed, the less fiscal 
deficits can be used by politicians to achieve opportunistic goals (Benito & Bastida, 
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2009). Obscure budgets often set the stage for embezzlement and corruption (Benito & 
Bastida, 2009). As budget transparency appears to hold politicians and public officials 
accountable, Benito and Bastida’s article can serve as a model for examining the 
relationship between budget transparency and the fight against fiscal corruption, which is 
one of the significant areas of corruption witnessed in developing countries, including 
Cameroon. 
Moynihan (2009) discussed performance issues in government as another basis 
for establishing the practice of anticorruption in the public service system. Moynihan 
sought to settle the debate on the source of legitimacy for public administration between 
two schools of thoughts—those who hold that the rule of law should be considered the 
dominant framework of the field, and those who have said that the study of performance 
should be considered the dominant source. By referring this argument to the study at 
hand, one would extract those elements related to government performance—the purpose 
of public policy administration. In public administration, the citizenry is the bedrock of 
all policies and what it awaits from the government is service delivery, which has to do 
with performance (management) (Moynihan, 2009). Improved government performance 
means the implementation of efficient and effective systems, and thus more 
accountability and less corruption. Moynihan provided another scholarly resource for 
studying government performance and how it is linked to the construction of transparent, 
accountable, responsible, and effective systems. These are the concepts that form the 
basis and the support system for all studies and practices of anticorruption by 
governments and other domestic and international anticorruption proponents.  
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Instruments for Anticorruption Practice 
There is no one uniform approach to anticorruption. Several tools and strategies 
are used to combat corruption, either curatively or preventively. These tools and 
strategies include the following:  
• The policy instrument made applicable through strategies such as 
anticorruption programs and campaigns and structural and functional 
administrative adjustments that seek to ensure certain standards for public 
performance and integrity.  
• The legal instrument that utilizes punitive and institutional strategies to 
curb corruption.  
• The role of leadership and society, which calls for transformational 
leadership and organizational change.. 
•  Citizen participation.  
The Policy Instrument 
Strategies such as anticorruption programs and campaigns, structural and 
functional administrative reforms that define standards for public performance and 
integrity constitute some of the instruments used by government as policy strategy to 
combat corruption.  
Anticorruption Programs and Campaigns 
In a recent study conducted on Eastern European Countries (EEC) by Moroff and 
Schmidt-Pfister (2010), the researchers documented findings on how anticorruption 
programs, projects, and campaigns became an essential aspect of furthering good 
governance over the past two decades prior to their study. These campaigns and 
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programs, Moroff and Schmidt-Pfister explained, are manifested at both domestic and 
international levels. Thus, the authors differentiate between domestic social movements, 
governmental political machines, and international legal machines. This separation 
creates a three-level platform for analyzing anticorruption efforts—the international 
society, the national government, and the domestic civil society. In the study, the 
researchers found out and concluded that the interface of the preceding three levels 
produced coincidental and spontaneous breakthroughs that largely outweighed systematic 
implementation of appropriate anticorruption strategies.  
Moreover, Moroff and Schmidt-Pfister (2010) stressed that broad social support 
for anticorruption strategies remains essential for the success of any international and 
governmental initiatives. This analysis might be true in the context of the current study, 
but the situation might be different in other cases since systematic anticorruption 
strategies might produce more effective results in these cases than focusing on broad 
anticorruption programs and campaigns. Programs and campaigns identified by the 
researchers were classified according to the three groups of analyses listed above, with 
actors and activities identified at each level. At the international level, Moroff and 
Schmidt-Pfister found an international society that is made up of actors such as 
“international organizations, international NGOs, transnational actors such as private 
foundations, think tanks, multinational business and some very active western 
governments” (p. 93).  
In another study conducted by Beblavý (2009) in Slovakia, the dynamics of 
anticorruption programs and campaigns are once again witnessed, especially as they 
interacted with other strategies to bring about an effective effort against corruption and its 
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consequences. Beblavý’s study revealed that government strategies against corruption are 
usually interwoven, as one form of approach could be used to implement the other. For 
example, certain structural reforms would require sensitization campaigns and educative 
programs for effective implementation. Beblavý found that amongst the things policy 
makers can do to decrease corruption in developing and transition countries, changing 
norms of behavior through education and public information campaigns is essential.  
 Beblavý discovered that Slovakia’s success in combating corruption started in 
June 2000 when the first Dzurinda government approved a national program for the fight 
against corruption, developed by the office of the deputy prime minister of economic 
policy, Miklos on the basis of a proposal prepared by TI, Slovakia (Beblavý, 2009, p. 
181). The principles and reforms held under this program targeted a “multifaceted 
strategy favoring changes both in formal and informal rule” (Beblavý, 2009, p. 182). The 
goal was to endorse reduction in administrative budgetary discretion and increase 
transparency, improve the functioning of the judiciary and prosecution, combat conflict 
of interest at all levels of government, and above all change norms of behavior through 
education and public information campaigns (Beblavý, 2009). Although the program and 
campaigns strategy did not stand alone in the Beblavý’s study, its significance is seen in 
the interface it creates between other strategies and their application in the field. 
Slovakia’s case is one from which other developing countries such as Cameroon can 
learn. 
In concert with Beblavý (2009), David (2010) conducted another study on Hong 
Kong, explaining how the country transitioned from a corrupt to a clean government, 
using the strategy of amnesty as one of the major weapons for combating corruption. 
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Most researchers in social sciences have agreed on the definition of amnesty, as 
forgiveness or pardon from a crime or other social liability, thus giving the concept 
different sociological, political, and criminological implications (Klug, 1998; Parker, 
2001; Shichor & Ranish, 1980). Some authors have refused to accept a standard 
definition of amnesty to mean a complete forgetfulness (oblivion) of the past, even 
though forgiveness might have taken place (Klug, 1998). Other researchers, such as 
Bennett, Harris, Laskey, Levitch, and Monrad (1976), see the argument as being deeply 
rooted in symbolic compositions in a political construction of what amnesty means. 
However, the argument can be settled by an agreement on what the legislation, the courts, 
and the constitution would stipulate for each society as seen in the following statement in 
the case of the United States: 
The American Constitution makes no mention of amnesties, however, 
Article II, section 2 grants the president the power to grant Reprieves and 
Pardons for offenses against the United States except in cases of 
Impeachment. The Supreme Court has declared that there is no legal 
distinction between amnesties and pardons, and therefore amnesties are a 
part of the constitutional fabric of the United States and have also been 
part of the historical reality as well. (Shichor & Ranish, 1980, p. 443) 
Other countries might adopt similar positions to that of the United States concerning the 
question of amnesty, and some might have the provisions clearly outlined in their 
constitutions. Using amnesty as an anticorruption tool would depend on the interpretation 
given to it by the country making the usage.  
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As significant as the concept of amnesty might be due to its drastic character in 
changing political culture, certain governments might neglect its usefulness, or may 
simply lack the right political judgments as to when to employ it and under what 
circumstances. This paradigm guided David’s (2010) study on Hong Kong. In that study, 
the author argued that mainstream researchers have seldom considered non-conventional 
triggers of anticorruption efforts such as amnesty (David, 2010).  
David argued further that the measures that lead to clean government in Hong 
Kong are different from those that contribute to its maintenance. In this effort, David 
challenged an over concentration of policy on formal structures of clean governance, 
while the actual process of changing the culture of corruption, which is changing the 
political culture is being overlooked. In the case of Hong Kong, David discovered that the 
country had failed to combat corruption before the mid-1970s through functional 
measures that were designed by legislature. However, the irresolvable situation started to 
change in the mid-1970s when the government started seeing the importance of initiating 
the programs and campaigns strategy, which took off with the creation of the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) as of February 1974 (David, 2010).  
Although ICAC was seen as the main structure behind the eradication of 
corruption in Hong Kong, David (2010) argued that the “granting of amnesty on a 
collective basis to members of the Royal Police force in 1977 is what actually paved the 
way to the ICAC’s success” (p. 396). This program parallels the position taken by the 
Cameroonian legislature in December 2011, holding that charges against individuals 
found guilty of corruption would be dropped if these individuals would return the funds 
to the government (Houmfa, 2012). This approach appears tactful in policymaking. 
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However, it creates negative results, where public officials proactively embezzle more 
government funds with the hope of investing ill-gotten capital, paying back the principal 
if incidentally caught but keeping proceeds for their private enrichment.  
To strengthen anticorruption programs, Spector (2016) in a study conducted with 
implications for Vietnam, put forth the role of a cost-benefit approach in encouraging a 
government to set out for effective anticorruption policy planning and action. In this 
approach that tend to perceive anticorruption strategy and practice different from the 
traditional perception, author argued that stronger anticorruption initiatives are more 
beneficial than institutional structures aimed at fighting corruption. Accordingly, Spector 
held that instead of focusing on negative consequences of corruption, countries should 
focus on the potential benefits of anticorruption. That the discussion needs to change 
from the notion that if you act (anticorruption wise) your government will avert that or 
this particular amount or level of harm, to the perception that if you act (anticorruption 
wise) your government will benefit in the following ways. This shifting of anticorruption 
practice from how to fight corruption to how anticorruption can benefit the government 
and the society at large, could give actors a different kind of motivation to commit to 
anticorruption practices in societies where corruption is almost normalized, like in 
Cameroon.  
The emphasis on anticorruption programs and campaigns are seen in the 
preceding studies, especially for the fact that the information pressure exerted by this 
strategy on the masses and the corporate society in general is the first step that 
governments should consider in order to change a corrupt political culture and set the 
pace for maintenance through structural reforms. The effectiveness of campaigns and 
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programs also depend on the strength of supporting institutions and structures. Thus, one 
would reiterate, as it is the argument in this study that anticorruption strategies are 
interwoven. Seemingly, placing emphasis on some strategies at the expense of others can 
create imbalance and dysfunction. Therefore, starting with public sensitization campaigns 
and educative programs within the public system, the governments of corrupt societies 
must also preview long lasting structural reforms designed to curb and discourage 
corruption at all levels of the society. 
Standards for Public Performance and Integrity 
This anticorruption strategy directly implicates the public administration in place, 
touching the core systematic values that define the structural and functional outlook of 
the government. Corporations usually adopt standards for integrity in business 
reminiscent of what the government does. A corrupt government therefore corrupts the 
entire economy. The study conducted by Desta (2006) examined certain strategies that 
concisely define structural and functional anticorruption reforms. These strategies were 
grouped into four broad categories, including, “economic/market reforms, 
administrative/bureaucratic reforms, accountability/transparency enhancing reforms, and 
political accountability enhancing reforms” (Desta 2006). This categorization enables the 
government to focus its anticorruption strategies based on needs within particular sectors 
of the government. And this is what makes policy implementation effective.  
In the case of Croatia, anticorruption efforts were guided by the “formulation of a 
comprehensive anticorruption code that would eliminate the dispersion of anticorruption 
legislation in numerous acts and redundancy that obfuscated the action of political actors 
in combating corruption” (Grubiša, 2011, p. 69). In the case of Cameroon, Nguemegne 
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(2011) evoked structural and functional anticorruption reforms that focused on 
administrative organization, constitutional provisions, intervention of international 
conventions, and the creation of specialized institutions, even though they did not create 
any considerable success in the fight against corruption in the country. It has not been too 
long a time since Nguemegne conducted the study in Cameroon. Thus, the situation 
might likely be the same presently, or even if changes have occurred, they may be of 
minute significance. 
Research shows that although diverse approaches reflect a government’s strategy 
in combating corruption, the uniqueness of system reforms in different countries fighting 
corruption are usually defined within the scope of standards for performance and integrity 
Grubiša (2011). In addition, institutions participate in a partial manner in the formulation 
process of the anticorruption policy in most developing countries. Grubiša  reiterated that 
the core policy making usually depends mostly on the decision of the head of state, thus, 
real transition into democracy has to be achieved for countries such as Cameroon to 
exhibit this pattern of formulating anticorruption policies. Lack of administrative 
participation in anticorruption policymaking is the reason why the implementation and 
monitoring process of such policy usually becomes ineffective in these countries. 
Grubiša pointed out that corruption is one of the pathologies in democratic 
politics, meanwhile totalitarian political systems are corruptive by definition because the 
misuse of power is built in the very foundations of arbitrary power. Six categories of 
pathologies of democracy listed by the author included, “political demagogy, political 
hypocrisy, political manipulation, political corruption, political paranoia, and political 
violence” (pp. 70-71). The author pointed out that this situation was prevalent in Central 
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Eastern Europe after 1989 following the collapse of the soviet communist system and its 
Easter European variants. According to the author, the above-mentioned forms of 
pathologies attracted much attention in Croatia at that time, because they became a 
measure of democracy in a country that is new to democratic policies or a country 
transitioning into democracy (Grubiša, 2011). The country was transitioning from a 
communist auto-centric system unto a democratic and more liberal system. Croatia had to 
take into consideration these dynamics, in order to set an anticorruption machine that 
could work. 
Grubiša also identified six main causes of corruption in Croatia, which included 
the existence of the old communist mentality system and traditional corruption culture; 
the influence of the 1990s Balkan Wars; non-transparent privatization process of state-
owned enterprises; nationalist revolution; massive bureaucracy founded on spoil system; 
and hyper-normativism or super-centralization and concentration of government, (pp. 76-
78). 
In the case of Cameroon, Tiky VI (2010) discussed the three main causes for the 
high level of corruption in the country. First, the author identified infancy of institutions 
that reflect the slow modernization, and in turn, the colonial past of the country. Second, 
Tiky VI discussed the willingness of local elites to loot the country’s resources after 
independence, and third, the extractive economic policies and the collusion between the 
country’s elites and their foreign patrons (p. 58). To these three causes, one can also add 
four other causes said to be the main causes responsible for corruption in developing 
countries, especially African countries. These include, “ethnic fragmentations, 
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persistence of traditional values, weak institutions, and low social capital” (Tiky VI, 
2010, p. 55). 
To exemplify some of the preceding ideas, Tiky VI documented a case whereby 
the civil servant in traditional African setting is compelled to share his or her fortune with 
relatives. In case the former’s salary is not enough to meet these obligations, thoughts of 
corruption to get sufficient means will begin to spring up (Harsch, 1993, Cited in Tiky 
VI, 2010, p. 55). This describes how traditional value can create grounds for behavioral 
traits that end up in corrupt practices when exercised in a modern market-oriented 
societal setting. African countries need to start facing these realities in order to 
successfully curb the corruption cankerworm that is eating them up daily.  
In an extension of the discussion on the causes of corruption, the demands to 
mention the existence of different theoretical dimensions on this subject seemed eminent, 
considering the fact that the solution to the problem (which is the focus of this study) 
cannot be understood without a full capture of the nature of the problem. Corruption 
fighters should have knowledge of the broad base of theories that describe why people 
and nations get involved in corruption in the first place. The main theories discussed in 
corruption literature include: historical and cultural theories (colonialism and inherited 
traditional values); economic theories (for example, rent-seeking and natural resources 
transactions, and cost-benefit analyses); institutional theories (the nature of governing 
institutions); agency theories (individual-bureaucrat client-principal relationships); and 
development theories (human development dynamics) (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2008, pp. 
249-250; Sims, Gong, & Ruppel, 2012). To these five approaches, it is good to add a 
moralistic or spiritual tendency that is based on the assumption that naturally, people are 
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corrupt due to the sinful nature inherent in humankind, and this is where moral 
philosophers and religious authors make their entry into the discussion on corruption 
(Gouinlock, 1994). 
Human development is the rational perspective held to be at the center of the 
discussion on the causes of corruption (Sims, Gong, & Ruppel, 2012). Thus, this study 
suggests that human development should be the most objective factor examined by those 
who make efforts to combat corruption in the countries infected by this peril. In a 
contingency theory of corruption conducted in 2012, Sims et al. collected data from 68 
countries, accounting for 80% of the world’s population. Through this study, the 
researchers discovered that there was a major effect of human development on 
corruption. In the study, one of the fundamental postulations of the contingency theory is 
described, whereby the theory argues, “the effectiveness of a solution depends on the 
conditions under which the solution is implemented” (Galbraith as cited in Sims, Gong, 
& Ruppel, 2012, p. 90).  
Treating corruption in Cameroon and in other developing countries with the same 
predicaments as a matter of contingency, as discussed by the preceding authors, would 
lead to the concept of contextualization, which is the theoretical nexus of this study. 
Contingency analyses would allow for a holistic assessment of the battle against 
corruption in Cameroon, and it is these types of approaches that can lead to the discovery 
of specifics that can in turn engender greater impact overall on reducing corruption. Sims, 
Gong, and Ruppel, (2012) discussed that linking contingency to human development is 
an emergent widespread corruption situation. In such a situation, people tend to involve 
themselves in bribery and all other crooked behaviors because they focus on the social 
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benefits that they could have had access to by nature and by right. However, because of 
underdevelopment of different dimensions and magnitudes, they are unable to access 
these benefits freely and fairly. This is the nature of the predicaments of most African 
countries, especially the countries of the CEMAC zone (“Communauté Économique et 
Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale” in French) or (“the Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa” in English).  
CEMAC is a regional development bloc of Central African states, created on 
March 16, 1994 in N’djamena, Chad and consisting of five other countries—Cameroon, 
Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and the Central African Republic. CEMAC’s mission 
is to promote the harmonious development of member states within the framework of 
establishing a common market (CEMAC, n.d). Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) scores and rankings for these countries indicate close similar 
trends in the perception of corruption in these societies. CPI for Cameroon from 1995 
which is when the program was first launched to the most recent publication in 2017 is 
shown on a list of tables under appendix A below. Looking at table 1 on that list, one can 
notice corruption perception trends for the country for the past 22 years. This is a picture 
of what is happening in the region. Cameroon as a leading member of this confederation 
can steer the dynamics of the combat against corruption in the entire region.  
Comparatively, looking at the causes of corruption in the case of Croatia 
discussed above and in the case of Cameroon, one would notice that some causes should 
be generalized, while some are specific. Massive bureaucracy founded on a centralized 
and spoiled system was a problem in Croatia’s case (Grubiša, 2011), and it is the same 
for Cameroon—weak institutions that permit autocratic forms of leadership (Tiky VI, 
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2010). However, there’s a specific situation of the effects of the Balkan Wars on 
corruption in Croatia (Grubiša, 2011), and in Cameroon, the extraction of natural 
resources stands out as a specific cause of corruption for the country in contrast to the 
preceding case (Tiky VI, 2010). This analogy is aimed at distinguishing causes of 
corruption and thereby suggesting that approaches for combat should also be made 
specific (or contextualized) when facing specific factors. If the causes of corruption can 
be understood at a general level, as well as at a specific level, the solutions should also 
follow such trail, while doors are kept open for possibilities of “adaptation” of solutions, 
a notion that is also paramount in the conceptualization of this study. The solutions to 
Croatia’s corruption problem started with the passage of the “National Program for the 
Fight against Corruption” in Croatia in 2002, and fully adopted in 2006 by the Croatian 
parliament, an action that is marked as the beginning point of the combat against 
corruption in Croatia Grubiša (2011). Grubiša also saw the intervention of the European 
Commission’s report and recommendations beginning 2001 concerning corruption in 
Croatia as another major turning point in the fight against corruption in the country. 
Strategies undertaken by Croatia since then culminated in a “revised action plan” 
approved on March 18, 2010, by which an announcement was made by the Prime 
Minister, Kosor, for a “general zero-rate tolerance of corruption” in Croatia (Grubiša, 
2011, p. 80). 
The five thematic areas identified by Grubiša as Croatia’s strategic vision for 
fighting corruption included the following: a) government focus on legal and institutional 
framework of the country, b) prevention of corruption, c) legal prosecution and 
sanctioning corruption, d) international cooperation, and e) dissemination of public 
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awareness on the damaging effects and harmfulness of corruption (p. 80). Amongst these 
strategies, structural and functional administrative reforms that could be identified 
included the monitoring measure, and the conditionality rule that the European Union 
(EU) made requisite for Croatia and other countries of the Balkans, for their accession 
into the EU. Monitoring is effectuated with cooperation and verification. Government 
agencies can implement these strategies amongst themselves.  
In another study, Lessmann and Markwardt (2010) examined the impact and 
usefulness of monitoring in government as a tool to combat corruption. The authors 
found out that monitoring is made more enforceable when there is free press, and that this 
is necessary for the success of a decentralized system of government, which is held as a 
proper governing mechanism that discourages corruption (Lessmann & Markwardt, 
2010).  
The dynamics of structural and functional reforms in fighting corruption were 
also examined in the work of Nguemegne (2011) on Cameroon. In that study, 
Nguemegne documented anticorruption efforts in Cameroon, stating how the country’s 
anticorruption system has failed due to “the numerous structural and functional 
weaknesses” associated with the system (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 83). Some of the major 
structural and functional reforms identified by the author included: “administrative 
regulations, ad hoc committees, and specialized bureaucracy” (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 84). 
Nguemegne discovered that corruption remained pervasive in the country, despite the 




Nguemegne also documented the abovementioned reforms, and for administrative 
regulations, author mentioned “bureaucratic hierarchy and administrative oversight” 
(Nguemegne, 2011, p. 86). This strategy encourages a “rigidly centralized and 
cumbersome administrative hierarchy that is supposed to shield the Cameroonian 
government from corruption” (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 86). Nguemegne also stated that the 
bureaucratic hierarchy and administrative oversight strategy attribute an organizational 
status to the state, fostering “public-private dichotomy rule, which implies that the public 
administrator’s bureau is separate from his/her private domicile (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 
86). 
Government regulations enforcing the public-private dichotomy rule were traced 
by Nguemegne beginning from a 1974 decree, amended by Decree No. 94/199 of 
October 7, 1994, right up to the Decree of October 12, 2000, amending the 1994 decree 
(pp. 86-87). According to Nguemegne, Article 37 of the 2000 Regulation “clearly 
prohibits ‘functionaries’ (civil servants) from getting involved in any lucrative private 
activity or business” (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 87). This is also considered a regulatory 
effort aimed at balancing “bureaucratic paradigm with democratic accountability” 
(Nguemegne, 2011, p. 87). The 1996 amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Cameroon also constituted one of the regulations identified by author for the same 
purpose (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 87). According to Nguemegne, the preamble of the 
constitution states that public interest should not be violated by the exercise of the right 
of private ownership by all citizens (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 87). The same constitution 
also states the incompatibility of certain top-ranking public offices with other positions 
(Nguemegne, 2011, p. 88). 
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The notion of integrity can sometimes be theoretically distinguished from strict 
ethical standards and enforced by regulation as pointed out by Miller (2010). However, 
the notions of ethics and integrity are held from a holistic perspective in this study, and 
the emphasis on integrity is an attempt to get government officials to practice more ethics 
without having to comply with several complex codes of conduct. Rather, integrity 
systems introduce the informal dimension of ethical practice, which actually produces 
greater results when successfully implemented, according to Miller. To understand this 
dimension, Miller defines an integrity system as “an assemblage of institutional entities, 
mechanisms, and procedures whose purpose is to ensure compliance with minimum 
ethical standards and to promote the pursuit of ethical ideals” (Miller, 2010, p. 241). 
Organizational integrity is paramount to the organization’s success, and this is a strong 
tool that governments fighting corruption must build for their system if they desire 
positive and long-lasting results. 
Specialized bureaucracies in Cameroon constituted the third strategy discussed by 
Nguemegne (2011) that falls within the scope of reforms that strictly have to do with 
changing the administrative practices of the country. Nguemegne reported the creation of 
three agency approaches: the “National Anticorruption Observatory” (NACO) in 1995, 
Anticorruption Units (ACUs) within different ministries in 1997, and the Superior State 
Audit (SSA) – an administrative audit institution that performs a function of oversight 
and investigation in Cameroon’s administration (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 96). The “National 
Agency for the Investigation of Financial Crimes (NAIFC) (ANIF in French) was created 
for the same goal in 2005, and NACC was created the following year (2006) to replace 
NACO (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 101). The preceding two organs are currently the main 
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institutions in charge of the day-to-day implementation of the government’s 
anticorruption policy in Cameroon. 
Nguemegne explained that the presence of these offices did not grant the 
government noticeable success in the fight against corruption. Rather, the institutions are 
said to have failed to meet up to the task due to reasons the author identified as lack of 
political will; poor administrative coordination and supervision of anticorruption 
mechanisms; failed legislative oversight; underpowered and dysfunctional judiciary; 
autocracy, non-merit system; state of impunity; media intimidation and crackdown; 
weakness of anticorruption bureaus; and the culture of corruption (Nguemegne, 2011, pp. 
102-114). 
Countries fighting corruption can design licit plans and strategies to ensure 
success of their efforts, however, lack of adaptation of strategies to the realities of the 
sociopolitical, economic, legal, and cultural dynamics of the said country hinder this 
fight. This dimension raises the notion of “contextualization” of anticorruption strategies, 
as the core argument of this study. Nguemegne (2011) did not examine detailed aspects 
of the contextualization perspective in the study conducted on Cameroon. In this study, I  
sought to look into such weaknesses with hopes of reducing the gap as much as possible, 
especially in the theoretical construct of anticorruption practice in Cameroon.  
Open Government Strategy 
McDermott (2010) studied the elements of structural and functional 
administrative reform in the “open government” strategy by studying President Obama’s 
memorandum on transparency and open government, issued on his very first complete 
day in office (McDermott, 2010, p. 401). McDermott documented an open government 
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reform as a system made up of “transparency, public participation, and collaboration” 
(p.401). According to McDermott, such reform emphasizes a transparent government, a 
participatory government, and a collaborative government. The open government plan 
was designed to impact all government agencies of the United States, while the task of 
guiding the policy was made a responsibility of the “Office of Management and Budget” 
(OMB) (McDermott, 2010, p. 402). McDermott also reported that the open government 
policy was executed with the help of two instruments—the initialization of an “open 
government directive and plans” (McDermott, 2010, p. 402), and the ratification of 
certain “laws and regulations underpinning open government” (McDermott, 2010, p. 
404). 
The open government directives and plans stipulated the following:  
1. Outlining agency responsibilities,  
2. Creation and institutionalization of a culture of open government,  
3. Requiring components of the open government plans developed by 
agencies,  
4. Fostering transparency through a strategic and detail plan that invigorates 
and guides the agencies into using technology to make agencies’ 
information available to the public,  
5. Increasing public participation in government, increasing collaboration in 
government by revising practices within each agency to “further 
cooperation with other federal and non-federal agencies, the public, and 
nonprofit and private entities”,  
6. Strengthening a “flagship initiative for transparency”, and  
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7. Instituting an outside evaluation that required “OpenTheGovernment.org” 
to evaluate open government plans of these agencies. (McDermott, 2010, 
p. 403-404) 
According to McDermott, the laws and regulations underpinning open 
government, include the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1980, the 1995 PRA 
reauthorization, the 1985 Circular A-130 implementing the Paperwork Reduction Act, 
and the 1994 Circular A-130 that significantly changed information policy and practices 
across the executive branch. Others include the E-government Acts of 2001 and 2002, the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and its amendments–original in 1966, and 
amendments in (1974, 1976, 1978, 1978, 1984, 1986, and 1996), the Open Government 
Act of 2007 and reiteration in 2009 by President Obama (McDermott, 2010, pp. 404-
412). Open government can significantly be explained within the scope of the 
understanding of the concept of “E-government,” which is currently a strong reformative 
tool in the hands of administrations fighting corruption. Most developing countries are 
still lacking the kind of technological manpower and institutionalization that can render 
e-government effective in their administrations (Dada, 2006; Heeks, 2002; and Ndou, 
2004). 
Continuing the discussion on the e-government concept as a significant 
administrative reform for anticorruption practice, Singh, Pathak, Naz, and Belwal’s 
(2010) study on India, Ethiopia, and Fiji discussed the concept comprehensively, 
including how it relates to anticorruption. The study was conceived with the aim of 
examining and analyzing e-government applications in developing countries, and how 
they can contribute to the improvement of governance and combating corruption. 
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Employing a mixed method research approach, Singh et al. conducted a survey targeting 
“over 918 citizens in India, Ethiopia, and Fiji, using convenience random sampling with a 
structured questionnaire” (Singh, Pathak, Naz, & Belwal’s, 2010, p. 254). In the study, 
Singh et al. demonstrated that many potential benefits of e-governance remained 
unexploited by developing countries, due to non-exploitation of what? They concluded 
that benefits of e-government were the same for both developed and developing 
countries, even though the latter was said to still have the need of increasing its usage of 
this method of governance.  
Singh et al. (2010) recommended that communication technology should be 
integrated in development agendas of the countries studied. They discovered that e-
government significantly contributed to the reduction of corruption in the countries 
studied, even though e-governance systems remained underused. Other studies held that 
the reasons for this limited usage included lack of financial means, technology 
underdevelopment, managerial shortcomings, and constitutional hindrances (Basu, 2004; 
Wagner, Cheung, Lee & Ip, 2003; Yildiz, 2007). 
The last administrative reform strategy for anticorruption practice reviewed in this 
study is the setting of ‘ethical codes’ that would guide civic, moral, and corporate 
behavior and responsibility, and ensure overall transparency, accountability, and integrity 
in the functioning of the government system of the country combating corruption. The 
works of Veil (2008), Corvellec and Macheridis (2010), de Arruda (2009), Karren and 
Zacharias (2007), and Mutula and Wamukoya (2009) were reviewed for detail 
examination and further illustration of the preceding strategy.  
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Veil (2008) analyzed public service practice in the United States, especially 
during emergency management situations, with the focus to demonstrate “how 
community partnerships and civic responsibility can improve community resilience” 
(Veil, 2008, p. 387). The enforcement of civic responsibility would improve government, 
even in the case of fighting corruption. Veil explained that civic responsibility is 
paramount to the success of democracy. Responsibility is often shown through voting, 
paying taxes, serving jury duty, and volunteering (Veil, 2008). Adopting an 
anticorruption culture is both a public and a civic responsibility. Even though Veil 
discovered that the “community partnerships” discussed in the study demonstrated that 
engagement and civic responsibility can improve community resilience and government, 
the society sometimes tends to show complacency in this area.  
Civic responsibility has generally been defined across social sciences as a 
behavior guided by social awareness, and thus it would incorporate all moral, ethical, and 
other sociopolitical values held and practiced by a given society (Ecklund, 2005; da 
Silva, Sanson, Smart, & Toumbourou, 2004). But bringing the community of people to 
act civilly is a difficult task, because laws that guide human behavior in society have their 
own shortcomings as well as the humans themselves. It is therefore no surprise to notice 
that societies that exercise greater civic responsibility tend to be less corrupt than those 
with less or no attention paid to civility.   
Close to the concept of civic responsibility is that of morality or moral 
responsibility. To combat corruption in a society, that society must exercise a certain 
level of moral awareness that rebuffs acts of corruption. While Corvellec and Macheridis 
(2010) examined the moral responsibility of “project selectors” in Swedish society, they 
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discussed the need for managers to be morally responsible for their choices during the 
process of project selection. The authors defined responsibility as a combination of 
“attributability—what choices the project manager can ultimately be praised or blamed 
for, and of accountability—what choices the project manager has to be prepared to 
answer for” (Corvellec & Macheridis, 2010, p. 212).  
Therefore, the morality of project selection goes beyond identifying the best 
possible project (s) for the parent organization. Selectors have a moral responsibility to 
design and manage a selection process that combines, in its various stages, openness with 
correctness and integrity (Corvellec & Macheridis, 2010, p. 218). Corvellec and 
Macheridis also reported that managers found it problematic to meet the demands of a 
“formalized view of responsibility” (p. 217), and they concluded that, public and private 
organizations alike subject managers to structural constraints and reduce managers’ 
responsibilities to make decisions and act in ways that systematically comply with their 
individual, moral judgments.  
A full template of managerial responsibility should therefore pay a more 
perceptive consideration, for example, to goal ambiguities, power games, hidden 
agendas, absurd routines, and other culturally determined behaviors, together with legal 
requirements, performance imperatives, the incentive system, moral support structures, 
the organizational ethical history, and the nature of the competition. (Corvellec & 
Macheridis, 2010, p. 217). These administrative practices should be integrated in 
governments having the desire of improving performance and eradicating corruption.  
Great philosophers such as Kant, Dewey, and Dostoevsky in their writings, have 
supported morality in government and within the general population as part of the solid 
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basis for building successful societies having to struggle less with ills such as corruption. 
Although social science research sometimes tends to deemphasize morality as a 
fundamental aspect of governance, classical philosophers did not ignore the significance 
of this concept in the relationship between the governors and the governed.  
Kant established morality on “the good will” (Kant, 1785/1964, p. 17). According 
to Kant, “the only thing that is good without qualification or restriction is goodwill. That 
is to say, a good will alone is good in all circumstances and in that sense, it is an absolute 
or unconditioned good” (Kant, 1785/1964, p. 17). The extension of this foundation of 
governance is seen in “the good will and duty, the motive of duty, the formal principle of 
duty, reverence for the law, the categorical imperative, ordinary practical reason, and the 
need for philosophy” (Kant, 1785/1964, pp. 19-23).  
Dostoevsky founded morality on God and the different existential stances of 
human nature, thus criticizing the Russian reformers for “renouncing Christ, and putting 
themselves in the place of God, and in doing so, they succeeded in undermining the 
people’s faith and capacity for love” (Guignon, 1993, p. xvi). Dewey’s own opinion of 
morality was based on the “instrumentalities of thought and conduct which have the most 
significant bearing on the quality of human life” (Gouinlock, 1994, p. xxi). Dewey’s 
process of inquiry was fundamentally “naturalistic,” seeing man as he is and as he 
interacts with the cosmos. Ethical behavior, be it at the individual or corporate level finds 
its roots in the writings of these philosophers, and such precedents apply to contemporary 
societal behavior. 
Moving to the discussion on structural and functional administrative reform 
strategies, explained within the framework of standards for public integrity, the works of 
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Mutula and Wamukoya (2009) and Karren and Zacharias (2007) provided the basis for 
examining this concept of integrity, as practiced by government and the corporate world. 
Mutula and Wamukoya examined the role played by information management in 
enhancing democracy, transparency, accountability, and integrity in government for 
governments in East and Southern Africa.  
It is also important that information custody of government is not only available, 
but also availed to the public. Therefore, the onus is on governments to put in place 
effective national and institutional frameworks including adequate capacity to harness, 
facilitate, and enhance information capture, organizational maintenance, and usage. With 
this, Mutula and Wamukoya (2009) argued that citizens and civil society organizations 
would be able to access and use such framework to monitor the public in the areas of 
administrative efficiency and effectiveness in achieving stated public service objective 
and target. 
In another study, Karren and Zacharias (2007) examined the critical application of 
integrity requirements in the business world. The researchers discovered that many 
employers in the United States made use of “paper- and- pencil integrity and personality 
tests to weed out dishonest, or otherwise suspicious protective employees from their labor 
pools” (p. 221). However, such approach has never been very effective, as advocates of 
integrity tests may significantly underestimate the number of false positives, which is the 
number of honest applicants being labeled as dishonest (Mutula & Wamukoya, 2009, p. 
222). This reveals some of the shortcomings of integrity testing. 
In the same light, governments usually use integrity-screening techniques to 
purify their employee pools. However, Karren and Zacharias (2007) argued that testing 
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for integrity is accompanied by weaknesses including “validity issues such as 
construction, confusion, false positive problem, faking issues centered around coaching 
and retaking tests, and privacy and fairness concerns” (Karren & Zacharias, 2007, pp. 
222-231). They also indicated that the dramatic increase in the use of paper-and-pencil 
tests was due to the passage of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA) of 1988, 
which “barred the use of polygraph or lie detector as pre-employment screening device” 
(Karren & Zacharias, 2007, p. 221). 
Testing for integrity is not common in developing countries as it is for developed 
countries. Although Karren and Zacharias critically examined the weaknesses associated 
with this activity, they do not rule out its importance in the improvement of the jobsite 
and consequently reducing the grounds for corruption and other work-related 
malpractices. They provide certain recommendations as to how the testing could be 
improved. These include, reducing the failures of the test, creating tests using the 
construct-oriented approach, balancing expectations of privacy against employers’ needs 
to know further research on intercultural and international differences in attitudes toward 
privacy and fairness of integrity testing, and researching other selection methods and 
management practices to screen theft (Karren & Zacharias, 2007, pp. 231-232). 
Barry and Stephens (1998) conceptualized the definition of integrity in an 
organization in terms of correspondence between values and behavior, giving the subject 
a morally neutral approach. Accordingly, they challenge the position held by 
fundamentalists such as Ayn Rand, according to whom integrity is a morally justifiable 
system of values and related to what constitutes “an appropriate set or system of ethical 
principles” (as cited in Barry & Stephens, 1998, p. 163). Alexander (2010) framed 
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integrity within the context of oligarchic fluxing shadows, which explains visibility in 
public affairs as an illusionary flux for the invisible (p. 503). Thus, system integrity 
depends on the ethical values set in place by the organization practicing such values. 
Integrity is perceived morally and ethically, justified more appropriately when 
distinguished to address different situations, circumstances, and organizational settings.  
Barry and Stephens (1998) reported that the development of integrity systems 
within governments is one of the most effective efforts for combating corruption in 
corrupt governments and societies. In addition, Alexander (2010) showed that developing 
countries have yet to adopt and make advancements in fighting corruption and using all 
pilot weapons for combating corruption for all societies. Alexander added that 
governments should ensure the formulation and coordination of all the strategies in legal 
terms and provide a framework for materializing every vision that leadership and society 
might conceive as to how corruption should be combated in the given country or society. 
Most researchers that have explored the nature of the policy instrument 
constituting literature that explains the two strategic dimensions of the anti-corruption 
policy instruments, which are anticorruption programs and campaigns (transformative 
information), and standards for public performance and integrity (structural and 
functional reforms) within the administration (Southeast European Legal Development 
Initiative, & Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002) have tend to propose more of 
curative measures to the problem of corruption. A more recent study conducted by 
Fedran, Dobovšek, Ažman, and Bren, (2018) on Slovenia, tends to explore a new 
dimension by which anticorruption measures should be given a preventive focus instead 
of a curative perception and concentration.  
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In discussing ‘integrity plan’ as a preventive measure or tool against corruption, 
Fedran et al. argued that effective anticorruption approaches should not focus only on 
making government work better but should also endeavor to make the people more 
honest. They proposed that each government sector should have an integrity plan and 
custodians of such plans. According to authors, prevention is not very popular in curbing 
corruption by government because it is longtime previewed (Fedran, Dobovšek, Ažman, 
& Bren, 2018), however, this is another innovative perspective by which anticorruption 
policies could be pursued. 
In the effort to reduce, prevent, and if possible eradicate corruption in 
governments, and consequently society using public policy and administration as a 
weapon, governments usually pay attention to topics such as sensitization and awareness 
campaigns, national anticorruption programs, accountability, transparency, public 
responsibility and performance, ethical and moral codes, collaboration, cooperation, 
public participation, and system integrity (Southeast European Legal Development 
Initiative, & Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002). This list might not be exhaustive 
as to what governments would put into place in terms of policy to curb corruption in a 
given society, but it covers the fundamental policy strategies exposed in contemporary 
anticorruption literature.  
The Legal Instrument 
The legal instrument is comprised of all strategies implemented by the 
government within the framework of the law to combat corruption. These strategies span 
from punitive measures taken by the courts and the administration to sanction acts of 




The anticorruption punitive strategy incorporates the law enforcing sanctions by 
courts and the administrations. This involves, in one way or the other, all the three 
branches of government (executive, judiciary, and legislative). Administrative sanctions 
need legal backing from the legislator and interpretation and custody from the judiciary. 
The legislator needs administrative public policy proposals to make effective laws and 
needs feedback from the judiciary to correct nuances in the laws found difficult to 
interpret. The judiciary needs administrative institutions and oversight for the 
enforcement, management, and coordination of the sanctions pronounced by the courts, 
and needs legal backing from the legislature. Punitive sanctions against corrupt acts 
usually include dismissals from office, imprisonment, suspensions, fines, and other forms 
of penalties. The application of this measure was examined through the works of Eliason 
(2009), White (2010), Kubiciel (2009), Peci and Sikkema (2010), Nasrawin (2010), and 
Majila, Taylor, and Raga (2014). 
Eliason (2009) discussed the federal criminal law prohibiting bribery and 
gratuities, as part of an intricate web of laws and regulations governing the behavior of 
federal officials. Eliason reveals that the law sanctioning corruption in the United States 
witnessed complex interpretations and applications at the time the study was conducted 
(p. 929). Eliason explained this intricacy of the law stating that, court decisions over the 
past decade have narrowly construed the bribery and gratuities law, making prosecution 
under that statute more difficult and giving prosecutors of federal corruption an incentive 
to look for alternative legal theories. Honest service fraud, traditionally used to fight state 
and local corruption, has stepped into the breach and increasingly appears in federal 
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corruption cases. But this trend threatens to upset the balance struck in the law between 
corruption criminal behavior by federal officials and behavior that may be unseemly or 
unethical but falls short of being criminal. (Eliason, 2009, p. 929)         
According to the author, honest service standards did not provide government 
officials or the public with adequate notice about the requirements of criminal law 
(Eliason, 2009). On the other hand, the author documented that “potential penalties vastly 
exceeded the penalties for gratuities or other lesser misconduct that may be repackaged as 
honest service fraud” (p. 929). As a remedy to this problem, Eliason proposed an 
amendment of the federal gratuities statute, and that a statutory definition of honest 
service fraud should be enacted. 
Interpreting acts of corruption and attributing them the appropriate sanctions can 
sometimes raise issues of clarity of the law, especially when administrative errors occur. 
However, criminal laws on corruption and their acute interpretation occupy an important 
place in government’s effort toward the combat against corruption. This is the first step in 
the application of punitive measures against corruption. The centerpiece of the law 
punishing corruption in the United States is 18 U.S.C § 201, Bribery of Public Officials 
and Witnesses.  
Courts usually also develop and use other prosecution theories, like the honest 
service fraud that was developed out of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes and 
became the leading prosecution instrument for corruption in the United States, touching 
even state and local officials that were not mentioned in the provisions of 18 U.S.C § 201 
(Eliason, 2009, p. 952). The first law punishes bribery and gratuities involving federal 
officials, while the second (honest service fraud) “charge state and local corruption, as a 
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scheme to defraud citizens and taxpayers of their intangible right to the fair and honest 
services of the government official, using the federal mail and wire fraud statutes” 
(Eliason, 2009, p. 952). 
The complexities raised in the preceding study, indicating the intricate nature of 
laws on corruption in a developed world country like the United States, reveal how, even 
advanced democracies can still find it difficult to pinpoint what behavior of the public 
servant should be labeled corrupt and criminal. It is also difficult determining the gravity 
and appropriate penalties to be attributed to such acts. 
 Most developing countries that do not have sufficient structures and competent 
juridical frameworks would usually avoid taking the pain to detail the definition of acts of 
public corruption. Until a government official is embezzling huge sums of funds, a case 
of corruption would not be heard in these countries, even though daily kickbacks, petty 
bribes, and under-the-table gifts are ravaging the fabrics of meritocracy, justice, 
democracy, and overall economic prosperity of these countries. As Nguemegne (2011) 
wrote, “this is typical in the Cameroonian case, corruption has become over the years so 
rampant in Cameroon that one is afraid that a real culture of corruption entrenched in the 
fabric of the society exists in the country” (p. 114). Yet, most corruption suspects are 
seldom arrested and prosecuted, and in general, corrupt officials are more likely to be 
exempted from a court’s trial, all due to an underpowered and dysfunctional judiciary 
(Nguemegne, 2011, p. 105).  
In Kubiciel (2009), the researcher revealed criminal sanctions embedded in the 
United Nations’ Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003, which is the principal 
international law and organization that fights corruption universally. Just as in Eliason 
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(2009), Kubiciel classified the infraction of corruption into two categories including 
bribing public officials and actively bribing foreign public officials (Kubiciel, 2009, p. 
139). Kubiciel also defined bribery as the act of lending a benefit in order to affect a 
decision unduly. According to author, the definition for the term bribery is drawn from 
Article 15 of the UNCAC. The article also criminalizes individuals who promise or give 
an inducement directly or indirectly to a public official, in order for the public official to 
restrain from exercising his or her duties (Kubiciel, 2009, p. 142).  
Article 15 (b) also criminalizes passive bribery, which refer to public officials 
who solicits or accept a gift and in return, acts or refrain from acting in accordance with 
his/her official duties (Kubiciel, 2009, p. 142). Other international legal instruments with 
similar provisions include the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) convention on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, the Council of Europe (COE) 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, and the European Union Convention on the 
Fight against Corruption (Kubiciel, 2009, p. 142).  
In the African context, more legal instruments include the African Union 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003), and the South African 
Development Protocol Against Corruption (2001). Furthermore, Kubiciel’s study argued 
that the development of the UNCAC in 2003 took international legal development fight 
against corruption to its highest peak. Kubiciel added that a ‘legal transplant’ of these 
instruments alone cannot sufficiently cure the social disease of corruption at national 
levels because, in order to record a considerable amount of success, expertise of law-
makers, law enforcement agents, and courts has to be employed (Kubiciel, 2009, pp.154-
155). Even in the case of Cameroon, the difficulty to establish an independent judicial 
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body with the aptitude of interpreting and punishing corruption infractions is inherent, 
causing a major handicap to government’s efforts of fighting corruption in the country. 
Besides conventions, constitutional and legislative stipulations, and general 
administrative law, the general rule of law theory is in itself a major legal weapon that 
requires close attention in a study of this nature. The basic and shortest definition of the 
rule of law would be: respect for the law—a concept that different authors in the social 
science field have broadly defined (Bufford, 2007). However, this study holds the 
definition of Bufford, which adopts Justice Anthony Kennedy’s position in a 2006 
address at the annual meeting of the American Bar Association (ABA)” (Bufford, 2007, 
p. 2). According to this position, the rule of law states that:  
i. The law is superior to, and thus is binding to all government officials;  
ii. The law must respect and preserve the dignity, equality, and human rights of all 
persons. The law must establish and safeguard the constitutional structures 
necessary to build a free society in which all citizens have a meaningful voice in 
shaping and enacting rules that govern them.  
iii. The law must devise and maintain systems to advise all rights of persons, and it 
must empower them to fulfill expectations and seek redress of grievances without 
fear of penalty or retaliation (Bufford, 2007, p. 3).  
From the preceding principles, Bufford stated that the ABA drew a working 
definition for the rule of law, summarized as “a government where the law is superior to, 
and thus binds, the government and all its officials and citizens” (Bufford, 2007, p. 3). 
Bufford also argued that the importance of an independent judiciary in the administration 
of the rule of law contemplates such form of government in which the law will be 
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superior to all (Bufford, 2007, p. 3). White (2010) examined the dynamics surrounding 
the rule of law in the legal effort against corruption in some Central Asian and Eastern 
European countries. According to the author, international donor agencies and 
development banks invested millions in the various countries, beginning from the mid-
1990s, to reform their post-communist judiciaries. With the belief that democracy and 
economic growth are dependent on the rule of law, these agencies carried out 
enforcement of institutional reforms concomitant to the approach of institutional building 
of the judiciary, which was implemented in the West (White, 2010, pp. 307-308).  
White further argued that even though such approach concentrated on improving 
the resources of the judiciary, education and training, and promoting judicial 
independence will have the corollary effect of eradicating corruption and implanting the 
rule of law. It is however regrettable that such was not the case in Central Asia and not in 
Eastern Europe as well (White, 2010, p. 308). Suggestions consisted therefore of the use 
of the jury method in fostering the rule of law, because such method took into 
consideration the sociopolitical realities of each country (White, 2010, p. 309). Acts of 
corruption in each country, based on this proposal, would be examined and condemned in 
accordance with different intrinsic cultural and political values that are held in each 
country. Even so, this study argues that such position does not efface a universal 
similitude for the works of corruption and it has consequences on the prosperity of human 
societies. 
Bufford’s (2007) conclusion on the rule of law supports White’s (2010) argument, 
when he stated that the importance of the rule of law lies in the manner in which it is 
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viewed and practiced by each society, such that the concept appears indispensable for all 
societies, and inexcusably compelling for all democratic societies: 
The rule of law is the bedrock for building a structure of ordered liberty and 
progress in civil society. It provides the foundation for economic development, 
the protection of human rights, the provision of self-government, the prevention 
of crime and corruption, the promotion of basic identity, and the achievement of 
economic and social rights. At the same time, it is important to recognize that the 
rule of law is not an international or apolitical matrix that can be imposed on a 
particular culture in a particular country. Instead, the rule of law must be realized 
through each country’s distinctive political, cultural and historical institutions and 
traditions. In consequence, the particular realization of the rule of law varies from 
country to country, both in the developed world and in developing countries. 
(Bufford, 2007, p. 1) 
The preceding conclusions are some of the pertinent perspectives that corruption 
fighters in Cameroon and in other developing countries need to uphold in their efforts of 
reforming and making use of the judiciary as a successful weapon against corruption. The 
observations made by White (2010) on the case of Central Asian and Eastern European 
countries are similar to those prevailing in other developing countries. The importation of 
democratic practices has always faced the problem of either ‘adaption’ or ‘understanding’ 
in the recipient countries. That is why time, education, contextualization, and sometimes 
rigor are necessary for successful spread and establishment of democratic values and 
institutions in these societies. 
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The evidence and impact of the punitive legal instrument usually includes, fines, 
imprisonment, reprimand, suspension, dismissals, and in extreme cases, execution and 
forcing into exile. These occur when the said acts of corruption are associated with 
genocidal killings and political treason of high degree, particularly in emerging 
democracies. The recent sweeping crackdowns on dictatorial regimes in North Africa 
(including Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia) by the masses in 2011-2012 can be seen as an 
example of the extreme measures that can be taken to punish those involved in corruption 
and abuse of political power. 
In another study by Peci and Sikkema (2010), the cost of punitive anticorruption 
measures on culprits of corruption was examined in Netherlands (a consolidated 
democracy) and in Albania (a transitional democracy). The research focus was to find out 
how the rule of law worked in combating corruption in the different democratic 
experiences. In the study, both countries had a common source of international law—the 
European Union Criminal Law Convention on Corruption that influenced their criminal 
laws against corruption. As Peci and Sikkema explained, this commonality stemmed 
from the recommendation that was made by the Minister of Justice of the Council of 
Europe in 1994. The Minister said that corruption ought to be addressed at a European 
level, for nations in the economic block of the EU, due to globalization effects (Peci & 
Sikkema 2010, p. 101).  
Following the recommendation, the Group of States Against Corruption 
(GRECO) was set up in 1999, to improve the capacity of its members to fight corruption 
and ensure compliance with the anticorruption standards of European Council (Peci & 
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Sikkema, 2010, p. 101). This study suggests that such global approach can benefit 
regional economic blocks such as the CEMAC zone, with Cameroon as member country.  
In the case of Albania, Peci and Sikkema (2010) explained the incorporation of 
the provisions of the Criminal Law Convention for the European Union in the Albania 
Criminal Code (ACC) as of July 2002. The authors stated clearly the definitions and 
offences of corruption, and attributed clear, concise, and appropriate penalties for them 
(Peci & Sikkema, 2010, p. 107). Penalties prescribed by some of the articles in the ACC 
include imprisonment and fines—some of the common criminal penalties that are 
applicable worldwide, although the severity may vary from country to country. The 
definition of passive corruption offense by public officials and the punishment attributed 
to it is stipulated in Articles 259, 260, and 319a of the ACC (Peci and Sikkema, 2010, p. 
108). Article 259, regarded as the general provision on corruption by public officials, 
stipulates the following definitions and sanctions: 
Soliciting or taking, directly or indirectly, by a person who exercises public 
functions, of any undue advantage or of any such promise for himself or for a 
third person, or accepting an offer or promise deriving from an undue advantage, 
in order to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his duty or function, is 
punished with a prison term of two to eight years and with a fine of 500,000 to 1 
million Lekë. (Peci and Sikkema, 2010, p. 108) 
In furthering the discussion on the offenses and punishment of corruption, these 
researchers distinguished between type of perpetrator and the corresponding severity of 
penalty. Thus, senior public officials would suffer more severe punishments compared to 
regular civil servants. The case of the Dutch revealed the same use of the dynamics of 
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imprisonment and fines to punish the corrupt (Peci & Sikkema, 2010, p. 114). Their study 
indicates that countries and societies that are serious to curb and eradicate corruption in 
their governments and amongst their people, have made their anticorruption efforts part 
of the law, and have out rightly and concretely condemned acts of corruption in their 
criminal law provisions. 
 Due to lack of such rigorousness in developing countries, even if the law 
provisions are made available, the implementation always remains a nightmare. 
Corruption is punished in Article 134 of the Criminal Code of Cameroon (Nguemegne, 
2011, p. 96). Its provisions in Section 1, stipulate five to ten years imprisonment and a 
fine of 200,000 FCFA to 2 million FCFA for a public official or any functionary who, for 
himself or for a third party, solicits, accepts, or receives donations, gifts, promises, 
presents, for doing, not doing or adjourning an act of his duty (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 96). 
This punitive weapon to combat corruption is recognized by most societies, be it in the 
developed or developing world. This study suggests that the weakness of this tool might 
stem from its implementation and therefore countries such as Cameroon that are 
dedicated to the fight against corruption can focus on enhancing the institutions that will 
ensure the enforcement of the law against corruption. 
International laws dealing with corruption seem to have recorded greater success 
in Europe, especially because the transplantation of these laws in various EU member 
countries is being done in the framework of mature institutions and advanced 
collaborative politics. Participative countries in the EU block are ready to make 
meaningful reforms in order to meet the requirements stipulated by international 
conventions on corruption.  
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An example of such adjustments was examined in Nasrawin (2011) for the case of 
the United Kingdom (UK), where author explained that the UK needed to introduce a 
new statutory law to bring members of parliament within the scope of the criminal 
offense of corruption. Nasrawin also argued that this would also be necessary in order to 
meet Britain’s international obligations to combat corruption in the public sector 
(Nasrawin, 2011, p. 204). The adjustments affected the British law to as far back as the 
“Bill of Rights” of 1689 (Article 9 on parliamentary privileges), and the “Prevention of 
Corruption Acts of 1889-1916” (Nasrawin, 2011, p. 204). 
The rigorousness of the law and legal endeavors to combat corruption in the UK 
and the other countries in the EU block lacks in most developing countries which are 
struggling in this race. This is so, especially with the current financial missteps resulting 
from bad and corrupt decisions by public officials. Its achievements in combating 
widespread corruption in public service and society in general are far more substantial 
and effective compared to the latter, where setting the platform for real democracy to take 
off is still a major challenge to most of the countries. Nguemegne (2011) mentioned that 
a state of impunity existed and persisted in Cameroon as one of the main reasons why the 
country’s anticorruption machinery is not productive (p. 106). As such, the punitive 
anticorruption weapon remains strategic and significant in the combat against corruption 
ostensibly on paper. 
Lastly in another study by Majila, Taylor, and Raga (2014), authors identified 
legislation as a punitive tool for anticorruption practice with focus on legislative 
capability of anticorruption agencies. Authors asked the question whether these 
anticorruption agencies have enough political muscle or recognition to identify and 
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punish acts of corruption, or do they only concern themselves with responding to 
demands by international agreements such as those coming from UNCAC, the SADC 
protocol against corruption, and the African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption. The study which was conducted on anticorruption legislation in 
South Africa with focus on Cape Town, revealed that most often, as it is in other 
developing countries like Cameroon, anticorruption legislation is politicized, and 
anticorruption agencies are not given significant political leverage that can enable them to 
execute their functions as they should. Authors therefore argued that for anticorruption 
legislation to work as a legal instrument to combat corruption, it must be depoliticized, 
and the agencies granted independence to function.   
This section, containing the review of recent works written on the punitive legal 
instrument for anticorruption, has revealed that punitive measures against corruption vary 
from country to country in terms of the definition of the corruption infraction and the 
severity of the penalty attributed to the infraction. The two common criminal penalties 
seen include imprisonment and fines. Other administrative sanctions might include 
suspensions, dismissals, layoffs, reduction of pay, and other forms of reprimands. The 
punitive measure is an effective anticorruption weapon, especially with contemporary 
contributions from international law and collaborative legal frameworks. The literature 
also revealed that the main concern surrounding this weapon is the challenges it faces at 
the level of implementation, especially for developing countries that lack the necessary 
democratic platforms, sophisticated institutions, and effective procedures to implement 
this measure productively. This raises the issue of institutionalization, which is the 
subject of the next section. 
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Institutionalization of Anticorruption 
The main issue here is that of deciding which and how many authorities should 
take charge of the government’s anticorruption machinery, and which institutions should 
sanction corrupt acts and govern the anticorruption system, and how? For any 
anticorruption effort and strategy to become effective and produce long-lasting effects, 
the government must at a certain point make permanent law so as to turn the volume of 
their message high, to the hearing of all citizens that corruption is a crime that is 
punishable by the law as all other crimes. The literature in this section contains 
investigations and analyses recently conducted on the developments that have taken place 
and are still going on in the anticorruption discourse. 
Yusuf (2011) discussed institutionalizing anticorruption against the 
institutionalization of corruption. To institutionalize an anticorruption effort is to grant it 
the legal, administrative, and sociopolitical backing that it needs in order to successfully 
and legitimately install itself in the practices of the system of the country or society 
taking the initiative (Yusuf, 2011). As such, at the center of institutionalization is the rule 
of law. In connection with the rule of law, Yusuf investigated and analyzed the role of the 
judiciary as the overarching factor for institutionalizing anticorruption (Yusuf, 2011).  
Yusuf conducted the study on Nigeria, making provisions for the lessons to reflect 
the experiences of other developing countries, especially those of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
According to Yusuf, the volatility of anticorruption policy when it interacts with politics 
is a common phenomenon. This statement stemmed from the findings in the Nigerian 
case that revealed that political malpractices had meddled with the judiciary system of the 
country, rendering the judiciary corrupt itself and as such, could not meet its 
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responsibility toward enforcing anticorruption practices in the country, especially when 
public officials are involved (Yusuf, 2011). Yusuf documented such deplorable 
institutional state in the following statement, describing the corruption case of one 
Governor Ibori, and how the judiciary failed to provide the legal oversight that was 
needed to sanction the case and make it an example to the other top government officials. 
Furthermore, Yusuf concluded that pursuing social reforms through the agency of 
an unreformed institution, in this case, the judiciary, gives rise to trouble in many post 
authoritarian contexts. Moreover, that such tendencies result from “common mistrust of 
courts in post authoritarian transitions, mistrust arising from social misgivings regarding 
the complicity of these courts in past illiberal governance” (Yusuf, 2011, p. 82). 
Therefore, it can be argued as suggested in this study, that if the judiciary performs its 
role in the fight against corruption in such context (involving developing countries), it 
must be reformed alongside the reforms that these governments are making to ensure that 
corruption is checked. 
Apart from installing the appropriate judicial system that is apt, grants the 
necessary independence, and is ready to foster the government’s success in fighting 
against corruption, the institutionalization of anticorruption is also examined in terms of 
systemization of anticorruption strategies. Ionescu (2011) pinpointed this factor by 
stating that “anticorruption initiatives must be viewed in a systemic manner” (p. 118). In 
discussing the economic dynamics of anticorruption, Ionescu presented the importance of 
elements such as “networks, the culture of corruption, the economic cost of corruption 
and cost-benefit analyses of corruption/anticorruption, and the understanding of new 
models of corruption in developing strategies against corruption” (Ionesu, 2011, p. 116). 
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Systemic corruption refers to political or bureaucratic corruption, but within the 
government, it can be described as organized corruption (Alam, 1989; Delacote, 2008; 
and Philp, 1997). The chronic nature of systemic corruption makes it a pathology that 
necessitates intensive and quality treatment in order to increase the chances and the hope 
for the occurrence of healing. Such is the case of most transitional democracies of the 
developing world. It is as such, suggested in this study that in order to counteract 
systematic corruption, governments engaged in the fight against corruption must do so in 
a systematic manner. This is where the notion of ‘political will’ comes into play, and 
shall be discussed in the subsequent section. 
Another aspect of institutionalized anticorruption is culture. Culture is spoken of 
mostly in terms of the practice of corruption, but the anticorruption culture is a notion 
that should be instilled into the systems that are stricken with massive tolls of corruption 
cases and are making serious strides toward changing the status-quo. Barr and Serra 
(2010) conducted a study on corruption and culture with participants spanning across 
several countries. The study revealed that “corruption as being examined contemporarily 
is, in part a cultural phenomenon” (p. 21). The authors arrived at this conclusion by 
asking certain pertinent questions suggested in this study to represent some of the 
fundamental questions that should be asked when making findings into the nature, 
sources, and causes of corruption. In the same way, the anticorruption discourse must 
visit these roots in order to develop and prescribe appropriate curative and preventive 
measures, and if possible, develop or manufacture a vaccine for the corruption pathology.  
The questions Barr and Serra asked were summed up in the following sentences: 
why do some people choose corruption over honesty, while others do not? Is it only the 
73 
 
economic cost and benefit associated with a corrupt act that are important or do intrinsic 
motivations also play a determining role? (Barr & Serra, 2010, p. 3). 
They also found out in their study that culture, i.e., the “values and beliefs” 
transmitted from generation to generation in a given society through socialization, 
justified and guided the ways that social institutions function, their goals and modes of 
operation, with social actors drawing on them to select actions, evaluate people and 
events, and explain or justify their actions and evaluations (Barr & Serra, 2010). 
Therefore, this is one of the reasons why corruption is more persistent in certain countries 
than others. (Barr & Serra, 2010). If corruption is a cultural phenomenon as Barr and 
Serra concluded, this study suggests that anticorruption efforts should be fostered such 
that they become a cultural behavior so as to see corruption terminated or reduced in a 
permanent manner in the given society.  
Finally, setting aside independent anticorruption bodies to function as the 
principal government structure responsible for implementing public policy on the combat 
against corruption is a recent approach that most governments have put into place in their 
efforts to win the battle against corruption in their various countries and communities. In 
Cameroon, these bodies include the NACC, the “Ministry under the Presidency of the 
Republic in charge of Supreme State Audit,” and the “National Agency for the 
Investigation of Financial Crimes (NAIFC)” (Nguemegne 2011, p. 96, 101).  
NAIFC and NACC are currently the specialized bureaus assigned with the 
daunting task of stopping the pervasiveness of bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon 
(Nguemegne, 2011). Other government departments, programs, and movements of NGOs 
function as auxiliaries to the special bureaus. In Nigeria, the Independent Corrupt 
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Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and 
financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) are the special bureaus principally responsible for 
issues of corruption and combating it in the country (Yusuf, 2011, p. 58). The trend is the 
same for all countries adopting this approach of special agencies. Their appellations and 
constructions may likely differ from one country to another, but their principal mission 
remains the same—fight corruption with all might, power, and strength. 
Literature shows that the strategy of using special anticorruption bureaus has 
succeeded to some extent in combating corruption in several countries (David, 2010; 
Grubiša, 2011; Smilov, 2010). This has however worked only in those countries where 
the bureaus have appropriate expertise and sufficient recourses to carry on with the 
enormous task of combating corruption. Some examples of these include the “office of 
combating corruption and organize crime (USKOK)” in Croatia (Grubiša, 2011, p. 78), 
the “Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)” in Hong Kong (David, 2010, 
p. 396), the “State Agency for National Security (SANS)” in Bulgaria (Smilov, 2010, p. 
69), and the “Anticorruption Monotony Group (ACMG)” in Albania (Smilov, 2010, p. 
73). The preceding countries have witnessed large-scale reduction in the trend of 
corruption in their governments and societies in general thanks to the unrelenting efforts 
and hard work put forth by their respective special and independent agencies. 
Furthermore, some countries like Cameroon and other developing democracies of 
the Sub-Saharan Africa regions have adopted the strategy of maintaining independent and 
or special bureaus to combat corruption. However, according to the recent corruption 




To ensure the effectiveness of the special bureau approach, Smilov (2010) 
suggested that political players must enforce these bodies (p. 72). This again raises the 
issue of ‘political will’, which will be examined in the next section. In a study on 
anticorruption agencies and their uses and applications in more than three Eastern 
European Countries (EECs), Smilov made the following assertions about 
instrumentalizations of these agencies by political players: 
It is impossible for key government officials to speak regularly about wide spread 
corruption, to measure it, and to organize public awareness campaigns, as this will 
associate the politicians with corruption in the eyes of the public. Therefore, there 
is a political need for a semiautonomous, semi-independent public body to take 
upon itself the anticorruption discourse on behalf of the ruling parties. (Smilov, 
2010, p. 72) 
Smilov also proposed four major structural and functional elements that these 
bodies need to consider at their creation in order to be successful. First is that their 
composition should build bridges with civil society and the opposition and second, the 
powers of these bodies need to be concentrated mainly in the area of institutional reform, 
legislative drafting, and coordination among other government agencies; investigative 
powers are not needed. Third, in relation to the media, the commission should be able to 
supply with media-friendly material and the fourth thing is in relation to business, one 
could expect that the commission remains discrete and appreciative of two major factors 
of business support: downsizing of the state and lowering of taxes (Smilov, 2010, p. 72).  
Issues of the distribution and separation of powers and effective coordination 
between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of the government, are usually 
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hindrances to the effective operation of special government agencies like the 
anticorruption bureau (Yusuf, 2011). Yusuf pointed in support of this assertion citing the 
case of Nigeria, that the Due Process Office (DPO), ICPC, and EFCC make the judiciary 
an unquestionably reputable institution (Yusuf, 2011, p. 58). 
Issues of power distribution are due to lack of strategy, vision, and, coordination 
in the way power is partitioned and managed among the various arms of the government 
(Smilov 2010). Smilov also rejected the attribution of investigative powers to specialized 
anticorruption agencies, arguing that they could counteract important groups such as the 
police and the prosecutor (p. 72). Smilov further added that special anticorruption 
agencies can in certain cases initiate proceedings that are then transferred to the 
prosecutor and the police for continuance (Smilov, 2010, p. 72). However, a slightly 
different situation prevails in the case of Cameroon, where the NACC is invested with 
greater investigatory powers in cases of corruption. As stated in the agency’s 
organization papers, the action of NACC is based on three fundamental pillars: 
investigation, prevention, and communication; studies; and cooperation (NACC, 2008). 
This, in comparison to the recommendations made by Smilov (2010) discussed below, 
indicates that special anticorruption bureaus function differently in different countries, 
the reason why some are successful in their missions and some are not. 
Smilov’s study suggested that fewer specialized bureaus should be created, or 
even that a single special bureau should be in charge, and the amount of legislation 
sanctioning corruption should not be overwhelming and ambiguous, rather it should be 
clear, fair, and concise. Yusuf argued that numerous legislative provisions and 
institutions can create conflicts between jurisdictions and possibly exacerbate rather than 
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reduce corruption incidences in a nation (Yusuf, 2011, p. 63). In addition, special 
agencies can initiate more effective anticorruption policies if they concentrate on the 
policy part of it and stay away from ground investigations, which belong to the judiciary 
and the police. 
Finally, the review on the institutionalization of anticorruption methods engages 
policy makers, practitioners, and researchers in a discussion on four major pillars of the 
institution of anticorruption (Scherer & Palazzo, 2008). These pillars are judicialization, 
systemization, culturalization, and independence (TI, 2007). These elements have been 
reviewed in the preceding section, and the different works reviewed indicate that 
substantial research has been conducted on the different aspects concerning the 
institutionalization of anticorruption norms, values, and practices in the given society. 
This might provide comparative lessons for countries still struggling to register a large-
scale win against corruption and its consequences. The next section provides a review of 
literature on leadership and the role played by society in the anticorruption discourse 
through topics such as political will, leadership style, culture, and other dynamics of the 
civil society. 
The Role of Leadership and Society 
The role of leadership and the dynamics of society in the combat against 
corruption are significant at several levels and worth examining. This study supports the 
leadership school of thought that upholds the notion that “everything rises and falls on 
leadership,” as stated by Maxwell (1999, p. xi). On the other hand, people and culture 
share a strong bond that makes it difficult to separate the two when conducting behavioral 
studies, as it is in the case at hand. This section therefore examines leadership dynamics 
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in the fight against corruption in form of the political will for change, usually initiated 
and guided by the leadership of the particular country or community. Secondly, the 
normative/cultural applications of societal behavior vis-à-vis corruption and the combat 
against it is examined to complete the circle of change, which requires both the will for 
change and the change in behavior itself.  
The Political Will for Change 
In the context of combating corruption, the concept of political will is defined in 
Kpundeh (1998), as the “demonstrated credible intent of political actors (elected or 
appointed leaders, civil society watch dogs, stakeholder groups, etc.) to attack perceived 
causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level” (p. 92). Kpundeh  also posited, “this 
will of political actors is a critical starting point for sustainable and effective 
anticorruption strategies and programs” (Kpundeh, 1998, p. 92). In the absence of a 
strong, determined, and committed political will, Kpundeh emphasized that the statement 
of government in reforming civil service, strengthening transparency and accountability 
and reinventing the association between government and private industry would remain 
mere rhetoric (Kpundeh, 1998, p. 92). Political will is thus seen as the fuel for change in 
the engine of government. Such change takes root first at the level of organizations and 
groups (government, private, civil society), and then spreads across the nation or the 
community. Thus, the use of leadership and organizational change becomes important for 
the understanding of the application of political will.  
Organizational change can occur with respect to two trends – evolutionary or 
revolutionary change (Burke, 2008). Evolutionary change is a gradual and steady change 
process that occurs within a long period, while revolutionary change engenders a major 
79 
 
transformation of significant parts or all of the organization within a short period. 
Changing the corruption culture in government and society is a project that can benefit 
from both types of change. Changing the corruption culture requires revolutionary change 
in terms of administrative reforms, and evolutionary change in terms of behavioral 
reforms. It might also implicate multi-level change, which is change at the individual, 
group, and organizational levels. Change can also be structural, functional, and statutory. 
Perspectives on organizational change must also take into consideration culture, 
organizational learning, and possible resistance—factors that will be analyzed further in 
the next subsection.  
The initiation of the kind of leadership that will stimulate the right political will 
and spark change within a political system is summed up in the good governance 
concept. This concept is fundamental in the discourse on corruption and the combat 
against it. To achieve good governance within a system, the right leadership and 
management should be present. The subsequent discussion in this subsection shall review 
some of the recent studies conducted on good governance and the combat against 
corruption and will end with a review of the concept of leadership, including how it 
influences political will and good governance, and how effective and important public 
management is in the consolidation of this anticorruption network. 
Good governance has been defined in Elahi (2009) as the process and structure 
that guides political and socio-economic relationships (p. 1170). This concept can 
sometimes be embedded or misunderstood with that of just ‘governance’ which is the 
exercise of economic, political and administrative authorities in managing affairs of a 
country (Elahi, 2009, p. 1170). Thus, the main idea that distinguishes between 
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governance and good governance decision is the process or structure of implementation 
of decision. Drawing from the good governance principles enumerated in the United 
Nations Development Program’s “Governance and sustainable Human Development” 
policy of 1997, Graham, Amos, and Plumptre (2003, p. 3) listed five good governance 
principles. These principles do not detail exhaustively what can contain good governance 
in a political system but are largely satisfactory to explain the expectations of good 
governance for all governments practicing democratic governance.  
The first principle concerns legitimacy and voice, which refers to the notions of 
participation and ‘consensus orientation’ enforce this principle, which upholds the 
viewpoint that all men and women should have a voice in decision–making either directly 
or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their intentions. The 
principle also adds that “differing interests can be medicated to reach a broad consensus 
on what is in the best interest of the group and, where possible, on policies and 
procedures” (Graham, Amos, & Plumptre, 2003, p. 3). The second concerns direction. 
The direction principle is expounded by the ideas of ‘strategic vision’, which requires that 
“leaders and the public have a broad and long-term perspective on good governance and 
human development, along with a sense of what is needed for such development” 
(Graham, Amos, & Plumptre, 2003, p. 3).  
Another one is the performance principle, which is realized through the 
implementation of the notions of responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency. These 
three sets of administrative strategies ensure that institutions and processes serve all 
stakeholders and produce results that meet needs while making the best use of resources 
(Graham, Amos & Plumptre, 2003). There is also accountability: The twin public policy 
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strategies of accountability and transparency explain what the accountability principle 
generally means to government. Accountability requires that decision-makers in 
government, the private sector and civil society organizations be accountable to the 
public, as well as to institutional stakeholders. At the same time, transparency is built on 
the free flow of information, where process, institution, and information are directly 
accessible to those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to 
understand and monitor them (Graham, Amos & Plumptre, 2003, p. 3). 
Fairness: The rule of equity and the rule of law guarantee fairness for all in 
society. These rules hold that all men and women have opportunities to improve or 
maintain their wellbeing, and as such, legal frameworks should be fair and enforced 
impartially, particularly the laws on human rights (Graham, Amos & Plumptre, 2003). 
These principles also reflect the stipulations of the United Nations Convention in the 
universal declaration of human rights. 
Elahi (2009) elaborated the preceding principles in a study on the character of 
UNDP and its take on the notion and policy of good governance. Being at the center of 
development of the good governance policy and its principles, the UNDP was said to 
have taken this policy to heart, with the major goal of materializing sustainable human 
development in the developing world (Elahi 2009). Not forgetting, other pioneers of good 
governance, including the World Bank, enforced this policy. As stated by the Elahi in the 
study, the term ‘good governance’ was first mentioned causally in the World Bank’s 
1989 report (Elahi, 2009, p. 1167). Just as in Graham et al. (2003), Elahi pointed out 
participants or players of governance to include the state, private sector, and the civil 
society. The force that unites these three parties is the concept of “social contract,” which 
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John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau are said to be the originators (Elahi, 2009, p. 
1173). 
Elahi explained the concept of social contract in the following words: 
Social contract is a conceptual watershed that acts as a facilitator in the 
humankind’s transition from the state of nature to civilized life. In order to trace 
the natural growth of human society, Locke and Rousseau, following Hobbes, 
postulated that people lived in the state of nature before submitting themselves 
under the authority of civil government. (Elahi, 2009, p. 1172) 
The social contract concept therefore helps to resolve most governance 
complexities including political powers, individual rights, and general respect for the 
state. Lessons of this analysis directly apply to those of developing countries that are still 
learning government and democracy. Combating corruption in these countries will take 
understanding and commitment to govern, and the principles of good governance for 
success to be achieved.  
When Slovakia saw corruption greatly reduced in the country between the 2000 
and 2008, it was because the principles of good governance were put into action by the 
leadership of the country. As said in Beblavý (2009, p. 180), between 2000 and 2008 
Slovakia experienced a major reduction in corruption, particularly in certain sectors. 
During this period, successive Slovak governments also passed major reforms in almost 
all areas of policy. Multilateral institutions (EU, World Bank) as well as bilateral donors 
played a significant role in this endeavor. It is therefore interesting to look at Slovakia’s 
experience in the light of how good governance agenda can be made realistic, as well as 
improving the aid process in corruption control. 
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Other countries that have successfully combated corruption using good 
governance initiatives during the past decade include, Croatia, Hong Kong, Bulgaria, and 
most of the CEE Countries that came out of communism and embraced democratic 
governance principles, institutions, and structures beginning from early 1990s (Grubiša, 
2011; David, 2010; Smilov, 2010; and Beblavý, 2009). International efforts aid in 
enforcing and establishing good governance principles in developing countries for 
reasons such as declaration of poverty, promotion of human rights, and combat against 
corruption. The end goal of these efforts is to speed up the development process of these 
countries. However, these efforts have proven to work only for some countries, where 
others like those of the sub-Saharan African region seem not to be responding very well 
to this treatment as current and past CPIs by TI would indicate. 
The reasons for this slow response are diverse, but literature has pointed strongly 
to the lack of or absence of leadership, which incorporates the political will necessary to 
implement good governance and provide quality, sufficient, and stable oversight to the 
newly created democracies. In Agbiboa (2010), the researcher examined the case of 
Nigeria, looking for connections between corruption and underdevelopment. This 
eventually stirred up issues like poverty, lawlessness, economic dependence, and high 
mortality rates due to low standard of living. Agbiboa found out that corruption had 
“penetrated all aspect of Nigerian society and public affairs” (Agbiboa, 2010, p. 482). 
Nigeria, just as other Sub-Saharan countries, is said to be less than successful in 
combating the corruption ailment due to several reasons, with ‘laissez faire’ leadership 
and share incompetence being the prime factor (Agbiboa, 2010). Another serious reason 
pointed by Agbiboa is the historical and cultural interruption caused by western 
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colonization in Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2010). This goes the same for most over 90 percent 
African countries. Other reasons pointed by author included “low public-sector salary, 
lack of transparent political processes, lack of effective incentives to public officials, 
ineffectiveness of the judiciary, societal pressures and culture, poor economic policies, 
and lack of effective media” (Agbiboa, 2010, p. 498). 
Concerning the incidence of corruption, in the case of Nigeria, Agbiboa (2010) 
quoted Maduagwu (1982), who blamed the rising incidence of corruption in the public 
service on the prevailing culture that condones and even encourages corruption. Agbiboa 
held the following observations for this pervasiveness of corruption in Nigeria:  
Corruption thrives in Nigeria because society sanctions it. No Nigerian official 
would be ashamed, let alone condemned by his people because he or she is 
accused of being corrupt. The same applies to outright stealing of government or 
public money or property. On the contrary, the official will be hailed as being 
smart. He will be adored as having ‘made it’; ‘he is a successful man’…and any 
government official or politician who is in a position to enrich himself corruptly 
but failed to do so will, in fact, be ostracized by his people upon leaving office. 
He would be regarded as a fool, or selfish, or both. (Maduagwu as cited in 
Agbiboa, 2010, p. 483-484) 
The Nigerian case reflects what nearby countries like Cameroon also experience. 
Referring to Ngomba (2006), Nguemegne (2011) posited that in Cameroon, corruption is 
so pervasive that one would think nobody does the right thing. The few honest people are 
lost in an ocean of corruption. There seems to be a socially established tolerance for 
corruption. Nguemegne also made the assertion that “corruption has become, over the 
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years, so rampant in Cameroon that one is afraid that a real culture of corruption 
entrenched in the fabric of the society exists in the country (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 114). 
Just to mention some of the dreadful examples of corruption in Africa, in Nigeria, public 
officials are said to have stolen more than $440 billion of public money between 1960 
and 1999 (Agbiboa, 2010, p. 491).  
Agbiboa explained that this is six times the Marshal Plan, the sum total required 
to reconstruct devastated Europe in the aftershock of the Second World War (Agbiboa, 
2010, p. 491). In Cameroon, one of the outstanding cases of corruption is that of Mr. 
Ondo Ndong, the ex-general manager of Fonds d’Entraide Intercommunal (FEICOM) 
(i.e., National Local Government Support Funds) (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 99). Mr. Ondo 
Ndong was sacked from office in November (2005), and later arrested in 2006, alongside 
32 other officials, charged with embezzlement of a sum of $104 million (52 billion 
FCFA) of public money (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 111). While 16 other suspects were 
acquitted, Justice Noah Ebella found the sum embezzled to be only $22 million (11 
billion FCFA) (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 99). Ondo Ndong was sentenced to 50 years in 
prison, his properties seized, and his bank accounts frozen (Nguemegne, 2009, p. 99). 
Other culprits were also sanctioned according to their crimes (Nguemegne, 2011).  
Agbiboa's study also documented that African Union (AU) report indicated that 
corruption drains Africa of US $140 billion per year. This is about 25 percent of the 
continent's GDP (Agbiboa, 2010, p. 491). In another study, Haruna (2009) took on the 
issue of leadership and political will in Africa, and specifically in the Sub-Saharan 
region, questioning the bases that establish public leadership in those countries. The 
author claimed that from decolonization, to the second liberation era, Sub-Saharan Africa 
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has suffered from leadership poverty (Haruna, 2009). Author documented the following 
thoughts concerning the perception of leadership in Africa, a view that has tend to prevail 
in the continent until current tendencies in which the need for change is becoming 
eminent:  
Whether in thought or in practice, leadership in Africa has been narrowly 
circumscribed, defined, and operationalized. The nationalistic leadership in the 
1960s, authoritarian leadership spanning the decades of the 1970s, and the 
managerial leadership proclaiming an "African Renaissance" in the 1990s, all 
assumed the leader-follower perspective, which places the responsibilities of 
leadership in the hands of the leader. This dominant theme portrays followers as 
passive or even subservient and takes the context largely for granted. (Haruna, 
2009, p. 941) 
Haruna consistently argued that the definition of leadership in African countries, 
especially those the author studied, have superficially focused on leadership 
characteristics, styles, and behaviors, hardly reflecting leaderships as practiced in African 
communities (Haruna, 2009). 
In the search for solutions to the above-mentioned leadership deficiency, Haruna 
proposed that an alternative, pragmatic view based on unique historical and cultural 
community norms should be held for leadership in Africa: one that fosters social change 
and institutional transformation (Haruna, 2009). The author referred to such approach as 
“community-based leadership,” which he argued that it has a better chance of succeeding 
in the sub-Saharan countries because it taps into and builds on the peoples’ cultures 
(Haruna, 2009, pp. 946-947). This approach is said to be both consistent with indigenous 
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social-cultural value systems of the people and supported by scholarships that makes the 
society the focal point of this argument, while considering the fact that in public 
administration, there is growing adherence to communitarian and non-bureaucratic 
approaches to public service. 
Thus, the need for a shifting of emphasis in leadership literature from leadership 
traits, skills, behaviors, to processes that are relational and context oriented. While 
Haruna’s study suggests a pertinent solution to leadership problem in Africa, this study 
also propose that community-based leadership should not negate the input that 
globalization tendencies would bring. The truth is that, things have happened to African 
history and have affected the leadership of the continent and its life in general. Therefore, 
the biggest concern of current leaders, scholars, and practitioners should be how to lay 
hands on what will work. A positivistic approach towards solving some of these problems 
is going to be rewarding if these countries would consider its adoption. 
Furthermore, on the issue of leadership and political will in Africa, Spears (2007) 
posited that attempts to solve many Africa’s challenges through benevolent leadership, 
democratization, and intervention do not address the fundamental structural issues that 
are a consequence of the African experience of state-building (p. 345). In a comparative 
study conducted on state formation in the West and in Africa, the author found out that 
the state and nation-building process in Europe and North America was a result of 
specific circumstances and, in particular, a willingness on some levels to tolerate violence 
and coercion as a means of state consolidation (Spears, 2007). This history of violence is 
seen as a lamentable, but necessary price to pay for development whose results became 
the advent of stable prosperous and democratic states (Spears, 2007). 
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In the case of Africa, Spears explained that the continent earned independence 
through direct accordance (granted) by the colonial powers, rather than through military 
victory as most of the states in the West and in Europe did in order to consolidate 
(Spears, 2007). The author concluded that this history left African states in a state 
weakness legacy (Spears, 2007, p. 350). This history is also said to have left African 
leaders with the heavy responsibility of concerning themselves with the kind of domestic 
issues that troubled their colonial predecessors – human rights, democracy, legitimacy, 
and territorial control, things that the states and the new leaders did not have enough time 
with which to become acquainted or ensure their institutionalization (Spear, 2007). The 
dynamics of internal weaknesses and external influences on the history of African 
leadership constituted the main argument developed (Spears, 2007).  
In the study by Spears (2007), the abovementioned historical events may serve as 
pertinent reasons why leadership in most African states became unstable for several 
decades after the colonial rule, but it will not serve the same reason why contemporary 
leadership should not succeed in the same continent as argued in this study. 
Globalization, human development, technology, and accessibility to resources have 
placed contemporary governance and state dynamics on a different scale compared to the 
situation that was prevalent in the 1960s. With strong political will to change, African 
leadership will perform better than current trends irrespective of the historical challenges. 
Other transitional states as seen in the preceding examples in this study, demonstrated the 
strong will for change across the public sector, private, and the civil society, and the 
results where large-scale reduction in corruption and increase in economic development. 
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In another leadership study, Wanasika, Howell, Littrell, and Dorfman (2010), 
documented how cultural heritage has greatly affected leadership style in Africa, creating 
grounds for difficult adherence to change, and the implementation of contemporary 
leadership styles that are needed for the market economy and for democratization. The 
authors observed in their study, that the servant-leadership model practiced by traditional 
African societies made the leader a disputes’ mediator rather than a behavior director 
(Wanasika, Howell, Littrell, & Dorfman, 2010, p. 235). The contemporary market place 
necessitates new and advanced leadership approaches that are embedded in leadership 
styles such as managerial leadership, situational leadership, transactional leadership, and 
transformational leadership. With each leadership style being developed to suit the ever-
changing development in human behavior with respect to time, scholars and practitioners 
need to learn how to adapt to change. 
With leadership being defined as the capability to formulate a vision and gunner 
support for it (Plachy, 2009), current leadership in Africa as well as elsewhere should 
understand that followers’ mentality and behavior changes with time. Events and general 
human dynamics have changed since the 1960s. More Africans, especially in the case of 
Cameroon, have attended and are still attending school in greater numbers than was the 
case two decades ago. Moreover, globalization and technological development of today 
have diversified the trends of the demand for goods and services. As such, the supply side 
must be responsive; otherwise, the result will be outburst of national revolution as seen in 
the recent cases of Tunisia and Egypt in North Africa. Civil wars may also prevail if 
change is avoided. Nguemegne (2011) pointed out that the absence of a ready political 
90 
 
will for change in Cameroon would be a major hindrance to a successful anticorruption 
mechanism for the country. 
Lastly, the study of Neupane, Soar, Vaidya, and Yong (2014) provided grounds to 
argue that political will for change must not be exercised solely by the government. The 
civil society should also exercise such willingness to accept change as they engage the 
government on different platforms of the economy. The study, conducted on how public 
e-procurement could help in reducing the risk of corruption in Nepal, revealed that the 
innovative tool of ‘e-procurement’ faced several challenges with regard to willingness by 
economic operators to accept and adopt the tool. This is a common trend with other 
developing countries such as Cameroon, where citizens cry out for lack of political will 
for change, but they themselves appear to be allergic to innovations in the way business is 
conducted since the culture of corruption seems to be benefiting those that are players 
from both sides.  
Leadership is paramount in developing, initiating, and encouraging the kind of 
political will that considers the eradication of corruption in the public service and in 
society in general as a political priority. Encouraging the prevalence of anticorruption 
culture against a corruption culture, is another anticorruption strategy worth reviewing. 
The next section will reveal some of the pertinent contemporary arguments that have 
been put forth on this subject so far by authors across different social science disciplines.     
Normative/ Cultural Applications of Societal Behavior 
The intrinsic nature of corruption is that it is a behavioral issue, thus, it is argued 
in this study that for such behavior to cease or reduce, it should be replaced by another 
behavior, which is that of anticorruption. Literature reveals that much has been written on 
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corruption and culture compared to anticorruption and culture, due to the predominance 
of corruption. Until the practice of anticorruption or until the decision by people to 
behave in an uncorrupt manner becomes a norm and social behavior engrafted and deeply 
rooted into the culture of people, less will likely be achieved in terms of effectiveness, 
permanency, and durability of anticorruption in a given society. 
In a study on Mexico, Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008), using a 
quantitative analysis, combined with a survey and econometric techniques, examined 
socio-demographic and institutional factors affecting the behavior of individuals who 
engage in corrupt acts. Using focus groups, the authors collected some information on 
how informal institutions and norms promote or block corruption (Guerrero & 
Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008, p. 357). The authors’ findings indicated a trade-off between 
perceptions, social dynamics, and individual incentives for corrupt behavior in an 
institutional framework, creating a kind of vicious circle that is difficult to break 
(Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008).  
The vicious circle mentioned by preceding authors is common in most developing 
countries fighting and struggling with corruption, (e.g., Cameroon). In such vicious 
circle, individuals see themselves particularly forced to commit corruption because the 
implicit system of values of the society in which these individuals dwell, have created a 
reward and incentives platform for corruption, thus rendering the latter a normative 
activity that can hardly be avoided by all (Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008, p. 359). 
In a situation where the implicit system of values disfavors corruption, an anticorruption 
culture could prevail. 
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Culturally-speaking, original African societal values do not breed corruption. 
Instead, the basic African culture teaches respect for the elderly, love for the family and 
community living, speaking the truth, and fear of ancestral curses and ailment if one is 
caught in an evil act for which he or she refuses the responsibility by telling lies. In the 
pure African traditional setting, it is believed that “gods” would strike someone dead if 
he/she lies for an act he or she committed. This kind of norms would not nurture or 
promoted the kind of corruption that is currently prevalent in most parts of the continent. 
Crittenden, Hanna, and Peterson (2009) argued that it is the advent of modern 
government that created the kind of implicit corruption culture currently witnessed in 
these societies.  
In analyzing the cheating culture as a global societal phenomenon, the researchers 
argued that findings suggest that the cheating culture came and spread globally as a 
capitalistic phenomenon (Crittenden, Hanna, & Peterson, 2009, p. 337). As such, 
societies would not have been corrupted without the notion and practice of business. 
However, this position is disputed in this study, as seen in studies above where 
communist countries witnessed some of the worst examples of corrupt regimes in recent 
decades (Grubiša, 2011; David, 2010; Smilov, 2010). It is factual that business culture 
creates fertile grounds for corruption, but corruption is a behavior that is deeply rooted in 
human beings just like any other sin. The notion of “everyone is doing it” (Crittenden, 
Hanna, and Peterson, 2009, p. 338) is an argument that can help to explain the 
pervasiveness of corrupt behavior in the developing world. 
The study of the structure of society and the prevalence of the culture of 
corruption also indicates that informal relationships have a strong influence in the 
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formation of the culture of corruption (Kingston, 2008, p. 90). According to the author, 
although many developing countries have inherited or adopted formal legal, political, and 
administrative systems similar to those in the developed world, the behavior induced by 
these rules has often differed from that which is prescribed (Kingston, 2008, p. 90). 
Kingston asked the following questions in social constructs and the prevalence of this 
corruption culture.  
First, he queried the reason why countries with similar formal rules experienced 
different corruption levels, why transplants of formal rules from one country to another 
often failed to produce the desired patterns of behavior, and why entrenched corruption is 
often difficult to eliminate (Kingston, 2008). Kingston concluded that different sets of 
informal rules could interact with various set of formal rules to produce a variety of 
behaviors and outcomes. These informal rules are different from society to society, and 
thus different outcomes are likely to be produced when they interact with the formal rules 
(Kingston, 2008).  
Lack of social capital or social trust is said to be at the center of the preceding 
tendencies for development of corruption cultures (Kingston, 2008). However, Kingston 
suggested that even though informal rules differentials amongst societies can closely 
explain the differences that prevail in social construction of behavior in these societies, it 
is not the only reason why people in the developing world feel compelled to be corrupt 
more than people in the developed world are. These societies have similar notions of 
formal institution, but the practice sometimes is different from what it pretends to be.  
Most African countries blame formal institutional development and affirmation, 
which makes them lag behind the developed world (Balafoutas, 2011). Human beings are 
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the same everywhere (with the original weak moral nature), but environment influences 
and distinguishes their behaviors based on the kind of behavioral patterns being enforced 
in that environment (Balafoutas, 2011). Implicit cultural values do not stand alone to 
influence behavior when it comes to corruption, rather, the role of formal institutions is 
significant, and it influences the behavior that will slowly turn into a normal practice and 
consequently become culture.  
In a more recent study, Ocheje (2017) reiterated the challenge faced by African 
countries in curbing corruption, due to the normative context of corruption in these 
countries. Author argued that if the normative challenges are not removed, the full 
potential in the rule of law as an effective anticorruption strategy would not be released 
for such purpose. And that social values and norms must yield to new direction if 
successful anticorruption practice must be realized in such environments.  
Another comprehensive notion that explains cultural and normative tendencies is 
the notion of “public beliefs” as seen in a psychological study by Balafoutas (2011). 
Cost-benefit analysis and the principal-agent notion are used to explain how the 
bureaucrat or government official rationally weighs the chances of gains and losses 
before deciding whether to be corrupt or not” (Balafoutas, 2011, p. 51). Looking at the 
emotions that surround the corruption act, the author suggested in the study that the 
corruption transactions between the lobby and the bureaucrat may depend on the beliefs 
of the public in the context of a repeated psychological game (Balafoutas, 2011). 
Therefore, a bureaucrat will receive more bribes in a society where corruption is seen as a 
normal behavior, than in a society that holds high expectations of the bureaucrat 
(Balafoutas, 2011, P. 58).  
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Generally, if social behavior standards are low, both the lobby and the 
government official feel comfortable to proceed with the corruption transaction. This 
model is more comprehensive and significant in explaining the implicit sources of the 
corrupt attitude compared to their socio-cultural explanations such as history, informal 
styles, and social structure. The model would align strongly with that of implicit systems 
of values seen above in Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008). 
Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008) argued that not all giving is corruption. The intent to 
corrupt and not to ‘bless’ must exist in order to rule for corruption. Circumstances and 
societal definitions are also important in determining what is considered a gift and what is 
considered as bribe. If not, the tipping culture that is practiced in the West will no longer 
be regarded as an act of gratitude and remuneration, but as a corrupt behavior that seeks 
to influence service. The same for a public official that receives an act of “thank you” 
from the citizens for rendering them a satisfactory service, an act that is not meant to 
corrupt the official in any way. Consciences of individuals involved in giving, and the 
socio-political stipulations of such behavior tend to be used as a barometer for corruption 
across societies. These eventualities should be watched when making an argument on the 
nature of gifts and bribes in the perpetration of corruption. 
To build a culture of anticorruption, researchers and practitioners must look for 
ways to shape public beliefs and implement systems of values to favor anticorruption 
behavior just as in the case for corruption as seen in preceding analyses. However, since 
wrongdoing is common in the human nature, the achievement of anticorruption culture is 
more of a fight compared to the likely and effortless emergence and flourishing of 
corruption. Among the few researches that have been considered with the goal to 
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discover and develop anticorruption models that can become practical societal norms, is 
the study on e-government conducted by Kim, Kim, and Lee (2009). Kim et al. used the 
institutional theory of analysis to document and evaluate the development of an 
anticorruption system which they called OPEN (Online Procedures Enhancement for 
Civil Application) (Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2009, p. 42). Conducted on the second largest 
metropolitan government in South Korea, Kim et al. explored three institutionalization 
dimensions –regulatory/coercive, cognitive/mimetic, and normative, and four 
anticorruption strategies embedded in the system. The results demonstrated how an e-
government anticorruption system in a local government evolved and became a prototype 
of a national system to be used for the same purpose (Kim et al., 2009, p. 42). 
E-government is a worldwide contemporary phenomenon in public 
administration, and a system like OPEN will work well for societies that have widespread 
use of the Internet and information technology both for government and the society as a 
whole. Expectations differ for developing countries like Cameroon, where 
underdevelopment has rendered internet and other associated technologies scarce 
resources. The OPEN culture is a future perspective for the country and its advent can be 
precipitated by the improvement of other institutions and structures that will ensure its 
installation and sustainability (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011). These include education, 
governing laws, creation and enhancement of markets, and the installation of modern and 
effective equipment.  
Civil society organizations can also hold and foster the anticorruption culture. The 
fight against corruption is not a responsibility that left in the hands of the government 
alone. A study of the Romanian educational system represents a case in which the civil 
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society decided to stand up and promote an anticorruption practice, not once, but on a 
continuous basis (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011). In their findings, the authors 
documented how the Romanian Coalition for Clean Universities (CCU), a grass roots 
coalition of civil society organizations and education stakeholders created between 2008 
and 2009 analytically supervised and examined 42 Romanian state universities during the 
academic years 2007-2009 to assess their governance, integrity, fairness, and their 
capability to curb corruption Procedures (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011).  
The CCU is a combination of NGOs—professional associations, student, and 
teacher unions. The perception of Romania as the most corrupt EU member state 
according to corruption perception index was as a result of the country’s educational 
systems and evaluated the impact of the CCU on the reduction of such levels of 
corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011, p. 532). Such efforts by civil society are 
paramount in stamping out the nature of corruption and ministering to an anticorruption 
culture, especially in developing countries where societal learning in the democratic era 
necessitates multilateral corporation between government, private, and international 
actors (Doig & Riley, 1998; Klitgaard, 1998; Everett, Neu, & Rahaman, 2006; Schmidt, 
2007). Other anticorruption behaviors can be built and promoted through government 
incentives initiated in people’s social norms. 
The review of the role of leadership and societal construct in the fight against 
corruption has considered different notions and concepts that need to be visited whenever 
one might want to understand how corruption comes into being and can be combated in 
the context of contemporary developing societies, especially those still struggling with 
high levels of public corruption. A strong political will embedded in good governance 
98 
 
principles, an understanding and adherence to the rule of the social contract, the 
transformation of leadership to reflect contingent leadership needs, the influences of 
public beliefs, implicit systems of value, e-government practices, and the cultural strength 
and political civil society organizations are some of the major notions and concepts 
reviewed. The next and final section of this chapter contains a review of an area that 
represents the main gaps noticed in the contemporary literature on anticorruption. This 
area is that of contextualization, which refers to the effectiveness of anticorruption 
campaigns and strategies in the specific societies in which they are being implemented. 
Anticorruption Approaches and the Contextualization Perspective 
Having reviewed the instruments for anticorruption practice in the preceding 
section, this section is concerned with the issue of the contextualization of these 
instruments in the given societies, with the goal of explaining the different perceptions 
that govern the approaches or instruments and how they demonstrate the dynamics of 
applicability and effectiveness of outcomes in the various societies. Anticorruption 
approaches or strategies are applicable and can be studied with respect to two contextual 
perspectives—the universal contextual perspective (Santiso, 2001) and the particularistic 
contextual perspective (Rothstein (2007). These two perspectives have different 
implications on the government’s anticorruption policy and mechanism for each country 
taking initiative to fight corruption. Sometimes, the actors might not be aware of the 
dynamics of the approaches, and as such, cannot assess their relevance in the fight. 
Research on anticorruption is growing and areas like contextualization are new 
and emerging, and thus appear to lack bulk and depth. Research reviews that discuss the 
concepts and the need that they present both in theory and in practice, make applications 
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and possibly recommendations to the case held in this study. However, this section 
concludes with an introduction of the debate on the application of these concepts, thus 
raising the question of the need for mixed approaches and adaptations of strategies for 
effective anticorruption practice. 
The Universal Anticorruption Perspective 
The theory of universalism as held in the practice of anticorruption refers to a 
conceptual anticorruption context in which global anticorruption initiatives and 
approaches are upheld and implemented worldwide, without necessarily considering the 
specific dynamics of the individual countries implementing such approaches. Universalist 
theories uphold the transplantation of international measures, especially from the West, 
through global cooperation and development programs and institutions such as the World 
Bank and IMF, into developing nations based on different economic and socio-political 
objectives set for each community (Santiso, 2001). Theoretical perceptions of universally 
oriented anticorruption movements saw early emergence in the works of Klitgaard in the 
late 1980s, especially as observed in the author’s formula for corruption which is pioneer 
in the field and was postulated based on a rational choice (institutionalist) perspective. 
Corruption according to Klitgaard is understood in this context as Monopoly plus 
Discretion Minus Accountability, which can be represented as C= M+D-A (Klitgaard, 
1988, p. 75). The rational choice theory in corruption was also taken up by Alemann 
(2005), who explained corruption as a problem of political economy that includes “a 
principle-agent model, according to which each player acts in the interest of his or her 
own mostly economic utility” (Aleman as cited in Gephart, 2009, p. 8). In other words, 
the institutionalist perspective sees corruption because of overarching strategies that lead 
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to monopoly, discretion, and a significant absence of transparency and accountability. 
This perception for corruption is believed to be the same for all institutions across the 
globe (Gephart, 2009), and thus if anticorruption strategies would define corruption in the 
same way, the approaches to combating it would believe that what would work for 
institutions in the West would also work for institutions in the East and South, especially 
in the context of democracy.  
One of the most developed studies on corruption, among those conducted on the 
subject of “contextualization” of the corruption/anticorruption concepts, is that of 
Gephart (2009). The author made a case for the study by highlighting criticisms that 
scholars have always imputed on the institutions promoting the international concept and 
movement for anticorruption. Those institutions include the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), various international NGOs, and international law in 
general seen in the United Nations (UN), EU, AU, and other international organizations, 
regional blocks and international conventions (Gephart, 2009). Gephart also posited that 
since corruption exists all over the world, in all societies, sectors, and in various forms; 
and since corruption is fought in equally manifold ways, anticorruption campaign are 
subject to the accusation that they do not constitute a sufficiently differentiated 
perspective (Gephart, 2009).  
In this study, I sought to put forth this argument with the precaution of not 
sounding overarchingly critical and only to realize at the end that those methods are 
effective and cannot be much neglected when making a case for anticorruption practice. 
As such, conclusions were only made after the collection of data that revealed the 
realities on the field. Gephart also took the same guard, stating that the critical voices 
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reflected in the article are not aimed at generally rejecting the World Bank’s  
anticorruption efforts as well as those of other international organizations. Instead, the 
critical observation could be seen as points of departure for identifying the preconditions 
of a successful fight against corruption (Gephart, 2009). 
According to Gephart, universalist arguments for a global approach toward the 
fight against corruption are based on several factors. The first argument is that more 
cooperation that is international increases transparency even at the national level (Eigen, 
2007; Gephart, 2009). Analyzing transparency initiatives in the oil and gas industries 
under the banner of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an 
international advisory group (IAG), Eigen examined the contemporary tendency for the 
fight against corruption, and described the coming together of international organizations, 
government institutions, the private sector, and civil society organizations to form a 
network that is aimed at realizing more successful results in the fight, especially for states 
that are rich in resources as victory for a global approach to anticorruption (Eigen, 2007).  
Organizations prominent in this fight globally include, TI that has grown beyond 
the wildest dream of the international community, with independent TI National Chapters 
in about 100 countries. Another key actor is the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) with its outstanding Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Official (1999), signed in Paris in 1997 by 35 exporting countries, enforced after 
1999. Other organizations include: The UNCAC of 2003; the Inter-American Convention 
against Corruption of 1996; the Convention of the Council of Europe of 1998; the 
African Union Convention of 2003; and other focused groups such as the Global Witness, 
a United Kingdom based NGO (Eigen, 2007, pp. 331-332).  
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Even though EITI focuses on countries that are rich with resources, indicated that 
EITI’s ramifications have versions that can affect all countries taking the fight against 
corruption as a serious matter. The author listed several countries whose governments 
have made endorsement statements for EITI including: Angola, Bolivia, Cameroon, 
Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Kazakhstan, 
Mauritania, Mongolia, Niger, Peru, and Sierra Leon (Eigen, 2007, p. 34). This is an 
indication of a growing spectrum of tools and structures for collaboration on the part of 
developing nations to address the corruption nightmare.  
Other arguments in favor of universalism in combating corruption are those made 
for the transplantation of good governance principles into countries lacking such qualities 
so as to foster sustainable economic and social development (Santiso, 2001). Laver 
(2010) took up this argument in another study designating the combat against the cancer 
of corruption as urgency in the international community involving states, multinational 
companies, and civil society groups. With less attention paid to this struggle by religious 
organizations, and given corruption’s profound moral and social justice dimensions, 
Laver posited that these religious organizations should be at the forefront of the struggle 
(Laver, 2010). Initiatives made possible by the international environment toward this 
fight included seminars that dealt with issues such as effective oversight and constraints 
among state institutions, participation and oversight by the civil society, the media and 
communities, improvement of public sector’s management, influencing and sustaining a 
competitive and responsible private sector and strengthening political accountability 
(Laver, 2010, p. 51). Laver however emphasized the role that can be played by religious 
values on the enhancement of ethical behavior for many communities (Laver, 2010). 
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The Particularistic Anticorruption Perspective 
Several arguments have been made due to the weaknesses embedded in an 
overarching universalistic anticorruption approach that sometimes does not consider 
adaptation exigencies for countries receiving these universal policies. This approach is 
criticized, thus leading to the argument for a particularistic approach that encourages an 
adaptation of approaches to specific contexts and promotes originality of anticorruption 
mechanisms to reflect the socioeconomic, cultural, and political realities of the societies 
involved in the fight. The particularistic anticorruption perspective is described in 
Rothstein (2007). In a study on corruption and the “Big Bang” theory, Rothstein argued 
that the combat against corruption does not need a magic key to an entry point or 
institutional device as suggested by the World Bank, that “small changes are likely to 
worsen the problem and make corruption and similar practices even more ingrained” 
(Rothstein, 2007, p. 5).  
Rothstein also put forth several arguments against the nature of the path taken by 
the World Bank and other prominent international corruption fighters to address the 
problem of corruption in developing countries. Rothstein concluded that the countries 
suffering from this ailment must muster forces internally to create a Big Bang change that 
can hardly come from international actors who believe mostly in a gradualist perspective 
of change as seen in the work of Johnston (as cited in Rothstein, 2007). Gradualists like 
Johnson posit that change should be initiated gradually, and that “building a sound 
framework of social, political, and state institutions is a work of generations (Johnston as 
cited in Rothstein 2007, p. 24). Rothstein disputed this concept especially when it 
concerns combating corruption. 
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Rothstein founded the particularistic public behavior perspective on the premise that:     
At the root of systemic corruption in a particular political culture, which is 
defined as a system in which government treatment of citizens depends on their 
status or position in society, people do not even expect to be treated fairly by the 
state; what they expect is similar treatment to everybody with the same status. 
(Rothstein, 2007, p. 13)  
In other words, corruption is rooted in deeply held beliefs about the proper order 
of exchange in a society – personal-particularistic versus impersonal-universalistic 
(Rothstein, 2007). According to Rothstein, this implies that to actually curb corruption, 
there must be a move by the entire social order and political culture from the 
universalistic equilibrium to the particularistic equilibrium (Rothstein, 2007). Universal 
anticorruption campaigns fail because they do not realize that corruption is rooted in a 
particularistic political culture in which almost all public goods are distributed on a 
nonuniversialist basis (Rothstein, 2007). I took the argument further by evoking the 
differences that exist in societal dynamics, thus siding with arguments that support an 
adaptation of measures and practices in each context. Thus, anticorruption in the context 
of Cameroon is not bound to be the same as in the American or British context in other to 
produce desired outcomes, even though examples of the latter can inspire the former. 
One of the significant arguments made against the nature of universal approaches 
for fighting corruption is found in the question of democratic legitimacy of such 
measures posed by Gephart (2009), arguing that many contexts of anticorruption have 
been developed and diffused by international organizations known for their lack in 
democratic legitimacy. First of all, the United States has a well-known voting authority 
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alongside other influential nations of the West for World Bank and IMF programs. This 
advantage blocks minority nations’ opinion even in deciding principles for several 
programs, including anticorruption endeavors. These programs are subsequently applied 
to these countries which have had almost no influence in their conceptualization 
(Gephart, 2009, p. 23). Now how would such measures work, when the people who are 
supposed to apply and live according to them on daily basis are excluded from the 
opportunity of understanding their originality and authenticity towards achieving the 
goals for which they were designed? 
Delegitimization of the states, governments, and societies of the global South by 
international anticorruption approaches (Gephart 2009, p. 24) is another predicament 
faced by governments of developing countries. This is exemplified through the World 
Bank's predominant zero-tolerance rhetoric on anticorruption that facilitates the legal and 
political prosecution of politically disagreeable actors and consequently jeopardizing 
opportunities for reformers, members of the opposition, and the entire society to 
influence change (Gephart, 2009, pp. 24-25). Therefore, international organizations need 
to improve on these approaches (Gephart, 2009). 
Social values and norms of every society must be at the center of any discussion 
that seeks to address issues that are embedded in such norms and values. This is the 
central argument for particularity in the formulation and implementation of anticorruption 
measures. Other arguments against universalistic tendencies include claims that 
international actors have used Western-oriented and usually ineffective anticorruption 
measures to foster neocolonialistic activities in developing countries. Actors like the 
World Bank have been criticized as opportunistic merchants who use these platforms to 
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foster their business abroad without a real deep goal of solving the issue of 
underdevelopment and its associated ills like corruption (Gephart, 2009). In all, 
particularistic anticorruption tendencies can be enhanced by the notion of adaptation, 
which is the subject matter of the next discussion. 
Adaptation of Strategies for Successful Anticorruption Practice 
Adaptation of anticorruption approaches is a continuation of the idea of 
particularistic anticorruption measures. Adaptation emerges from the critical analysis that 
examines the dynamics of contemporary universalistic anticorruption movement that 
have portrayed both strengths and weaknesses in the fight against corruption through 
considerable initiatives and influences of the world bank, IMF, UNO and other 
multilateral and bilateral anticorruption conventions. This has hence given opportunity 
for the rise of a particularistic notion that cautions the universal approaches concerning 
the different realities every society is experiencing in its daily sociopolitical existence, 
and the need for such approaches to connect to these realities to bring about an inside-out 
change and not the reverse. This pattern of ideas was held to make the case for 
contextualization of anticorruption approaches in Cameroon. 
In a study conducted by Quah (2008) on India, the country's policy context was 
analyzed considering five major elements: "geographical, historical, economic, 
demographic and political aspects that influence the implementation of the country’s 
anticorruption strategies" (Quah, 2008, p. 55). To these factors, Quah added a cultural 
aspect and a legal aspect to constitute seven contextualization outstanding factors that 
were employed in this study to examine the contextualization tendency of the 
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anticorruption approaches practiced and fostered by the current Cameroonian 
government. 
Quah argued that the gigantic Indian population, complex administration, and 
coupled with other economic factors, did not create a favorable policy context for the 
prevalence of an anticorruption strategy (Quah, 2008). Quah however suggested that in a 
proactive approach to combating corruption, such obstacles should not be examined 
independently or expected to vanish on their own or even separated from the 
anticorruption effort in any way. Rather, the anticorruption effort should be designed to 
not only address such atmosphere but to be sowed into the various contextual aspect of 
the society so that they will now auto-combat their corruption issues from inside-out and 
emerge with an authentic level of purity that is lasting and sustainable (Quah, 2008).  
In a study on Papua New Guinea (PNG), Walton (2016) revealed how 
anticorruption measures in the country fell short of producing expected outcomes due to 
the absence of a strong focus on how such measures needed to address the policy context 
of the country. Author identified four major policy contextual aspects that anticorruption 
must pay attention to, which included the opportunities and threats involved in state 
politics, structural conditions that support citizens’ corrupt acts, non-state actors’ role in 
causing corruption, and legal responses to corruption that end up in prosecution. The core 
lesson from Walton’s study is that understanding local, political, cultural, and economic 
issues of a society is uncontestably necessary for successful anticorruption practice.  
Adaptability of approaches combines the advantages associated with international 
anticorruption strategies with those unique to the policy context of the country in which 
these strategies are being implemented. Gephart (2009) identified one of the major 
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positive potentials of intentional anticorruption efforts to include the capability of 
“transporting and diffusing entire conceptions of the "correct functioning of political 
systems" (Gephart, 2009, p. 31). In the context of democratization, this assessment is 
true, because democratic principles and applications are formulated based on universal 
ideologies, one of which is Weber’s legal-rational theory. Adaptation is seen as a means 
for contextualization as conceived in this study. In the globalization context, no country 
or society exists alone. Means and ideas flow from one end of the world to another more 
rapidly today than was the case 30 years ago.  
In a more recent study, Ramanujam and Caivano (2016) emphasized the changing 
landscape of economic/development studies, stating that this area had recently 
experienced a shifting of focus from a universal model of practice to a more pluralistic 
approach that calls for countries to shape their policy prescriptions based on their own 
sociopolitical contexts. Having the rule of law as a fundamental requirement for 
economic development, authors suggested that ultra-pluralism of policymaking 
philosophy could lead to the neglect of the core principle of the rule of law even though 
authors agreed that the new pluralistic trend that calls for contextualization of policy 
making strategies was good for the countries.  
The study being conducted on BRIC countries suggested therefore that as these 
countries build their new approach and vision as to how the rule of law should be crafted 
and implemented to favor economic development in their community, actors should still 
consider a set of fundamental rule of law principles that would exist alongside current 
transitional institutions, thus building trust in formal institutions as the economic growth 
process advances (Ramanujam & Caivano, 2016). 
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Having in mind the notion of adaptation of strategies which is a developing trend 
in policy studies for developing countries, anticorruption practices in Cameroon by 
NACC were examined in the light of the policy context of the country, which 
incorporates political, economic, legal, and sociocultural contextual aspects. After such 
examination, conclusions were made on the nature of anticorruption practices in the 
country, revealing major facts such as how compliant and effective international 
strategies have been and can be (Gephart, 2009). The extent of global efforts and the 
specific issues in Cameroon that anticorruption approaches need to address in order to be 
successful and sustainable were noted together with the policy context of the country. 
Summary 
Research studies across different social science disciplines were examined in this 
chapter, and it was discovered that uncurbed corruption is a major barrier to good 
governance, economic development, and the eradication of certain chronic social 
problems such as poverty and low standards of living, especially for developing 
countries. The chapter demonstrated that corruption is combatable through different 
measures and mechanism employed under the banner of anticorruption, engaging the 
interplay of efforts of international and domestic actors. 
Recent literature on anticorruption identify some of the major strategies used to 
fight corruption in mostly developing countries to include economic/market reforms, 
administrative/bureaucratic reforms, accountability/transparency enhancing reforms, 
democratic accountability enhancing reforms, legislative and judicial reforms, and 
general influences from the dynamics of globalization. The literature also indicated that 
most countries, especially those of the southern hemisphere have not been very 
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successful in their efforts of curbing corruption in their respective societies, due to lack of 
robust strategies, mechanisms, strong institutions, and political will. In general, the 
literature on anticorruption tend to focus on administrative and system theories and 
practices, meanwhile there remains to be void between cultural and behavioral character 
of populations in relation to anticorruption practice. This study sought to explore this gap, 
while adopting the concept of adaptation as the bridge with which the other concepts of 
anticorruption could be connected, and also as an attempt to close the aforementioned 
gap. Chapter 3 discussed the methods by which data for the study was collected and 
analyzed to provide pertinent basis for the discussions and the conclusions raised and 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss the methods used to conduct the study. The chapter 
included the following aspects: research questions; a description and justification for the 
research design of the study; the choice of the population sample; data collection methods 
and methods of data analysis; ethical issues; and an explanation on how the evidence of 
quality in the study was ensured.  
Research Questions  
This study is guided by one overarching question and four sub questions. The 
main question is: “What anticorruption strategies are perceived as effective in helping the 
government of Cameroon curb systematic public corruption?” The subquestions are listed 
below: 
1. What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon’s 
NACC?  
2. What can be learned from NACC’s past experience of working with 
anticorruption policies and programs?  
3. What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the government to 
implement effective anticorruption policies?  
4.  How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially 




Research Design and Rationale  
This study was conducted as a qualitative exploratory case study of the current 
anticorruption approaches the government of Cameroon employs to combat corruption. 
Creswell (2009) defines qualitative research as “a means for exploring and understanding 
the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem” (p. 4). The 
qualitative method was selected for this study because of the need to contextualize 
anticorruption approaches or mechanisms in the case of Cameroon. Such an approach 
would bring the study into contact with a real-world problem that requires extensive 
exploration, interaction with participants, collection of potentially sensitive information 
and inductive analysis and interpretation of it.  
The exploratory approach provided a platform upon which I could seek findings 
about the nature of the government of Cameroon’s anticorruption policy, its scope, 
strategy, and resources. This allowed a determination to be made as to whether the 
anticorruption strategies put in place by the government were properly addressing the 
policy context of the country, in the effort of curbing corruption in the society, especially 
within the civil service.  
The case study method of inquiry was selected as the qualitative tradition of 
inquiry that suits best the focus of this study. Case study is defined as “the study of an 
issue explored through one or more cases within a bounded system” (Creswell, 2007, p. 
73). Yin (2014) defined case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon (the case) in depth and within its real-world context” (p. 16). 
This means the case cannot be studied in abstraction, the researcher must associate the 
inquiries with actual happenings or activities in a designated setting. The encompassing 
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nature of case study expounded by Yin makes the approach more fitting to study most 
complex phenomena, as it tends to provide the researcher with a more simplistic platform 
and tools to carry out the inquiries. It is on this definition that this study situated its 
inquiries into Cameroon’s anticorruption strategies as implemented by NACC.  
Through this study, I sought to explore anticorruption practice in the context of 
Cameroon. Trochim (2001) also stated that the case study method is considered as the 
most suitable approach for studying a phenomenon in a particular context. Designing this 
study in the same light allowed for an in-depth exploration of the anticorruption 
phenomenon in the political, legal, economic and sociocultural context of the 
Cameroonian society.  
Role of the Researcher  
My role as the researcher in this study was to provide all the knowledge and 
material resources needed for the successful completion of the study and the realization 
of its objective. I employed methods and processes to ensure that relevant data was 
collected. Participant request forms were used to contact participants for the purpose of 
fixing the date, venue, and time for face-to-face interviewing with the participants. The 
study also required traveling to the field to meet participants in person for interviewing, 
but this process was replaced by virtual interviewing due to security reasons on the field. 
This study engaged knowledge accumulated in the field of study of public affairs 
in general. An approval was obtained from the Walden University Institutional Review 
Board (IRB), which served as the permission to conduct research on human subjects. The 
study also noted the dates and venues where data was collected, and the experts that 
participated in providing the data. Being in close contact with the data collected and at 
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the same time being the person that analyzed the data, could create fertile grounds for the 
occurrence of bias for the qualitative researcher (Goulding, 2002, cited in Apori-
Nkansah, 2008). However, I took several measures aimed at dealing with possibilities of 
subjectivity. The study was subjected to peer review and the use of multiple sources of 
data and data collection methods, with the aim of curbing and preventing any major 
biases that could emerge from personal subjectivity.  
Methodology  
Qualitative case study was employed as the methodology for this study. Yin 
(2014) recommended the case study method due to the emphases it places on rigor, 
validity, and reliability. Case study design, according to Yin, is an all-encompassing 
method that facilitates the study of complex subjects. A research study usually follows 
either a qualitative or quantitative approach, or both approaches depending on the nature 
of the inquiries the researcher intends carrying out (Creswell, 2009). Establishing an 
inquiry continuum enables the researcher to determine an approach that is suitable for the 
subject being researched (Creswell, 2009). The researcher’s philosophical worldview 
plays a considerable role in determining the suitability of each of the approaches 
(Creswell, 2009, p. 5). The nature of the research problem, the researcher’s personal 
experiences, and the audiences of the studies are also determining factors in choosing a 
specific method (Creswell, 2009). I considered the preceding factors to make a choice for 
design in this study.   
The qualitative researcher uses activities to locate real world problems that 
require extensive and thorough exploration, interaction with participants, developing 
assumptions that set the base for inquiry, collecting sensitive information and inductively 
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analyzing them, and establishing a conclusive tone that calls for action from targeted 
actors (Creswell, 2007). Exploring anticorruption practice in Cameroon fit well into the 
preceding description, and thus the suitability of the qualitative method. The qualitative 
case study method itself is held as a practical and readable approach (Yin, 2014).  
Selection of Sample Population 
According to Marshall (1996), choosing a sample to study is an important step in 
any research project because it is not practical, efficient, or ethical to study an entire 
population. As advised by Marshall, participants and other sample forms, including 
documents, are selected based on their relevance. All sampled sources of data should also 
possess the potential to contribute accurately and informatively to the understanding of 
the phenomenon being studied (Marshall 1996). This is the reason why participants for 
the study had to be public servants that work with an anticorruption agency and as such 
are familiar with these different strategies of the agency.  
I used purposeful sampling to select participants who were considered as key 
informants to the study. According to Creswell (2007), purposeful sampling occurs when 
researcher selects individuals and study sites because they can purposefully inform an 
understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study. The study 
made use of key informants –individuals who could provide important in-depth 
information about corruption approaches and who were contactable (see Goulding, 2002, 
as cited in Apori-Nkansah, 2008). The targeted participant population in this study was 
established based on the premise that these individuals were perceived to be 
knowledgeable and possessed the necessary experience worthy of inclusion.  
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The participants were accessible for the acquisition of the information. Key 
informants included public officials who were knowledgeable about Cameroon’s policy 
on anticorruption. They came from NACC which is the government agency responsible 
for Cameroon’s anticorruption programs and administration. Information about the 
anticorruption strategies and mechanisms put in place by the Cameroon government was 
also extracted from government documents, fact books, and archives that held such 
information. 
There are different strategies for conducting a purposeful sampling, which include 
purposeful criterion sampling, maximum variation sampling, snowball or chain sampling, 
and others (Patton, 2002). I employed the purposeful criterion, maximum variation, and 
snowball purposeful sampling strategies to select participants for the research. Purposeful 
criterion sampling allows for a predetermination of criterion of importance, a strategy 
common for quality assurance efforts (Patton, 2002). This strategy enabled a preselection 
process where I could chose participants who could help me answer the research 
question. In this study, the criterion was that the participant must have direct 
responsibilities and functions in the government agency in charge of anticorruption 
programs and administration in Cameroon (NACC). This was to ensure that the 
participants had the capacity to make insightful contributions to the pool of information 
concerning government’s anticorruption policy for the country.  
In addition to criterion sampling, I used maximum variation sampling, which is 
advantageous in that it allows for the selection of few cases or a case, with which 
analyses could be made to describe multiple perspectives about the cases or case being 
studied (see Creswell, 2007). The implication of this method is that, few cases (in this 
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case 20 participants) from different  segments  of the sampling population were used to 
make a representation of the population at large and answer the questions on the subject 
matter without necessarily analyzing all existing or possible cases available. This was 
aimed at sampling heterogeneity, which helps capture the different areas of the general 
population, something that cannot be achieved effectively with random sampling, 
especially in this case whereby the subject matter is technically specific (Creswell, 2007). 
In other words, instead of seeking representativeness through equal probabilities, 
maximum variation sampling seeks it by including a wide range of extremes. The 
principle is that if a researcher deliberately tries to interview a very different selection of 
people, their aggregate answers can be close to that of the whole population (List, 2004). 
Therefore, instead of focusing on government employees who hold higher administrative 
offices in NACC, or seeking to obtain representation from all facets of the agency and 
any other source of anticorruption policy in Cameroon, participation I focused on the 
agency with the most technical aptitude to provide the data needed (NACC), and included 
some officers from higher levels of the agency and others from the very bottom level for 
variation purposes.  
Sample Size 
A sample size of 20 participants was selected for this study. Sample size is said to 
have no rules in qualitative inquiry, and that it depends on what one wants to know, the 
purpose of the inquiry, what is at stake, what is useful, what will have credibility, and 
what can be done with available time and resources (Patton, 2002).  
This study employed a realizable sample size. According to Marshall (1996), 
quantitative researchers have often failed to understand the usefulness of studying small 
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samples, with the misapprehension that generalizability is the ultimate goal of all good 
research. This is because the primary goal of a qualitative study is to provide in-depth 
information about an experience, as opposed to quantitative research in which the focus is 
representativeness. Marshall held that an appropriate sample size for a qualitative study is 
one that adequately answers the research questions. As such, flexibility in determining 
the sample size for a qualitative study is recommended. Thus, the sample size used in this 
study cannot be described as large or small; rather it is an adequate size that provided 
room for flexibility in gaining in-depth understanding of the studied phenomenon. 
Data Collection Methods 
Multiple data collection methods were employed in this study to ensure in-depth 
and trustworthy analysis. These sources of data included interviews and documents.  
Interviews  
Interviewing was used as a primary tool for collecting data in this study. This is 
because interviewing provides the platform upon which one can stand to go beyond 
observing just the physical and superficial facts of a case and be able to enter into 
participants’ perspectives and obtain deeper information about the nature of the case 
(Patton, 2002). There are three major variations in interviewing: the informal 
conversational interview, the general interview guide, and the standardized open-ended 
interview (Patton, 2002). I used the general interview guide with open-ended questions to 
collect data information from the interviewees.   
The nature of the interview ensured that the interviewer was given enough 
flexibility to intervene and steer the conversation to any direction that is deemed 
desirable and could present the interviewee with more precise and systematic questions. I 
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used the encrypted virtual platform WhatsApp to conduct online chats with participants. 
This method was chosen because of the current political instability that made it unsafe 
traveling to Cameroon. Face-to-face interviews and focus groups interviews are other 
techniques that bring the interviewer and interviewee into close physical contact.  
The advantage of individual face-to-face interviewing is that it focuses on the 
individual, thus making the interview intensive and enabling the interviewer to fetch in-
depth and detailed information for the subject matter under study (Patton, 2002). It also 
allows that informal communication that occurs during face-to-face discussions is 
noticed, thus providing the study with more in-depth information. The disadvantages of 
this method however include scenarios in which the interviewee hesitates to provide 
information, which is a reaction that is not common with a focus group (Krueger, 1994; 
Morgan, 1988; Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990, cited in Creswell, 2007). The method is 
also costly and time consuming. However, the richness of detail and quality of 
information it ensures overshadows any difficulties that may come with it.  
I planned to travel from the United States to Cameroon to collect data for this 
study. However, Cameroon was undergoing intensive political crisis at that time and the 
territory was unsafe. Telephone communication was as such used to replace the face-to-
face interview option. Effective contemporary technology has made it possible to 
communicate in a situation like this just as if one was physically present with the other 
party.  
Documents  
In this study, documents included primary and secondary sources of available data 
that revealed facts on significant issues in the study, such as the political, economic, 
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legal, and sociocultural realities of the country, and some of the anticorruption strategies 
or practices in place. Documents for research might include records, archives, fact books, 
and also photographs, compact disks and videotapes, which have sometimes been viewed 
as a fourth category of types of data (Creswell, 2007). 
Documents played an important role in this study because they enabled access 
into certain forms of information such as institutional fact checking which could not be 
obtained easily through other techniques. Individuals and organizations sometimes might 
be willing to release public documents concerning operations rather than participating in 
interviews which could be seen as a time-consuming or sensitive activity like the subject 
of this study. Therefore, documents were added to interviews to constituted the methods 
used to collect data for this study.  
 
 




1. What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by 
Cameroon’s NACC?  
2. What can be learned from NACC’s past experience of 
working with anticorruption policies and programs? 
3. What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the 
government to implement effective  
4. How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used 
to potentially improve the development and 




Method of Data Analysis 
Data Management, Analysis, and Representation  
The process of managing, analyzing, and presenting data in this study covered 
four essential stages, which included: management (organization) of the data in the first 
stage; reading and transcription of the data in the second stage; analyzing the data 
through descriptions, clarifications, and interpretations in the third stage; and, finally 
packaging and presenting the findings in the fourth stage. The process therefore started 
and ended with data management ideas, indicating that the organization of data before 
and after analysis was key in this section of the study. The main purpose of data 
management is to prepare data for proper analysis and representation. If the tracking and 
organization of data is done poorly, the analysis and all other activities that follow also 
fail, since they are all intertwined. Miles and Huberman (1994); and Miles, Huberman, 
and Saldana (2014) pointed out that data management is one of the four major issues that 
are liable to affect the general management of a qualitative study. The three other issues 
include: computer usage; staffing and time planning; and, agreements with study 
participants. 
In this study, I focused decision making on three main issues: ensuring high 
quality and accessible data, documentation of the analysis that have been done, and 
retention of data and associated analysis after the study was completed. Data 
management issues were handled through formatting, cross-referral, and indexing. Other 
methods included ‘abstracting’, which means a condensed summary of longer material, 
and ’pagination’, which is the use of unique numbers/letters to locate specific material in 
field notes.  
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I also made use of the following strategies: a) developed and used multiple data 
storage instruments such as paper notes, computer disc folders, and USB flash drive, and 
also ensured simplification and clarity of data. Since complex data and words could not 
be avoided completely, an appendix of definitions and codes was created to facilitate 
comprehension, and b) made anticipations ahead of time and figured out solutions for 
prospective field issues. Moreover, no participant was neglected throughout the study, 
since the participants could be contacted more than once in case of data loss or need for 
follow up. 
At the first stage, the data was organized into files and folders and a system for 
developing codes using letters and numbers was put into place, then the comprehensive 
material including interview transcripts, documents, and field notes were read to gain 
acquaintance with the material and to develop a deep insight and understanding of the 
data and make sense of it Apori-Nkansah, 2008). Memos were derived from short 
phrases, key ideas and concepts that were jotted down in the course of reading and 
reflecting on the data.  
The second stage covered the development of initial codes. According to Saldana 
(2015), coding in qualitative research is to use words or short phrases to summarize data. 
A preliminary coding framework was developed for the study, and then full codes were 
later derived from the data collected as shown in appendix B below. Using the codes, I 
was able to focused on reducing the data text into smaller, more manageable themes, so 
that one could easily identify specific or different patterns and trends in the data, and how 
the data addressed the foundational theories of this study and equally answered the 
research questions raised. The codes were abstracted from the data through an iterative 
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process that required reading the data several times for new insights until a level of 
saturation was reached – when no new insights or meanings were emerging from the data 
again. Furthermore, the codes were regrouped into categories of similar ideas. The 
categories and codes were compared and contrasted for new insights and the development 
of more codes. This activity was done repeatedly until data saturation was attained. Then, 
the categories were applied to the research questions to provide an understanding of the 
concept of anticorruption. This approach of comparing and contrasting ideas within data 
until saturation is reached, for the sake of developing codes and categories, is what 
Apori-Nkansah (2008) refers to as the “constant comparative” approach (p. 102). 
The third stage is the level whereby proper data analysis was done, including 
describing, classifying, and interpreting the data. Even though this stage called for core 
analysis of the data, one must mention the fact that data analysis begins right from the 
moment the data is being collected. This is especially so, due to the huge size and 
complex nature of data usually collected by the qualitative researcher. Different strategies 
and techniques are employed from this point onward to assist the analytical procedure.  
Codes are useful in this procedure, as they are used to assign units of meaning in a 
study, and to reduce the size of data as these codes work intricately as paraphrases to 
sizeable words, phrases, sentences, or even paragraphs (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The 
coding strategy that this study employed is the pattern coding, which allowed for the 
examination of frequencies of particular words to indicate the implications of such 
characteristics to the phenomenon being studied. The study adopted other methods and 
strategies for in-depth analysis, including an ‘integrated’ approach that proceeded with a 
contextual analysis that connects all the salient aspects of the case into one main stream 
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of ideas. This entails detailed description, categorical aggregation, direct interpretation, 
establishment of patterns, and development of naturalistic generalizations of the 
interview transcript (Creswell, 2007).  
The main thematic tool that was selected to connect the different pieces of the 
data gathered in addressing the main research question raised in this study is the term 
“effectiveness”. The operationalization of effectiveness enabled the analysis to explore 
the relationship between the different themes drawn in the study to depict existing and 
working anticorruption theories and practices, connecting them to the case at hand to 
demonstrate what the practice in Cameroon is and how effective it is in an actual combat 
against corruption. Therefore, good governance theories and practices, which are also 
deemed identical to anticorruption theories and practices, such as respect for the rule of 
law, independent judiciary, freedom of speech, accountability, and transparency, were 
compared with the strategies actually implemented by the Cameroon’s anticorruption 
agency (NACC). The analytical tool of ‘impact’ (achievement) was used as a first step in 
this comparison. The results were in turn compared with the actual environmental 
dynamics of the country, and that’s where the notions of “policy context” and 
“contextualization” came in as second step to enable the study to understand which 
strategies could work better for Cameroon’s situation (conclusion – third step).   
The fourth and final stage called for the packaging and presentation of the data in 
a readable and comprehensible format, and also how to represent the data in tables, 
matrices, and narratives (Creswell, 2007). The study therefore had to build a logical chain 
of evidence that answered and validated the research questions, reconciling the problem, 
purpose, and significance of the study. I used tables, matrices, charts, and narratives to 
125 
 
represent data in this study. For tables, an iterative “code mapping” figure was used to 
show how the codes that were built into categories could now be applied to research 
questions in order to form themes. In addition, this study made use of “Constas’ 
documentational table” for the development of categories (Constas, 1995, p. 262, cited in 
Apori-Nkansah, 2008, p. 104). This table was used to show how categories were 
developed and how these categories helped in making the analysis an open process 
(Apori-Nkansah, 2008). Constas argued that the researcher must make the process of 
analysis of qualitative findings a public event in order to ensure trustworthiness of such 
findings (Constas, 1995, cited in Apori-Nkansah, 2008, p. 104-105). The table was 
accompanied by a matrix that represented the different categories developed. The study 
made use of manual coding and all data management and analysis were done without the 
employment of any software management tool. 
Finally, narratives were provided in a literary format, with the descriptions and 
interpretations drawn from the findings of the study. The preceding processes worked in 
conjunction with each other to provide a detailed account on how this research arrived at 
plausible findings on the dynamics of anticorruption in Cameroon.  
Structuring the Narrative Report  
Case study research is said to have no standard format for reporting findings 
(Merriam, 1988). In this study, I provided a detailed description as well as interpretations 
that were influenced both by research and by intellectual insights on the dynamics of 
anticorruption practice in Cameroon. The narrative of the case study was opened and 
closed with sketches in order to draw the reader into the case. This approach employed 
several different successive stages that were followed in structuring the narrative report. 
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The first stage consisted of a vignette that introduced the reader to the time and place of 
the study. The next step identified the issue, the purpose, and the method of the study, in 
order to expose the background of the writer and the issue surrounding the case. An 
extensive description of the case and its context, with the aid of uncontested body of data 
was then presented.  
Besides choosing a design for structuring the narrative report, I also struck a 
balance between the weight of the information accorded to description and that which is 
allocated for analysis. The study focused on analyzing the case more than describing or 
narrating its occurrence, thus providing more substantial and solution-driven information 
concerning the phenomenon studied. In addition, the choice of the balance and the entire 
structure of the narrative report generally depend on the intent of the study (Creswell, 
2007). I maintained the objectivity of the study, which was to guide the structure of the 
narrative report, thus providing a deeper understanding of the mechanisms and strategies 
that are being utilized by the government of Cameroon to combat corruption in the 
country.  
Issues of Trustworthiness 
The quality of a study is assessed based on its credibility and trustworthiness 
(Trochim, 2001). These terms are used in the context of qualitative studies for validity 
and reliability purposes. The process of validating a qualitative study is not rigid, fixed, 
or strictly measured as might be the case for a quantitative study. Rather, the process 
comprises of a ‘crystallization’ of different processes within the sphere of collecting, 
analyzing, interpreting, and applying the bulk of data associated with qualitative research 
(Trochim, 2001). For the sake of credibility and trustworthiness, I ensured that findings 
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matched with the beliefs and perspectives of participants. Credibility and trustworthiness 
is also assessed based on other qualities such as transferability, dependability, and 
conformability. Transferability allows for external evaluation of the study, to ensure that 
the findings can be transferred elsewhere, given similar conditions. Dependability 
requires that the changing contexts of the study be identified and demonstrated as to how 
such changes impact the findings. Conformability demands that the procedures of the 
study be documented, to collaborate and confirm the findings (Trochim, 2001) 
 I this study, I employed certain techniques that aided the overall quality 
verification and evaluation exercise. These included the techniques of reactivity, 
reflexivity, and triangulation. Firstly, concerning reactivity, note was taken of the fact 
that the data collected for the study was sensitive data due to the nature of the research 
topic. Generally, due to political connotations, it was previewed that participants might 
be reticent in discussing issues of corruption. Being aware of these dynamics beforehand, 
precaution concerning “reactivity” was taken before the start of the data collection 
process and throughout. Reactivity is “the influence of the researcher on the setting or 
individuals studied” (Maxwell, 2005, p. 108). 
 On the same note of political sensitivity of the subject being explored, note was 
taken that participants could speak, but not in detail. However, to succeed in getting the 
information needed to ensure quality for the study, probes were used, also referred to as 
“intervention” as discussed in Maxwell (2005, p. 111). These probes are intelligent 
interventions made during the interview session, which help in bringing out information 
from the interviewee without violating their rights or confidence. These interventions 
helped in the retrieval of authentic and quality data, even though quality in qualitative 
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studies cannot be 100 percent ensured, due to the fact that participants themselves can 
make voluntary and involuntary errors.  
Secondly, “reflexivity” as described in Creswell (2007), refers to the questions 
such as, “how has the author’s subjectivity been both as a producer and a product of this 
text? Is there self-awareness and self-exposure? Does the author hold himself or herself 
accountable to the standards of knowing and telling of the people he or she has studied?” 
(p. 213). This view is one of the strong points upon which quality assurance in this study 
was anchored. I respected every one of these steps throughout the study.  
 Lastly, triangulation requires that multiple data collection tools and sources be 
compared and aligned with each other (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Analyzing a problem 
from multiple angles so as to establish validity in such analysis is what is referred to as 
triangulation in qualitative research. Triangulation could be in relation to data, 
investigator, theory, methodology, or environment. Data triangulation which means usage 
of different sources of information; and methodology triangulation which means usage of 
different data collection tools are the main forms of the triangulation held in this study to 
increase its validity. Also, peer review, including review from my dissertation committee 
members served as another form of triangulation for the study. Apart from final reviews 
from dissertation committee members, the study was submitted to the review of two 
professionals in the field of public policy and administration who have completed 
academic studies of this nature, and especially within the most recent decade.   
Ethical Considerations 
According to Creswell (2007) “a qualitative researcher faces many ethical issues 
that surface during data collection in the field and during analysis and dissemination of 
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qualitative reports” (p. 141). The main ethical concern that this study presented was the 
sensitive nature of its object. Corruption is a topic that is surrounded by strong political 
sensitivities and tensions, especially in developing countries. Generally, public officials 
in Cameroon were expected to show a great deal of reticence in discussing anything that 
has to do with corruption, especially during this time that the subject is a hot spot in the 
current political dynamics of the country. Several top government officials, including the 
former minister of territorial administration and decentralization, former secretary general 
at the presidency of the republic, former minister of finance, former prime minister, and 
many other senior civil servants have been apprehended and incarcerated by the 
presidential “Operation Sparrow Hawk” for embezzlement of public funds. Others who 
have also been apprehended include great business tycoons spanning the civil society and 
para-public institutions (Cameroon Polls, 2012). The issue is highly complex, and thus 
had to be approached with much caution and astute strategies that would ensure and ease 
data collection. 
To ensure that the preceding ethical concerns were properly addressed, I put in 
place several measures that helped optimize the protection of all categories of 
participants. Such measures included designing the case study to present a composite 
picture rather than an individual picture, informing the participants of the purpose of the 
study, and not engaging in deceptions concerning its nature but making it clear to the 
participants (Creswell, 2007). Other measures included: assuring the participants of the 
anonymity of their responses during and after the study; explaining the research questions 
and data collection methods to the participants before seeking their consent to participate 
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in the study; and informing participants that they can withdraw from the study at any 
point in time if they wish to do so (Apori-Nkansah, 2008).  
In addition, by acknowledging the political sensitivity of the study, data collection 
strategies that ensured privacy for the participants were employed. Thus, participants 
were not asked any questions that touched nor revealed any facts connected to their 
private lives. All questions were based on systematic and procedural facts concerning 
how the government of Cameroon approaches the combat against corruption in the 
country. The study did not seek to inquire information on who is or who is not corrupt 
and/or responsible for the corruption in Cameroon, but rather focused on established 
public strategies and institutions designed to tackle the problem within the country. The 
technique of note-taking during interviews was employed and no audio- or video-
recording was used, since the current nature of events in the country would have probably 
scared most public officials from accepting that their contributions to a study of this 
nature be recorded through media by which they could be identified. 
Summary  
In this study, I sought to explore and contextualize the current anticorruption 
mechanisms and strategies employed by the government to combat corruption in 
Cameroon. Case study research was selected to serve as a theoretical method of inquiry 
for the study because it provided a platform for performing an in-depth and contextual 
analysis. Interviews and documents were used as tools for data collection. The interviews 
were semi-structured, with open-ended questions.  
Participants that provided data for the study were 20 in number. They were 
purposefully selected through criterion, maximum variation, and snowball sampling 
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strategies. The data collected was coded and analyzed through detailed descriptions, 
categories and aggregations, objective interpretations, patterns, and naturalistic 
generalizations. The findings of the study were validated with multiple data sources and 
data collection methods, thick description, supervisory checks, and peer review. The 
narrative report was developed through a realist approach. 
Participants were protected and assured of the anonymity and confidentiality of 
the information they provided for the study. Chapter 4 analyzed the findings that emerged 




Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to explore the Cameroon government’s 
anticorruption policy by assessing the government’s anticorruption approaches and how 
they are implemented, so as to provide a deeper understanding of the instruments used by 
the government to combat corruption in the country. By so doing, I sought to evaluate the 
extent to which these policies satisfy good governance principles and the reasons why 
they have not achieved much success since their launch.   
The main question addressed by the study was: What anticorruption strategies are 
perceived as effective in helping the government of Cameroon curb systematic public 
corruption? The following sub-questions were then asked as a follow up to the main 
question so as to obtain in-depth information:  
1. What have been the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon’s 
NACC?  
2.  What could be learned from NACC’s past experience of working with 
anticorruption policies and programs?  
3. What tools did NACC agents feel were needed from the government to 
implement effective anticorruption policies?  
4. How could the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially 




This chapter provides an overview of the findings of the study. It explains the 
processes of data gathering, analysis, and interpretation. The chapter concludes with a 
presentation of the findings, giving answers to the questions of the research. 
Demographics  
This study employed 20 participants with different backgrounds and expertise in 
anticorruption practice. The pool of participants targeted a specific department within the 
overall NACC agency in order to ensure focus and accessibility to in-depth information.  
All participants resided in Cameroon. They were all Cameroonians ranging from 
36-60 years of age. All of the participants worked with NACC, and five out of the 20 
participants were female.  
For the purpose of confidentiality, each of the participants was assigned a 
particular alpha-numerical identifier. Each participant was assigned the identifier P 
(participant) and a numerical ranging from one to 20. For example, the first participant 
was P1 and the final was P20.  
Lastly, the term public servant was used instead of civil servant to describe the 
participants because the former is more generic and covers everyone working with the 
public sector either as a direct employee or a contractor. But the latter narrowly identifies 
only those who are direct government employees with civil service status. These ones can 
be identified with the appellation public servants, but not all public servants have civil 
service status, especially in the context of public administration and public law. 





For data collection, two methods were employed, which included interviews, and 
document review. After receiving approval from Walden’s IRB (approval number: 0500), 
I contacted a pool of potential participants at NACC, including a chief senior officer who 
was the director that issued a letter of cooperation for data to be collected from that 
branch of the NACC agency. All participants had experience with anticorruption policies 
and strategies of the agency and they were working at the branch charged with 
implementing the agency’s policies in the telecommunication sector of the government. 
NACC is organized in such a way that divisional missions are dispatched to each 
government sector or department to ensure that the agency’s vision and activities cover 
the entire government operations.  
I started by making a general appeal to the NACC department to get a potential 
participant pool. The management was able to provide me with a pool and then I initiated 
separate contacts with the individuals and sought their consent for participation. 
Following this initial survey, I was able to sort out those who exhibited interest in 
participating in the research. I then sent each person a formal invitation to participate and 
an informed consent form. About 40 individuals were initially part of the potential 
participant pool, but 20 candidates signed up for participation and this was my purposeful 
sampling size determined during the design of the study. 
All potential participants were given the opportunity to review the informed 
consent form and ask questions related to the study and any other clarifications they 
needed to know in order to make informed decisions about their participation in the 
study. In order to ensure that I answered the research questions comprehensively and that 
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the outcome of the study was representative of the government of Cameroon, a 
purposeful sampling technique was employed, and diversity of participants was 
considered so that different viewpoints and opinions would be represented.  
In the invitation letter, I ensured that potential participants were asked to indicate 
their voluntary willingness to participate in the study by reading through, understanding 
the terms of, and signing the informed consent form. They also had to consent to 
providing me with their WhatsApp registered mobile telephone numbers which were to 
serve as the secured communication platform for conducting the interviews. All 
interviews were scheduled based on convenient times and dates for the participants. Since 
the interviews were conducted virtually, participants also had the choice to determine 
locations convenient to them at the time of the interviews. After the establishment of a 
mutual time and date for the interviews, I kept periodic reminders with the participants 
through secured text-messages as the interviews proceeded.  
Interviews 
I started interviewing the participants based on availability. Since participants 
were working, each person was giving time to rest after working hours and thereafter we 
engaged into the interviewing process. Due to the sensitive nature of the research subject, 
I always started off by ensuring the participants of the confidentiality of their private 
information and the anonymity of any data or disclosure they make throughout the 
process.   
Based on convenience to the participants, they chose their location during the 
interviews, and most indicated that they were at their homes during the virtual interview 
conversations. On my end, I was in my home office, and I ensured that the environment 
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was quiet and free from any form of distraction. I also informed each participant to make 
sure that their environment was conducive to and functional for the interview activity. At 
the beginning of each session, I reminded each participant of the voluntary nature of their 
participation in the study, the protection of all of their information and disclosures with 
confidentiality, and the agreement that they could withdraw from the study at any point 
without any particular reason or notice. Before delving into interview proper, I ensured 
that a brief conversation was conducted between myself and the participant to prepare the 
atmosphere and set a conversational tone and ease that will make the interview process 
smooth. I always reminded the participants that they should respond to the question to the 
best of their knowledge and not be compelled to say anything they did not feel like 
saying. I also told them that they were all identified by coded initials for reasons of 
confidentiality.  
Within a period of three weeks, I conducted 20 interviews using 20 open-ended 
questions that gave the participants the latitude to express themselves based on 
knowledge, experience, and available information in and around their agency concerning 
the topic addressed. I was not able to physically travel to Cameroon for face-to-face 
interviews due to a political crisis that was going on in the country at that time and posed 
serious security concerns for my. This challenge was explained to my dissertation chair 
and committee with a proposed potentially effective alternative of conducting the 
interviews virtually. The proposal was approved, and I put into place a functional 
mechanism and equipment that ensured effective and successful interviewing.   
During the interviews, I asked different questions, some to redirect the 
participants toward the topic, and others to ease conversation when a particular question 
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appeared challenging to the participant. Each of the 10 questions listed on the interview 
protocol was posed to the participants, and several sub- and diversified questions were 
asked to facilitate the main questions and the entire process. 
All the interviews were conducted between the participants and me. No one else 
intervened in each of the sessions. Due to network difficulties and security reasons, voice 
recordings were not obtained; instead, all participants were requested to type their 
responses on a WhatsApp platform that was equally encrypted for security reasons. A 
separate platform was used for each participant since each of them had a sperate mobile 
telephone number. I downloaded and printed the separate interviews for coding and 
analysis. I also kept the digital records of the responses on my Apple iPhone 7 which is 
also locked with a security code, and then at the end of the interviews, I transferred the 
original transcripts to a secured flash drive and equally stored them in my private e-mail 
academic folder to ensure that I do not lose all the data if one storage devise 
malfunctioned. The data shall be stored at these two locations for at least 5 years 
according to IRB prescription, after which it will be destroyed following IRB directives.  
The interviews generated 113 transcribed pages of data. The longest interview 
lasted for about 3 hours and 13 minutes, the shortest was 1 hour 06 minutes, with an 
average of 2 hours. Participants were allowed to take breaks when needed, but none took 
a voluntary break during the interviewing process except for a few instances of network 
problems and the need to recharge mobile telephones. Overall, the process went 
smoothly, and the participants expressed contentment at the end to have been given the 
opportunity to participate in the study. A summative interview table presented below 




In addition to data collected through interviews, I also collected data through 
review of relevant documents that were available at that time. The purpose of this 
additional source of data was to ensure triangulation of primary data source and to 
establish a base for trustworthiness in the data analysis output.  
Data used for document review could come from public documents, personal or 
private documents, archival sources, non-verbal information, and from mass media 
including newspapers, magazines, radio, and television programs (Singleton & Straits, 
2005). Bowen (2009) also added that the sources of data for document review vary 
substantially and could almost include any relevant verbal or nonverbal information.  
Based on this background, I reviewed data obtained from government published 
documents, including the presidential decree creating NACC, reports on the state of the 
fight against corruption in Cameroon by NACC and I followed online news and talk 
shows on issues of corruption and the fight against it in the country. I also reviewed press 
briefings of NACC concerning the elaboration of a national strategy to fight against 
corruption by the agency, and finally, I reviewed publications made by experts based in 
Cameroon concerning the corruption/anticorruption subject in the country. 
Description of Data Analysis Process  
Coding  
To code qualitative data is to assign unique labels to the text passages of the data 
that will act as references to specific information derived from the data (Bernard, 1994; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994). In this study, I had to create and assign codes that 
corresponded to each of the thoughts held by the respondents, about the nature of the 
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prevalence of corruption in the Cameroon especially in the civil service, the combat 
against it, perception on the effectiveness of the NACC, opinions on the influences of 
international policies in the fight, and proposals on strategies to improvement 
anticorruption practice by NACC. The codes also encompassed data that was collected in 
form of document review.  
After assigning codes to all the data, a code list was then created inductively and 
manually based on the responses gathered from the field (see Carey, Morgan, & Oxtoby, 
2006). A priori codes were envisaged from the research questions and conceptual 
framework of the study, but only served as a reference to facilitate actual coding as 
represented in Appendix B.  
As seen in appendix B, coding was done in three different iterative levels. The 
first iterative level shows the initial codes built from the data; the second level depicts 
how the initial codes are grouped into categories; and the third iterative level shows how 
the categories are applied to research questions to develop an understanding of the 
phenomenon of corruption and the combat against it by NACC using the different 
mechanisms and strategies of education and sensitization programs, good governance 
principles, investigations, institutionalization, and international cooperation. The codes 
were then analyzed with the help of other strategies and methods, which are discussed 
below. Results were presented in themes and patterns. The categorization of the data to 
facilitate analysis was done with the help of Constas’ (1992) documentational table for 




According to Lacey and Luff (2009), there are no “quick fix” techniques in 
qualitative analysis (p. 6). Thus, there are several different methods that can be employed 
for qualitative data analysis. In this study, an integrated approach was employed for the 
analysis. This approach proceeds with a contextual analysis that connects all the salient 
aspects of the case into one main stream of ideas (Lacey & Luff, 2009). In this respect, 
strategies employed to analyze the interview and document transcripts included detailed 
description, categorical aggregation, direct interpretation, establishment of patterns, and 
development of naturalistic generalization, as they are said to be the most appropriate 
strategies for analyzing data in a case study research (Creswell, 2007). The contextual 
perspectives of the subject discussed were aided by a case study approach, which 
revealed in-depth information concerning the realities surrounding the phenomenon being 
studied.   
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
The trustworthiness of a qualitative study is addressed by examining issues of 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (Basit, 2003). These can also 
be summed up as validity and reliability, which highly depends on the effectiveness of 
the data collection tool in terms of the nature of the tool, and how it is employed (Basit, 
2003). For this study, no computer software was employed to assist either the data 
collection or analysis process. This was due mostly to technical reasons and other remote 
considerations. Although the manual approach of preliminary analysis, which included 
coding and categorization of the data, was tedious and time consuming (see Basit, 2003), 
it was more acute for a detailed content analysis of the size of data collected for this 
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study. Interviewing was the tool judged best for this study, but for validity and reliability 
purposes, the data was triangulated with other data collected through document review 
(see Miles & Huberman, 1994).     
Credibility 
Credibility, according to Shenton (2004), measures the congruency of the findings 
of the research in relation with reality. Shenton also sees credibility as one of the most 
important factors needed to establish trustworthiness in a study. Credibility guides the 
qualitative researcher to demonstrate that the research portrays a true picture of the 
subject being studied (Shenton, 2004). Credibility therefore measures accuracy and how 
factual and believable the findings of the study may be perceived.  
To show credibility, Patton (2002) posited that the researcher must demonstrate 
rigor in the data collection process, including analyzing the data; must show that the 
researcher himself is credible; and that the philosophical believe in the value of the 
research is established. In this study, I used an expanded and knowledgeable interview 
participant pool. I also triangulated the interview data with document reviews. These 
steps, together with observance of rigor in analyzing the data demonstrated the credibility 
of the study. 
Transferability 
Transferability means the possibility for the research findings to be generalized or 
transferred to other settings (Shenton, 2004). In this study, I demonstrated transferability 
by choosing to study the anticorruption within NACC which is renown in the area of 
anticorruption in Cameroon, and as such representative of other organizations making 
similar efforts.  
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To ensure generalizability of the study, I designed the interview protocol to fully 
capture salient questions surrounding the phenomenon being studied as touching all 
NACC activities across the national territory. I also made sure that the participant pool 
contained individuals that have had experience working with several divisions of NACC 
in different governmental departments according to the organizational and administrative 
design of NACC.  
Dependability 
Dependability refers to the stability of the findings of the study over time (Bitsch, 
2005). Therefore, the findings should be supported by data received from the informants 
of the study (Anney, 2014). It also means given same or similar context, the study should 
be repeatable or replicable (Guba and Lincoln, 1982). Dependability however, could be 
challenging to establish due to the changing of the environment of the study (Shenton, 
2004).  
According to Anney (2014), a major approach to ensuring dependability would be 
to keep an audit trail. This entails carefully tracking and storing raw data, notes, 
documents, records collected from the field, test scores, and others (Guba and Lincoln, 
1982). In this study, I demonstrated dependability by fully describing the research design 
and methodology, and I ensured that the procedure of data collection and analysis was 
carefully done, and records kept such that a complete trail of the study could be reached 
at any time. Also, if such trail is followed (the various steps of the research) and 
replicated in the same of similar environment, the results obtained would likely be similar 




Confirmability is established by the degree to which the findings of the research 
could be said to be an accurate representation of participants’ views (Shenton, 2004). 
Confirmability ensures that the interpretations of the findings of the research are not 
purely from the imagination of the researcher, but rather that they are derived from the 
data collected (Anney, 2014). Also, the extent to which the researcher intentionally 
acknowledges his biases determines the level of confirmability of his study (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  
Apart from triangulation, I established confirmability in this study by 
documenting the rationale behind every step of the study, I ensured that they data 
collected was carefully analyzed and participants true views of the subject matter  
represented, I made direct quotes of participants’ own words where appropriate, I also 
ensured that the data collection tool and the storing tools were checked and properly 
administered and utilized. Finally, I took necessary precaution to ensure that I did not in 
any way inadvertently modify the views and comments of the research participants.  
Results  
The results of this study presented in this chapter contain an encompassing 
analysis and interpretation of the data collected from the research participants and 
documents. The technique applied to analyze the data collected was content analysis, 
which was used to sort out recurrent and major themes and patterns emerging from the 
data. These were then interpreted, and meanings attached to all of them.  
The guiding argument of the study was that the adaptation of public policies to 
fundamental principles of good governance and to specific policy contexts would yield 
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better results for public administration and to the government and society at large 
compared to situations whereby public policies are being made without any intentional 
consideration of these factors. Following this premise, the case of the effectiveness of 
anticorruption policies in Cameroon as implemented by NACC was raised through four 
research questions: 
RQ1: What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon’s NACC? 
RQ2: What can be learned from NACC’s past experience of working with 
anticorruption policies and programs? 
RQ3: What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the government to 
implement effective anticorruption policies? 
RQ4: How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially improve 
the development and implementation of anticorruption strategies at NACC?  
To answer these questions, 20 research participants were asked 10 open ended 
questions through individual interviews with the intention for the participants, who were 
professionals, to provide responses that could be used to answer the research questions 
comprehensively. The questions sought to know the kind of strategies and policies 
implemented by NACC to combat corruption in Cameroon, especially within the 
government. Secondly, the questions sought to find out how effective these strategies 
have been in the agency’s and government’s overall anticorruption effort. Thirdly, the 
questions sought to discover whether the anticorruption strategies reflected good 
governance principles, and whether they were equally influenced by international 
strategies at large. And finally, the questions sought to understand the policy context of 
Cameroon and make a case for the adaptation/contextualization of anticorruption 
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strategies for effective outcomes. The interview protocol and document review were 
therefore designed with great care to elicit the data needed to answer the preceding 
questions.  
Research Question 1 
What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon’s NACC? 
Introduction 
Through this question, I sought to identify the kind of strategies and policies 
implemented by NACC to combat corruption in Cameroon, especially within the 
government. I also sought to capture the general prevailing issue of corruption in 
Cameroon and to know whether government have made serious strides towards its 
eradication, and how the research participants, who are anticorruption agents, felt about 
the overall government efforts in combating corruption in the country. Questions 1 to 3 of 
the interview protocol focused on eliciting information that answered question 1. 
Documents reviewed concerning this area, including the presidential decree creating 
NACC and agency reports on the state of the fight against corruption in Cameroon by 
NACC were also used to answer question 1.  
An analysis of the interview questions and documents uncovered seven major 
anticorruption strategies implemented by NACC through government’s effort to fight 
against corruption in Cameroon. The strategies were sorted in two categories. The first 
category constituted strategies that are rooted in good governance principles, and the 
second category identified strategies that are regular public policy. The good governance-
based strategies were seen as opportunities to gain even more effective anticorruption 
results by strengthening their performance through the consideration of contextual 
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factors, while the regular public policy strategies were seen as challenges, waste, and 
reasons for governmental reform.  
Good Governance Opportunities  
In reviewing the interviews and documents, three major good governance 
principles and opportunities were identified. These are said to be opportunities to develop 
effective anticorruption strategies because the data indicated that even though these 
principles present in the practice of anticorruption at NACC, they however needed to be 
improved upon. These indications could be seen from the emerging themes on figure 1 
under appendix B.  
The creation and institutionalization of NACC gave the government a sound 
vision and direction to fight against corruption in Cameroon. All 20 interview 
participants of this study from P1 to P20 affirmed that the creation of the National Anti-
Corruption Commission (NACC) was one of the major steps the government took to 
combat Corruption in Cameroon. Also, information from document review indicated that 
NACC is a central government agency charged with the state’s administrative effort to 
curb corruption in Cameroon. Accordingly, NACC reports revealed that the vision of the 
head of states, Biya, since his rise to power is 1982 had been to build a Cameroon that 
was free of all forms of corruption. Created by a presidential decree on March 11, 2006 
NACC represented one of the strongest materializations of the president’s vision of a 
corruption free Cameroon. Although participants were quick to reveal weaknesses they 
believed were associated with NACC’s operations, they were enthusiastic about the 
overall creation and institutionalization of the agency an anticorruption organ of the 
government. P1 had this to say about NACC:  
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            Fighting corruption by the government has as first goal the creation of specialized 
institutions in which we have NACC. But this institution from its creation has 
witnessed a lot of setbacks by reason of the fact that its members are appointed 
and are often former agents of public service. Therefore, the fight is slow and 
inconsistent. NACC has sub-units in all public institutions and representatives. 
There is also a phone number available to those who have been victims to 
denounce culprits.  
In addition, P3 in his own words said:  
            The NACC was established to eradicate corruption in the country. Many 
strategies have been put in place. Apart from “Operation Sparrow Hawk” that 
tracks and punishes those suspected of corruption, a recent hotline has been 
instituted and permits victims of corruption to be heard 24/24. This service 
permitted many corruption cases to be handled promptly.  
P5 added that NACC partnered well with other business coalitions and with the 
public contracts regulatory board to tackle the issue of corruption in the country. P13, 
P14, and P15 pointed out that NACC as an organization was created with good intentions 
and that the agency was fervent in its role which was more focused on investigating and 
reporting corruption cases to the powers that be, and that such lack of autonomy was one 
of the reasons why they could not achieve much as an institution.  
Institutional and legal reforms by the government initiated the rule of law in the 
fight against corruption in Cameroon. One of the major tenets of good governance is 
respect of the rule of law by the population and the government. The law makers 
themselves must respect the laws they make. Having the rule of law and respect for it has 
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been a challenge for most developing countries. In the case of Cameroon, at least for 
anticorruption purposes, investigations of this study revealed that the government 
actually carried out institutional and legal reforms that brought the rule of law to the 
center of the anticorruption struggle within its institutions and in the country at large.  
The data collected from documents and interviews showed that in an effort to 
curb corruption in Cameroon, the government in addition to creating NACC, created a 
special criminal court for anticorruption prosecutions, a government department in charge 
of superior state control, a public contract regulatory board, a national agency for 
financial investigations, all working together in conjunction with NACC and other public 
actors in the fight such as the ministry of justice, the audit bench at the supreme court, 
and the judicial police. Also, the government brought article 66 of the constitution to the 
lamplight, and enacted other laws that reinforced the fight against corruption in the 
country. Participants identified and viewed these reforms as opportunities which 
government could make significant strides in the corruption battle if they were 
sufficiently supported in terms of funding, enforcement, and overall political will. In his 
own words, P7 expatiated on this government effort as follows: 
            First and foremost, the government has created anticorruption units in all public 
structures like state universities and other higher institutes of learning. In some 
professions like in the military, there are anticorruption units instituted under the 
leadership of NACC to denounce some of those uniform men and women who 
have been sent on the highways to control the safety nature of roads. There is a 
free call number that has been made known to the road users to denounce any 
form of corruption by anyone in uniform who instead of being worried about the 
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state of the car or the car documents as well as speeding nature of the driver, is 
more concerned with collecting money. All drivers know the fine that awaits them 
in case of any highway offense but most often they think they will drive without 
possessing the required documents with the intention of corrupting the controllers. 
Even though these strategies have been put in place by the government to curb 
corruption, a lot still needs to be done for this to be a reality.  
P8 added that article 66 of the constitution required that all top-level public 
officials must publicly declare their assets before and after taking up government offices. 
P2 also identified the preceding act as a good anticorruption strategy. P4 said the 
government appointed a priest by name Dieudonne Massi Gams, to head NACC as a sign 
to show government’s seriousness in the fight and the need to respect the rule of law.  
The implementation of whistleblowing and public denunciations brought 
legitimacy and voice to NACC’s anticorruption effort. One of the fundamental good 
governance principles is that government should be able to guarantee freedom of speech 
and allow the voices of the masses to be heard. This study revealed that such opportunity 
in the anticorruption struggle in Cameroon existed based on the operational strategies of 
NACC. Almost all the participants stated that NACC had a toll-free number that allowed 
individuals in all spheres of life to call NACC’s officer round the clock to report cases of 
corruption. Government programs for public sensitization such as “operation sparrow 
hawk” launched by the president through NACC since its inception in 2006 helped in 
cultivating a conducive environment for the voices of the people to be made inclusive and 




Participants pointed out several public sensitization and educational efforts 
carried out by government to inculcate values of civil duty in the communities and get 
citizen participation active in the corruption fight. P11 pointed that NACC put up notices 
in public institutions sensitizing the public government services that are free, she also 
mentioned TV and radio programs that are dedicated to educated the people on the 
activities of NACC, meanwhile P18 spoke within the same lines recounting government 
channels opened for whistleblowers, P1 mentioned open public debates organized by 
NACC to sample student’s opinion on the subject matter and equally advise them on the  
issues, P10 mentioned a website and email address available for the public to report 
corruption issues (website: www.conac.cm) (email: info@conac.cm). All these efforts are 
opportunities that government could reap huge policy successes if funded, monitored, and 
intentionally enforced.  
Other NACC Anticorruption Strategies and Challenges 
Apart from strategies that were rooted in good governance principles, NACC also 
implemented several other strategies as part of its “National Anticorruption Strategy” 
(NAS). But the study revealed that these strategies would probably not offer the same 
opportunities for effective anticorruption practice as the others discussed above. Rather 
they posed several challenges to the system and could only benefit NACC’s vision if they 
are totally reformed to reflect certain good governance practices. The four Strategies 
uncovered under this category revealed that:  
Effective decentralization should include structural and service decentralization. 
Cameroon is a unitary state where government is centralized, making the capital city 
(Yaounde) where the seat of government is situated, the lone vibrant place for the 
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origination of significant government decisions and activities. Based in Yaounde, NACC 
also operates by this centralized trail and would have to control the activities of all other 
units spread across the national territory. A decentralized system also means 
decentralization of decision making and as well as structures. The study revealed that 
even though NACC took significant steps towards decentralization, the efforts were 
limited to structural decentralization, and service operations were still centralized for the 
most part. Participants pointed out these dynamics and some of them elaborated on what 
they thought decentralization meant to NACC as a strategy for anticorruption. P1 stated 
decentralization as one of NACC’s anticorruption strategies whereby NACC’s unit are 
spread across the territory and in all public services to carry out anticorruption activities. 
Criticizing the layout of this strategy, P17 had this to say of NACC: 
            It is an observatory commission and it receives complaints from government 
personnel or citizens and table to the presidency to receive the authorization to go 
to the field for investigations before submitting its reports to the presidency, N/B 
it does not have powers to enforce any decisions. 
P6 pointed out that the structures were decentralized but the operation of services 
were still highly centralized as seen in the concentration of decision making in the central 
organ in Yaounde. P18 blamed such concentration on the lack of autonomy for NACC. 
He passionately expressed this view in the following words: 
            To be frank, an organization like CONAC (NACC) ought to be independent and 
work based on facts discovered and not on political motivations. This greatly 
hinders work at the agency. We work mostly on public projects which have not 
been completed. But we work with other ministries such as that of public works, 
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supreme state control and auditing. We equally work with international 
organizations for mutual legal assistance. The organization has as function to help 
in the realization of public projects by preventing embezzlement. It equally has as 
aim to assist the country towards development 
The preceding revelations are the discoveries that we made concerning 
decentralization as a NACC anticorruption strategy. 
Investigation without prosecution might lead to wastage of public resources. This 
study uncovered that investigation of alleged corruption cases was one of the core 
functions and approaches of NACC against corruption in the country. However, this 
strategy was challenging to the organization based on assessments from the data 
collected. P6 spoke passionately about the nature of these investigations in the following 
words: 
            I wonder if NACC members can arrest without the help of the police like in 
Kenya where anticorruption commission members can arrest even uniform 
officers in flagrant delicto. There is the so-called sparrow hawk operation by the 
government working with NACC, which seems to me more like an operation for 
political score settling rather than a fight against embezzlement.  
Additionally, P8 stated that certain investigations were covered up because the 
investigators were bribed by the suspects. The fact that NACC lacked the police power to 
make arrests was already a limitation to possible prosecutions. And secondly when these 
cases were turned over to the law enforcement agents for arrest and prosecution, some 
ended up not being prosecuted or wrong culprits being punished due to administrative 
bottlenecks, political score settling, and bribery of the law enforcement/judiciary. NACC 
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continued to spend substantial amount of resources on this strategy but yielding less 
effective results.    
Checks and audits are as effective as the nature of the pollical system in place. 
NACC also used checks and audits as a tool to combat corruption in the several 
government offices. It worked in cooperation with the inspector general of the supreme 
state control department to ensure that regular audits were performed in all government 
departments and major administrative units. These checks however could only be 
effective if the supervising organ (NACC) was neutral and granted the administrative and 
political autonomy to carry out this function. Cameroon’s political system lacked genuine 
checks and balances and power weighed significantly in the favor of the executive branch 
of the government with little capacity left for the legislative and judiciary branches. The 
political system influenced the way NACC carried out its business. In his own words, P7 
explained these dynamics as follows: 
            In some ministries, especially the ministry in charge of finance, various networks 
have been mounted to carry out dubious and corrupt practices on the civil servants 
who come there to follow their files. The issue of middlemen in this activity has 
been a wonderful experience as someone who has nothing to do with a particular 
ministry has the power to block the advancement of one’s file if he or she does 
not comply. A case I personally witnessed was one widow who was running after 
the late husband’s allowance. The man was a gendarme officer. When she 
approached one worker at the central treasury in Yaounde, the person requested a 
percentage of the money if he should assist her to have the due allowance. The 
woman accepted and after the deal was done, she went and reported the matter to 
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the minister of finance and the said civil servant had to use his own networks to 
survive expulsion from the public service and was only given punitive transfer. 
The preceding reports demonstrated the nature of the work culture born out of the 
country’s political system that favors a highly centralized government that makes public 
administration challenging.  
Intergovernmental and International Cooperation without political will yield less 
results. Information from the data also revealed that the government through NACC took 
several strides to establish intergovernmental and international cooperation as 
anticorruption strategy. Data collected from NACC reports on the state of the fight 
indicated that Cameroon in the international environment of the fight against corruption 
was charged with several activities including the signing of international conventions and 
treaties on governance and the combat against corruption. Cameroon was a signatory to 
the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and is also a subscriber to 
pan-African sub-regional norms. NACC also engaged in inclusive governance which 
brought in private sector entities to partner with the government in the cause. The agency 
equally cooperated with other government departments to make the fight an 
encompassing government effort. These relationships demonstrated significant 
intergovernmental steps taken to ensure public performance and promote transparency 
and accountability, but they also seemed to portray only an effort to fulfill regular 
government duty, as the policies lacked real action and intention to eradicate corruption 
by all cost. P6 expressed his views concerning these findings in the following words: 
            Generally, I would say that there is a very weak will on the part of the 
government to see corruption eradicated in Cameroon. This is evident by the fact 
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that even the main institution created by the government to fight it is ill equipped 
and ill powered to fight it: the text creating the commission gives it little or no 
power to do the job and so at the end of the day it is more or less a paper tiger or a 
toothless bulldog that barks but does not bite.  
P15 added that the challenges stemmed from the governance system put in place. 
To P13, it was an issue of actual will to cooperate and respect of operational 
autonomy. He stated that other government policies infringed upon, counteracted, and or 
watered down useful and potentially productive programs envisaged by NACC.  
Need for Governmental Reforms to Improve Strategies  
The themes that emerged from the data on the question of the kind of strategies 
implemented by NACC in its anticorruption effort, revealed from the second part that 
there was need for system reform so that the strategies could gain traction and thus thrive. 
Based on the analysis, decentralization, investigations, checks/audits, and 
intergovernmental and international cooperation were potential policy strategies that 
could result to great gains in the anticorruption struggle, but NACC and the government 
needed to review and make system reforms based on the experiences expressed by the 
participants. More expressions on this need were made by participants as they responded 
to the other questions. So, the issue of reforms shall come up again as we proceed in the 
analysis.  
Summary of Findings on Research Question 1 
In determining what strategies and how NACC combated corruption in 
Cameroon, especially within the government, this study found out from participants and 
from document review that NACC implemented strategies that could be categorized in 
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two sets: First were good governance principles, which gave the agency significant 
opportunities to record good results in the combat against corruption when they are 
consistently funded, monitored, and enforced. Second were policy strategies that were 
adopted under regular government public policy schemes but created less good 
governance opportunities even though they presented potentials for positive impact if 
reviewed and shaped through governmental reforms.  
Research Question 2 
What can be learned from NACC’s past experience of working with 
anticorruption policies and programs? 
Introduction  
After identifying and categorizing the various anticorruption strategies 
implemented by NACC in its effort to curb corruption both in government and in the 
country at large, the second question sought to find out how its agents felt about their 
interaction with the said strategies on daily basis. This was aimed at having a grasp of the 
knowledge of participants on the subject matter, understand the dynamics, perceptions, 
and realities of the effects of NACC’s strategies on the system, discover the achievements 
of the agency, and also uncover criticisms on both its successes and failures. Data from 
questions 3 to 5 of the interview protocol and information from document review helped 
to answer this second question.  
Through the findings, I uncovered seven major pointers. The first indicated that 
the participants understood the subject matter and could produce good results as 
employees of NACC when given the right tools. Two of the pointers revealed major 
achievements (successes) of NACC, and four of them outlined some of the main 
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weaknesses of the agency and where it could be said to have failed as an anticorruption 
machine.  
Availability of Qualified Labor  
Good systems need good people working with the systems in order to produce 
good results. Qualified people sometimes are not necessarily good people, especially 
when the organizational culture does not provide them with opportunities to exhibit good 
tendencies. This is the trend that was discovered with the review of interview responses 
and documents collected for this study. The participants indicated a deep understanding 
of the corruption/anticorruption subject. Writers and reporters from the documents 
proved similar qualities. However, the findings portrayed serious distortions in civil 
service hiring procedures and culture that surrounded government employment and even 
an organ such as NACC that should at least be free of the infection. The issue as such 
appeared to be that of organizational culture and not lack of qualified labor thereof.  
When asked about their experiences at NACC, participants were able to articulate 
the vision of NACC and all its intended strategies, but they did not show that NACC was 
producing a lot of results in terms of practical output. P8 said although the agency is 
meant to serve as an anticorruption machine, it was not equally free from the corruption 
syndrome. P9 said public officials caught in acts of corruption were ready to bribe their 
way out and also hide facts from NACC investigators, and because of the high rate of 
poverty in the country, NACC agents were bound to accepts such bribes. This 
observation revealed an underlying problem of low salaries which further findings shall 
address. P10 made an experiential expression that portrayed knowledge and 
understanding of concepts and procedures of the agency. In her own words, she said:  
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            As one who has been working with NACC, it has not been an easy task. It is not 
easy because most of those who call to report the issues of corruption do not 
reveal their identities for fear of being harmed. However, we have been carrying 
out seminars and projects to educate the population about the danger of 
corruption, especially on the need to denounce corrupt practices.  
Within the same lines of expression, P11 articulated his experience at NACC as 
follows: 
            I have worked with the agency for 5 years. I have worked on the following 
projects: “Corruption free Hospitals”, and “Public Funds Safety”. Within the 
corruption free hospitals project, I was essentially evaluating the efficiency of 
services provided by medical personnel, investigate and identify types of 
corruption methods as well as their modus operandi, then design strategies to curb 
these. With the public fund safety project, I was on this project more for fraud 
investigation related to high profile administrators of the country like 
ministers…etc. These projects caused a lot of awareness of the public on how 
state services operate, thus the corrupter and the corrupted were rendered 
powerless except there was collusion.  
When asked about what anticorruption strategies NACC could employ, 
participants were rich in their contributions, and this again went to show that quality 
labor was available for the agency and likely for the government as a whole, and thus it 
was left for the government to create the right environment in which these individuals 
could thrive. All 20 participants could articulate at least two fundamental strategies that 
were linked to either accountability, transparency, integrity, public responsibility, and 
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good governance as a whole. All responses on this particular question were worth 
mentioning due to their potencies for a viable anticorruption policy pool.  
P1 said culprits should be public shamed, embezzled properties seized, and sever 
manual labor inflicted on them. He also mentioned education on civic responsibility and 
issues of corruption/anticorruption beginning from elementary levels.  
P2 said gift giving before services are rendered should be discouraged, that public 
services should be fully decentralized, and that hard work and meritocracy should be 
encouraged.  
P3 said he strongly thought that the proper implementation of Article 66 of the 
Cameroon constitution would be a positive strategy. This article required public officials 
to declare their assets before and after assuming public offices. Participant though the 
strategy served in a great way to create basis for justification of wealth acquisition. 
P4 said households and the younger generation should be the target. That moral 
education should be taught in schools in order to create integrity base for these young 
ones. That NACC officials should be elected rather than being appointed, and that the 
judiciary system should be given full independence. 
P5 proposed matching government jobs with appropriate qualifications, and that 
salaries should be increased to dissuade public servants from being tempted into corrupt 
practices. 
P6 mentioned institutional reforms, and reforming the instrument creating NACC 
to give it more investigative and judicial police powers to do its job.  
P7 proposed legal reforms, including naming and shaming, and incarceration of 
culprits, especially public servants with higher posts of responsibility.  
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P8 said there should be devolution of administrative and financial resources. That 
Cameroon should learn from other countries, and that there should be a change in 
leadership.  
P9 proposed the implementation of sever criminal and civil sanctions for those 
that are guilty of corruption crimes. 
P10 said both the corrupted and the corrupter should be punished and inflicted 
with heavy fines and long-term prison sentences.  
P11 proposed equity in governance, creation of a body that is independent of 
politics to prosecute the anticorruption struggle, and involvement of private sector 
opinion in public policy making. 
P12 said leaders at NACC should not be appointed by presidential decree, and 
that anticorruption sensitization programs on radio and television should continue and not 
be limited to city areas but be brought to villages in form of debates that could end with 
trophies and other prizes.  
P13 said civil and public servants should be well remunerated for their labor. 
P14 held the same view as P13, stating that the basic minimum wage should be 
raised, and that this was possible when compared to the funds the government was losing 
to corruption perpetually.  
P15 proposed that private investment should be encouraged by the reduction of 
taxes for businesses, that the state should put in place a stronger policy for contract 
negotiations in the private sector to protect individuals, that the state should also set up 
incentives for public servants and encourage general participation in the fight against 
corruption, that recruitment into public or civil service should be accompanied by an on 
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the job training (OJT) on anticorruption practice, that merit based recruiting should be 
encouraged in government and public service, and that public policy should help give 
powers more to institutions than to persons. 
P16 mentioned public sensitization and annual publication of reports about the 
state of corruption in the country. 
P17 said a strong system of accountability, effective decentralization process, 
improved human resources management be put in place to enhance good governance. 
P18 proposed that government should raise public awareness and inform the 
public that government alone cannot eradicate the ill of corruption without public 
participation, that international cooperation in the fight be promoted, and that government 
should improve the overall economy and social aspects of the country.  
P19 suggested that NACC should ensure the protection and compensation of 
whistle blowers. 
Finally, P20 proposed that public servants should be educated on the ills of 
corruption to the citizens they are called to serve. That they should be encouraged to 
reject corrupt acts even if they are proposed by their clientele. And that public services be 
computerized in order to increase accountability. The richness of the preceding responses 
demonstrated the availability of a resourceful and available labor for a productive 
anticorruption machinery for NACC, but the assessment of the achievements of the 
agency indicated that it was challenged by other factors different from personnel issues. 
Achievements of NACC 
Findings from the study indicated that NACC did not produce the kind of results 
participants thought should have come from an anticorruption machinery of its caliber. 
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Their expectations were that after more than a decade in existence, the agency should be 
able to lay down a groundwork that would significantly curb the amount of corruption 
present in government and in other sectors of the country. Amidst the different criticisms, 
the study was able to identify three noticeable projects of NACC that could be regarded 
as achievements of the agency. These included the following: 
Cameroon’s position among corrupt countries of the world shifted. The years 
1998 and 1999 were the worst for Cameroon regarding its standing on the Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index list of countries in the world organized 
according to the least corrupt to the most corrupt from top to bottom. Cameroon found 
itself at the bottom of the list consecutively for these two years as the most corrupt 
country of the world. Since then and with the creation of NACC come 2006, the position 
has shifted and the data indicated that even though the country was still among some of 
the most corrupt countries of the world by year 2017, it was not at least occupying the 
bottom position of the list as in previous years.  
Changes in Cameroon’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) can be seen on table 
1, appendix A under the list of appendixes below. In 2017 CPI reports indicated that the 
country was still performing considerably poorly, ranking at 153 out of 180 participating 
countries, and scoring 25 out of 100 points in total. Even with such low performance, 
some participants regarded the shift from the most corrupt to just one of the most corrupt 
countries as a positive move achieved by NACC. In this regard, P2 said he thinks the 
agency was somehow effective due to the slight improvement in the country’s CPI. 
Public awareness increased. One of the significant items that was noticed 
throughout the data was the consistent and overwhelming positive impressions and 
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testimonies participants shared about NACC’s community awareness programs and 
public sensitization projects and schemes on corruption/anticorruption issues. In his own 
words, P5 shared the following testimony on this achievement:  
            Government via NACC has partnered with some institutions (business coalitions 
against corruption, and the public contracts regulatory board) to tackle corruption. 
It does investigations to ascertain corrupt practices for the purpose of either 
administrative sanctions or prosecution. It has also made available a toll-free 
number for public denunciation of corrupt practices. My personal experience has 
been enriching, especially by the corruption sensitization programs and training of 
personnel within the context of partnership with the above-mentioned partners.  
P7, P18, and almost all the participants also mentioned the toll-free number, 
which is 1517, as a significant successful tool and strategy implemented by NACC. This 
strategy opened up the anticorruption project to the entire public and increased awareness 
among the masses that corruption is actually a practice that should be shunned among the 
people. Participants equally mentioned the regular broadcast of corruption/anticorruption 
issues on national television and radio as another successful move by NACC in raising 
public awareness on these issues.    
Several high-profile public servants incarcerated, and some funds recovered. The 
news on corruption and anticorruption in Cameroon for the past decade as of 2018 was 
highly characterized by the incarceration of top-level public servants, especially those 
who were in charge of managing the day to day business of the government. The study 
found out that “operation sparrow hawk” which was a landmark anticorruption program 
launched by the head of state through the NACC machinery led to the conviction and 
164 
 
imprisonment of ministers, heads of departments, and several directors in charge of 
government agencies and parastatals. The program also led to the recovery of several 
billions of Francs CFA. Although participants dubbed it a scores-settling tool used by the 
head of state to get rid of his political enemies, data from documents revealed that indeed 
several government officials have been incarcerated under this program and some funds 
embezzled by them were retrieved. From an expert report by a home-based scholar, 
Bechem (2018), the following cases and statistics were discovered:  
Between 2008 and 2018, the supreme state audit indicted numerous state 
dignitaries who were jailed for embezzlement. In its 2008 report, the agency boasted to 
have helped save the state a sum of about 35 billion FCFA embezzled by public officials 
in corruption schemes. Similar efforts were made by the national agency of financial 
investigation (NAFI) and the supreme court audit bench even though these two 
institutions regrettably had no powers to press charges on the people indicted by their 
investigations. Furthermore, the special criminal court was created to hear embezzlement 
cases that were in the amount equal to our superior to 50 million francs CFA. In 2014, the 
ministry of justice in its report to the national assembly revealed that the sum of CFA 
2.401.235.610 (trillions of francs CFA) was recovered from embezzlers back to the 
state’s coffers. The reimbursement was done in exchange for discontinuance of 
prosecution proceedings.  
The expert report named the following high-profile officials convicted within the 
past decade under the “operation sparrow hawk” program: Dayas Mounoume, former 
director general of the Douala Port Authority, Arsene Essomba the former deputy 
director of the port, and Abel Maguieb, ex administrative and financial director of the 
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same agency were all sentenced to15 years in prison each for embezzling 458 million 
francs CFA. In 2015, former director general of airports was sentenced to 30 years 
imprisonment by the special criminal court for mismanaging the sum of one billion, six 
hundred, and forty-two million francs CFA. Other high-profile sentencings included that 
of Ephraim Inoni, former prime minister of Cameroon, and Marafa Hamidou Yaya, 
former minister of territorial administration and decentralization of Cameroon (minister 
of interior) and longtime collaborator of the president of the republic. Reporter indicated 
that these successful convictions were minimal compared to the vast number of 
corruption cases that were not yet indicted due to the difficulties posed by a judiciary 
that’s yet to be independent, as it took orders from the president of the republic who is 
also head of the higher judicial council (HJC).  
The preceding achievements were strong points that NACC could hold closely to 
reflect and be encouraged to improve in its function as the central anticorruption agency 
of the government of Cameroon. P17 for one gave some minimal credits to NACC by 
affirming that even though the agency was not effective in its anticorruption mission, it 
helped in realizing a slight improvement in the fight against corruption in the country.  
Weaknesses of NACC 
Information from data collected for this study revealed several distress points 
within NACC as an organization, with challenges coming mostly from the kind of 
government system in which it found itself. The confessions and perceptions of 
participants were obvious to the fact that NACC could be termed for the most part, a 
failed or ineffective project based on the several weaknesses of the agency pinpointed by 
the participants and were identified by the following four factors: 
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Lack of ownership and independence. The most frequent and outstanding reason 
pointed out by most participants to be responsible for the weakness of the NACC organ 
was the lack of actual ownership and independence of the agency in terms of design and 
decision making. Participants held that the organization was failing because it was not 
allowed to design and draft its own policies, rather it had to wait for everything to come 
from the president of the republic. P17 stated that NACC was attached to the presidency 
just like any other key institution involved in the corruption fight, as such could not take 
any enforcement measures of its own. In her own words, P8 made the following 
passionate expressions regarding the lack of ownership and independence for the agency: 
            It is not very effective because it was developed by others and just imposed on us, 
and since it did not come from us, there is lack of ownership. You know when 
you don’t own something, managing it too becomes a problem. Even use of the 
thing is a problem.  
In stronger terms, P7 reverberated similar expressions made by P8 as follows: 
            The effectiveness of the government in tackling corruption in Cameroon can be 
graded with an average mark if one were to become a teacher to grade the 
government. What is problematic here is the efficiency of the working nature of 
those structures put in place by the government. It is like creating structures 
without corresponding powers to effectively accomplish their mission. This can 
be equated to sending a military man to a war front without the basic ammunitions 
necessary to confront his enemies. There is no doubt that every Cameroonian is 
aware of the fact that to enter any higher institute of learning, requires one to pay 
bribe for a place, especially for schools like ENAM, IRIC, EMIA, ENS, INJS etc. 
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(these are all acronyms in French for prominent public schools in Cameroon 
responsible to recruit and train for civil service retention). What blocks the 
government from dismantling this network full of corruption is a million-dollar 
question that needs a fine mind to reason and come up with the answer. Over 90% 
civil servants in Cameroon are corrupt in one way or the other, tying with the 
assertion that ‘impossible is not Cameroon’.  
Most participants expressed the view that NACC was not as independent as it 
should have been, and therefore could not operate flexibly, especially in a highly 
corruption driven environment in which the main anticorruption agent should be expected 
to hold some considerable amount of discretionary authority for swift action. This 
rendered the agency powerless, and often the lack of autonomy caused other government 
programs to interfere with the agency’s plans and strategies as explained by p13.  
Negative Influences of politics. Participants reported that there was outright bias 
in the way NACC strategies were shaped and implemented, due to the influences of party 
politics and power politics. P6 said of the actions carried out under the schemes of 
“operation sparrow hawk” program to be more of a political score-settling tool rather 
than an anticorruption machine. P9 added that the program was a big fiasco, because the 
government itself was not sincere, and that sanctions to corruption cases were usually 
politically oriented. In his own words, P19 equally amplified the issue as follows: 
            People do not feel the impact of government strategies. Some feel that the 
struggle has been reduced to the arrest and detention of top government officials 
who are seen as potential threats to the regime in place. This makes the struggle to 
be perceived as a political one. Petty corruption is still alive.  
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According to participants, indictments and convictions were based for the most 
part on the discretion of the president of the republic, leaving no ample room for 
institutional procedure in carrying out anticorruption policies.  
Defiance of the merit system. Another prevalent factor noticed from the data was 
the absence of a vibrant merit system that could establish a firm foundation and provide 
support for the fight against corruption in the country. Participants pointed out that 
corrupt practices such as bribery, recruitment of unqualified workers into the civil 
service, duplicity of functions, and abuse of authority were still highly practiced in the 
government irrespective of the anticorruption effort by NACC. They believed this was 
partly due to the absence of a merit-based system in place.  
Public servants themselves were said to be in regular defiance of the system. P8 
said even some NACC workers took bribe to coverup corruption cases. Pay for play and 
backdoor illegal deals within the public service were identified as threats to a productive 
anticorruption program by the same government. The system of justice in place did not 
make things better either, as it was said to favor mostly particular individuals such as the 
political class. Justice was said to be perverted, as such the state of impunity prevailed 
and because of this, P10 said most corruption perpetrators either went unpunished or 
were not effectively punished.  
Conceptual and contextual challenges of the agency. The last major weakness of 
NACC discovered in the study was the issue of conceptualization of the agency and 
contextualization of its strategies. The study revealed that the agency was not in the first 
place conceived as a judicial institution that could be seen as the anticorruption police. 
The agency’s key functions as described in the 2011 NACC report on “the state of the 
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fight against corruption in Cameroon”, constituted mainly 1) prevention and 
communication measures, 2) studies and cooperation measures, and 3) Investigation 
measures. The conception of the agency apparently lacked strong law enforcement basis. 
The agency’s lack of prosecutorial and police authority was frequently raised by the 
participants as some of the key reasons for its weakness. Expressing a feeling of total 
consternation due to this situation, P7 exclaimed in the following words:  
            NACC has failed woefully in the fight against corruption. This is because 
Cameroonians are still to see where a head master (principal) of a primary school 
will be punished for receiving bribes before admitting students, likewise the 
principals of secondary and high schools and rectors (presidents) of state 
universities. Enough of the denunciations! What Cameroonians expect to see us a 
structure that will have the competence to arrest and punish officials involved in 
corruption.  
P7 added that NACC has not distinguished itself from other organs of the 
government that were equally created to combat corruption but apparently failed to 
realize significant victories. These included the national agency for financial 
investigation, the public contracts regulatory board, the supreme state audit, the audit 
bench of the supreme court, the ministry of public contracts, and the ministry of justice. 
P3 also strongly held the view that the conceptualization of NACC was problematic, as 
government focused on duplicating structures without giving them practical institutional 
ability to function as they should. In his own words, he said: 
            One thing that the government has been good at doing is the multiplication of 
agencies as well as organizing talks on this issue. This is clearly ineffective 
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because, more and more mismanagement and misappropriations are recorded in 
the country.  
P6 said she was yet to see a situation in which a NACC agent would arrest a 
corruption suspect without the help of the police as done in Kenya, where anticorruption 
agents can arrest even uniform officer in flagrante delicto. On the issue of 
contextualization, it appeared that the agency did not pay much attention to the policy 
context of Cameroon in terms of the economy, culture, and political environment that 
surrounded the agency. It still had to look into the giving culture of the people, the 
extremely low salaries paid to citizens in relation to devaluation of the Francs CFA, and 
the political system that pushed powers mostly into the hands of individuals and not 
institutions. Expert report by Bechem (2018) lamented on the absence of an autonomous 
judiciary in the country, and most participants perceived corruption as becoming more of 
a cultural issue in Cameroon that needed solutions that addressed the culture.  
Summary of Findings on Research Question 2 
Through this question, I examined the experiences of the participants in terms of 
their interaction with the various anticorruption strategies implemented by NACC and 
gathered their perceptions on how successful the said strategies were and the factors that 
influenced either their success or failure. The findings revealed that NACC made a few 
strides in curbing corruption in the Cameroon public service and in the country as a 
whole, but it still needed to do much work because its weaknesses and challenges 
appeared to be more noticeable than its achievements and could lead to a failed institution 
in the absence of true intervening reforms.  
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Research Question 3 
What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the government to implement 
effective anticorruption policies? 
Introduction 
Following the assessment of the effectiveness of the anticorruption strategies 
implemented by NACC, the next question that needed to be answered was how possible 
shortcomings of the system could be improved upon in order to give it the capacity to 
produce better results. Question 3 was as such asked in order to find out what participants 
thought government could do differently in order to make NACC more viable as an 
anticorruption force. It was also asked to gather tools that participants believed could be 
used to solve the failures of NACC identified in question 2. Question 6 and few more 
data from questions 7 and 8 from the interview protocol, and data from document review 
were used to fully cover the subject matter of question 3. 
The study revealed several strategies that could be regarded as solutions to the 
problems raised in question 2. Proposals made by participants projected the need for 
NACC to overcome barriers and hindrances to good governance by moving into an era 
where attention is given to good government behavior through the observance of good 
governance principles, and this would enable the establishment of a more productive 
national anticorruption strategy. Four major categories of strategies were gathered from 
the data.  
Policy and Political Reforms 
These are reforms that referred to the authority and scope of NACC. Since most 
participants believed that the agency was weak due to lack of autonomy and 
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independence, these reforms were proposed to have some amount of power shifted to the 
agency so that it can do the enormous job it was called to do. Policy reforms in this case 
would be refer to changes in government decision making that would target and improve 
NACC’s anticorruption strategies, meanwhile political reforms would be government 
changes that would increase NACC’s independence, giving it the politico-institutional 
leverage it needed to thrive amidst corruption forces coming from other powerful 
government institutions and authorities. Participants that made strong expressions 
concerning this need were P1, P2, P4, P5, P6, P8, P13, P16, and P18. In his own words, 
P1 suggested the following: 
            The government should make NACC an independent committee and institution. 
All the other institutions like the special criminal court, the audit bench at the 
supreme court...etc, should be directly supervised by NACC. The members should 
hail from an independent electorate of credible moral background.  
The propositions made by P1 could only be possible by legislated political 
reforms, because NACC could not arrogate such authority to itself. Cooperation between 
the major three branches of the government was need for such reform.  
P2 on the other hand proposed a policy reform which required that government 
should take more rigorous punitive measures against those convicted of corruption.  
P4 said government should ensure the election of NACC’s members just as P1 
suggested, instead of having them being appointed by the president of the republic.  
P5 suggested that NACC should be empowered with the capacity to prosecute 
corrupt persons. P6 supported this position, stating that the agency should be given vast 
and full powers to investigate corruption offenses, make arrest of offenders irrespective 
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of their rank or corps, and prosecute them in court. P8 added her voice to the call for 
autonomy for NACC and added that the judiciary system be made independent. Expert 
report from Bechem (2018) indicated that the judiciary in Cameroon was still under the 
total control of the executive, as the president appointed all judges and magistrates 
without confirmation and also sat as the head of the higher judicial council. P13 
supported the request for autonomy and the need for NACC officials to be elected rather 
than appointed, stating that their appointment made people to see the agency only as a 
political tool in the hands of the president for scores settling with his enemies. 
In addition to supporting the call for autonomy, P16 suggested a policy reform of 
autonomous budgeting. According to him, NACC should be able to draw up its own 
budget and table before the national assemble (legislator) for voting. P18 reiterated the 
points made by the other preceding participants in the following words: 
            Make the NACC autonomous financially, legally, with competence to launch 
actions even against high ranking state officials without seeking permission from 
anyone but the parliament.   
Institutional and Operational reforms  
These are reforms that would target the reshaping of the internal institution of 
NACC and the reinvigoration of its working principles. Some of these reforms could be 
initiated and managed by NACC without necessarily having to run to superior 
governmental authority for authentication when given proper autonomy. During the 
examination of the previous question, most participants pointed fingers at NACC and 
concluded that it was not vibrant in most of its anticorruption processes and principles. 
They expected NACC to exhibit characteristics of good governance. The proposals made 
174 
 
in this section were aimed at solving this problem. Expressions from P7, P9, P11, P14, 
and P15 captured these reforms. In his own words, P7 expressed the need for the 
following operational reforms: 
            What in my humble opinion Cameroon needs to do is to try to design different 
strategies to fight the different forms of corruption in the country, starting from 
“grand corruption”, which can be fought by sending those big fishes to jail for 
corrupt practices perpetrated by them. As for “petty corruption”, those isolated 
individuals involved at a negligible scale can be named and shamed in 
newspapers that have national coverage and even televisions at the end of every 
year. This should be carried out systematically across the country in all offices.  
Distinguishing between types and levels of corruption provided NACC with the 
opportunity to organize properly and function effectively.  
P9 suggested NACC’s processes be digitalized and that NACC should also 
recommend that government services be computerized. He added that NACC could 
station undercover agents in different zones across the national territory to track down 
corruption cases. This could be seen as a great strategic reform but might face 
implementation challenges if NACC lacked the police power to initiate arrests. NACC 
was not also going to be able to computerize its activities if it lacked the political will and 
finances coming from the government.  
P11 proposed another operational reform, which required that NACC should 
make it a strategy to request that surveillance cameras be installed in all public offices, 
and that these cameras should be reviewed regularly by an independent body and reports 
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given to NACC. To cut cost, NACC could have a separate division within NACC do the 
camera reviews.  
For institutional reforms, P14 proposed the making of NACC a more objective 
institution whose findings are interpreted without bias or subjective influences. P15 
articulated his own views in the following words:  
            NACC should be given the possibility to develop anticorruption messages and 
programs of its own, should be given the opportunity to administer these 
programs by themselves, given the powers to render evidence on cases public, and 
be given the opportunity to examine and be present in all public recruitment 
processes.  
Basically, participants wanted the making of NACC an actual anticorruption force 
with legal basis as an institution vested with both police and prosecutorial authority to 
find, arrest, and prosecute all defendants of corruption.  
Community and Culturally Oriented Measures  
This strategy targeted the environment and looked intricately into why the 
corrupter and the corrupted got involved in corruption in the first place. The study found 
out that the gift-giving culture and patronage practiced in the Cameroonian communities 
built up altruistic tendencies for bribery in the people. The laissez-faire civil service 
culture of the country also breaded corruption. As solutions, participants proposed the 
initiation of reforms such as effective firing of corrupt government employees, 
discouragement of gift-giving for the purpose of accessing public services, increasing the 
salaries of civil servants, raising the minimum wage, increasing human resources and 
financing for areas identified with high levels of corruption, publicly shaming corruption 
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convicts, reinforcing public sensitizations and educational programs on 
corruption/anticorruption, and the inclusion into school curriculums of moral and civic 
education that thought children about the dangers of corruption, anticorruption behaviors, 
and  patriotism for their country.  
Most of the participants expressed the need for these community and culturally 
based reforms. The most prevalent of all the measures was the need to include lessons on 
corruption into the curriculums of primary and secondary schools. Participants held a 
strong perception that corruption in Cameroon had become a cultural issue that needed 
more than institutional solutions. P6, P7, P17, and P20 advocated for these reforms in 
their suggestions, stating that if government could initiate them, they would stand a better 
chance to achieve positive results in the fight against corruption in the country.  
International Cooperation 
Participants expressed different feelings towards the involvement of international 
organizations and other international entities in the fight against corruption in Cameroon. 
The perceptions were strictly divided between the question whether international 
intervening measures were needed to help the fight against corruption in Cameroon or 
not. Some participants like P7, P11, and P15 believed that the international community, 
especially international organizations and multinational firms from the West were part of 
the corruption problem in Cameroon.  
P7 said the international community had little or nothing to offer as solution. And 
that most often, they came to the country for the same cause but came out from the 
presidency singing the same song being sang by the regime in place. He also emphasized 
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that Cameroon problems needed Cameroon solution, and that they international 
community could not change the behavior of Cameroonians overnight.  
P11 was more passionate in his expressions against the need of the international 
community as part of the solution to the problem, and strongly condemned their 
intervention in the issue through the following statement:  
            International community has helped in grooming what we have today as 
corruption vested country spanning back to the time slaves were bought by the 
bribery of our chiefs. Because Cameroon is a potential land of opportunities, the 
international community comes in for these huge opportunities by lobbying and 
bribing, thus rendering the whole system corrupt.  
P15 held the same views as P11, stating that he did not think the international 
community had a significant role to play in terms of solutions to the problem since they 
focused on publishing results of Cameroon as a highly corrupt country but offered little 
or nothing to solve the problem. He also believed that some of the corruption practices 
benefited international corporate business as they exploited the natural resources of the 
system at low prices due to kickbacks and paying of huge bribes to top level government 
officials.  
Despite the strong rejection of international help expressed by some participants 
as seen above, others believed that NACC and the government needed to cooperate with 
international actors in the area of anticorruption for a more viable and successful 
anticorruption machine for the country. This second view was more popular among the 
participant P2, P3, P5, P6, P10, P12, P14, P18, and P19 all advocated for and supported 
cooperation with international forces for effective anticorruption practice by NACC. P2 
178 
 
said international actors could help ensure that embezzlers return stolen money kept in 
banks in the diaspora. P3 in his own words said: 
            The international community has a mighty role to play. They set the pace by 
which many countries function globally. How about them prescribing economic 
sanctions on these corrupt countries. If they for example reduce or totally end aids 
to Cameroon, this would be a hard measure, but could serve a productive role to 
ending corruption.  
When asked about some of the international anticorruption strategies that NACC 
has adopted and is currently implementing, he added: 
            Yes, I can quickly think of transparency international. They usually require 
Cameroon to send annual reports from all parts of the country before harmonizing 
a general report. 
According to P5, and P6, the international community could be instrumental in 
the fight against corruption through bodies like transparency international, and their 
corruption perception index (CPI) for the country determined interest in the country by 
foreign investors. Therefore, if foreign investment declined for this reason, the state could 
be more serious in adjusting its behavior towards corruption in order to attract these 
investors. They added that the international community could help by repatriating 
embezzled funds stored abroad, prevent transfer of embezzled funds, and provide 
assistance in the area of capacity building so that the government and NACC could be 
strengthened to wage the war against corruption in the country.  
To P10, P12, and P14, the international community was helpful through 
anticorruption conventions, bilateral agreements, and cooperation schemes like the ones 
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provided by the platforms of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
(UNCAC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
Oxfam, and transparency international.  
 P18 and P19 added that the international community could help in fact finding, 
extradition of runaway corrupt officials, and providing expert reports. When asked about 
existing international strategies, they mentioned expert reports by Amnesty International, 
cooperation with Interpol for investigations, and implementation of the provisions of the 
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.  
Summary of Findings on Research Question 3 
Answers to question 3 served as participants’ proposals for solutions to the issues 
raised in the second part of question 2. The issues were essentially that NACC was weak 
as a government organ charged with the enormous responsibility to eradicate corruption 
from the Cameroon civil service and from the country at large. In its quest of fulfilling 
this mission, it recorded some successes, but failed greatly and generally to meet the 
mark, as corruption was still highly prevalent in the country according to the perceptions 
of participants and CPI reports by Transparency International. The answers in this section 
proposed the types of tools and approaches the government could engage both on the 
domestic and international fronts to improve on NACC’s construction and operation as a 
productive anticorruption machinery for the country.  
Research Question 4 
How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially improved the 




The premise of this study proceeded with the claim that effective anticorruption 
strategies are those that were designed based on good governance principles. The 
question raised from this background was to know whether the anticorruption strategies 
implemented by NACC reflected these principles, and if they did, what results did they 
bring to the fight, or if they did not, then how could they be improved in order to give the 
agency more opportunities to craft strategies that could address the corruption problem 
with more positive outcomes in view? These questions were answered through 
participants’ responses and data collected from documents as seen in question 1, 2, and 3. 
Question 4 was an extension of the investigation on effective anticorruption policy 
making, giving the study the latitude find out how proposed policies could be 
contextualized for better results, especially policy strategies that came from the 
international community.  
Question 4 therefore sought to find out whether participants understood 
international dynamics of the anticorruption strategies implemented by NACC, and what 
their thoughts were concerning how such policies could be engineered to work more 
effectively with the local systems in place. The question also sought to know participants 
overall perception on the state of the fight as led by NACC. Investigations from 
document review, and responses to questions 9 and 10 on the interview protocol were 
used to answer question 4. Also, it should be noted that part of question 8 on the 
interview protocol identified the international anticorruption contributions to the fight 
against corruption in Cameroon, and this was already introduced under question 3. In this 
section, the focus was more on the effectiveness of these strategies.  
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Participants were once more divided on the effectiveness of international 
strategies in the fight, but they all agreed that for these strategies to yield positive results, 
they must align with the domestic environment. Overall, three major findings were made 
through this question. The study found out that: 
International Influence 
Some participants in preceding analyses did not view the intervention of 
international actors in Cameroon’s anticorruption strategy to be positive. They believed 
that multinational firms and other international organizations were instead part of the 
problem of corruption in the country, explaining that they paid kickbacks for lower cost 
in natural resources markets, and that countries of the developed world served as safe 
havens for embezzlers of public funds.  
Other participants asserted that the international community played a positive role 
in the anticorruption struggle in Cameroon through educational and empowerment 
programs, cooperation with investigations, expert reports, scientific policies, and strategic 
aid. Findings revealed that these international influences were well in place and could be 
felt within the NACC system, but it was left for the agency to properly adapt these 
contributions to the policy context of the country and make them viable solutions to the 
problem. P1, P2, P3, P6, P7, and P13 made the following expressions about their 
experience working with an understanding of the involvement of international strategies 
in NACC’s anticorruption policy. In his own words, P1 said: 
            In my opinion, the primary actor in this fight is the government. The international 
community has a limited role to play. In 1998 and 1999, the country was listed by 
Transparency International as the most corrupt country in the world. This 
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situation exerted some pressure on the government in the eyes of her international 
economic partners like IMF and the World Bank. Many top government officials 
were arrested in this respect. I therefore think that the international community 
has a lot of influence when the country’s economy is at stake. 
P2 added that imported policies added value to NACC’s strategies. P3 said, the 
simple fact that there was an “international watch eye” over the system, caused policy 
makers to remain alerted and aware of the situation either consciously or unconsciously. 
P6 expatiated her experience as follows: 
            There is a success story of the fight against corruption in Cameroon which just 
came to my mind. That is, the activities of an Israeli registered Nongovernmental 
Organization (NGO) operating in law enforcement in the wildlife sector of 
Cameroon. This NGO is called the Last Great Ape Organization (LAGA) and 
works in collaboration with the ministry of forestry and fauna (MINFOF) in 
wildlife law enforcement. LAGA adopts disguise and undercover strategies to 
unveil wildlife crime and even motivates law enforcement officers to work with 
them to combat wildlife crime thereby minimizing possibilities of corruption of 
law enforcement officers and ministerial officials.  
The example by P6 was a clear indication that International intervention was part 
of the strategy for the fight against corruption in the country. P7 said the interventions of 
organizations such as the World Bank and Transparency International in domestic policy 
making often met stiff resistances from officials that were corrupt and were afraid of 
exposure. However, the continues pressure from these organizations kept the government 
on alert and increased its resolve in cracking down these corruption foes.  
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To P13, the world was fast becoming a global village, and therefore states became 
obligated to involve themselves in transactions with other states as partners for the 
purpose of surviving in this new advent of global village. This equally applied to 
anticorruption policy making and implantation. P13 expatiated on his experience of this 
connection between NACC and international forces in the following words: 
            All of these bodies have contributed enormously to the fight against corruption in 
Cameroon. But it has always been a very difficult task when it comes to 
implementation. This is because these international bodies are most often clear 
and transparent in their policies. But if corruption is persisting in our country, it is 
because we have all what it takes to fight corruption, with ideas from these 
bodies, but we are not willing to depart from the practice. Working with these 
international initiatives have been wonderful, but the real problem in Cameroon 
always is the issue of implementation, we do not have good laws.   
Neglecting the Need to Contextualize Anticorruption Strategies  
The eminent presence of international influences on anticorruption policy making 
necessitated contextual interpretations in order to adapt these foreign strategies and 
contributions to domestic realities for better results. However, the study showed that 
NACC did not do much in converting these policies to properly address local realities. 
That was participants’ reactions, and their views were expressed as follows:  
P8 stated that international actors came in with laws and institutions that did not 
fit sometimes with the Cameroon context, because they did not take into consideration 
local realities. She gave the example of the creation of NACC and the launching of 
“operation sparrow hawk”, that they were born from recommendations of international 
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organizations, with transparency international said to be at the origin of the whole NACC 
idea. P18 also expressed concerns of contextualization, asserting that policies brought by 
international actors worked better with advanced democracies, and could be fruitful at the 
domestic level only when applied with keen consideration of the policy context. In his 
own words, P19 made the following contributions concerning international anticorruption 
policy influences on NACC:  
            Definitely some strategies have been borrowed. An example is the law creating 
NACC, which is heavily believed to be a response to international pressure. The 
arrest and detention of corrupt officials is believed to be a necessary evidence to 
prove to the international community that the system is indeed fighting against 
corruption. The international community is contributing through pressure 
mounting.  
The believe by some participants that international actors caused minimal or no 
intervening impact on NACC’s strategy also revealed the kind of attention the agency 
paid to these policies and in extension the rigor with which they treated the need to have 
these policies interpreted to better address the country’s own political, economic, 
geographical, and sociocultural realities for better results.   
Corruption vs Anticorruption Perceptions    
The last question of the interview protocol gathered final thoughts of participants, 
and analysis in this section was done by putting these thoughts together with the rest of 
the data and looking for participants’ perceptions on the major issues of corruption, 
anticorruption, and NACC. The first set of perceptions that emerged from this analysis 
reflected the state of corruption in Cameroon according to the participants, and the 
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second set reflected participants perception on anticorruption and the success of NACC 
as the main government agency charged with the task of eradicating corruption in the 
country.  
 
Figure 2. Corruption perception by participants 
 
Most participants believed that Cameroon was still highly corrupted. From the 
civil service to other public offices and in the private sector, 75 percent (15 out of 20) 
participants perceived that corruption in the country was still on the high side. 20 percent 
(4 out of 20) of them believed that corruption was prevalent in the country but not as high 
as it was during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Only 5 percent (1 out of 20) of the 
participants was unsure about the state in terms of high corruption or moderate levels of 
corruption.  
When compared with Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency 











scored 25 out of 100 points, with scores ranging from 0 = highly corrupt to 100 = low 
corruption. These results matched almost perfectly with participants perceptions in this 
study, because 100 – 25 is = 75, which could be interpreted to mean that 75% of CPI for 
Cameroon in 2017 held that the country was corrupt, with 75 percent indicating very high 
levels of corruption. Meanwhile 75 percent of the participants in this study believed the 
same. These findings could then establish the basis for the assessment of solutions, which 
will be explored in subsequent chapter.  
Participants blamed the high levels of corrupt on a plethora of reasons, including 
the laissez faire nature of government, poor economy, lack of adequate anticorruption 
enforcement mechanisms, lack of the spirit of public service, absence of political will and 
bold steps to curb the problem, endemic nature/culture of corruption, state of impunity, 
defiance of the meritocracy, poor management, poor legal system, administrative 





























The study revealed that most participants perceived NACC as well positioned to 
bring solutions to the problem of corruption in Cameroon, but that it was limited in scope 
and in operation by several factors as seen in preceding analyses. About 20 percent out of 
the 20 participants believed that NACC was successful or had significant hopes for 
success in its mission as the anticorruption machinery of the country, meanwhile up to 70 
percent concluded that NACC considerably fell short of performance and as such needed 
serious reforms to ensure that the agency survives with any real hopes of registering 
significant victories in the fight. A negligible 10 percent (1 out of 20) of the participants 
was not sure about taking a particular stand on the success assessment. 
Summary of Findings on Research Question 4 
Due to the eminent interaction between domestic and international policies in 
contemporary global governance arrangement, it was imperative to assess the role played 
by international actors in the anticorruption effort of Cameroon through NACC. Findings 
in this section revealed that the international community influenced NACC’s policies, but 
the officials at NACC paid less attention to the dynamics of these strategies and as such 
did not adapt them properly to serve their purposes. It was also discovered that 
participants strongly believed corruption in Cameroon was still on the rise, and that 
NACC was not achieving much in positive results despite the efforts of the agency.  
Summary  
In this chapter, I presented an overview of the purpose of this study, the questions 
the research sought to answer, participants’ demographics, detail results from data that 
was collected on the study, analysis processes of the data, and the methods used to 
demonstrate the trustworthiness of the study.  
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Data collected on the research topic sufficiently answered the research questions 
and made it possible for NACC’s anticorruption strategies to be identified and its 
achievements and challenges revealed.  
In chapter 5, the interpretations of the research findings will be presented, 
discussions will be made on the limitations of the study, important policy provisions, 
implications for social change, and practical and future academic recommendations. And 
finally, conclusions will be drawn. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations  
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to explore the Cameroon government’s 
anticorruption policy by assessing the various anticorruption strategies it implemented 
through the NACC, which served as the central agency for government anticorruption 
practice in the country. The aim was to provide a deeper understanding of the instruments 
used by the government to fight against corruption in the country. As such, in this study, I 
sought to evaluate the extent to which these strategies reflected good governance 
principles, as well as the impact of the strategies and their associated challenges in the 
anticorruption cause.  
Through a review of the literature on the topic of corruption, I discovered that no 
scholarly research had been previously carried out to assess the Cameroon government’s 
anticorruption strategies through NACC. Specifically, there was no clear understanding 
of what the achievements and the shortcomings of the agency were and what it meant to 
contextualize these strategies for better anticorruption performance by the agency and the 
government at large. In this study, I sought to bridge this gap in the literature.  
I chose a qualitative case study design for this study because such a design 
provided the platform upon which I was able to explore governmental anticorruption 
strategies as practiced by NACC. The research questions for this study identified the 
anticorruption strategies practiced by NACC as the implementation scheme of the 
Cameroon government’s policy for the fight against corruption and clarified the role of 
international actors in the fight and what could be done to improve on these strategies. 
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The analysis of my findings in this study led to the discovery that NACC’s 
anticorruption strategies were greatly challenged due to poor design, formulation, and 
implementation of the policies. The findings concurred with most of the literature 
reviewed on anticorruption policy making and implementation, especially regarding the 
effectiveness of the Cameroon government’s efforts and strategies against corruption in 
the country (Bechem, 2018; Cameroon Today, 2011; Fombad, 2000, 2003; Freedom 
House, 2011; Houmfa, 2012; NACC, 2006; Ndoumbe, 2008; Ngomba, 2006; 
Nguemegne, 2011; Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, 2012; Tiky VI, 2010; TI 1998, 
1999, 2017).  
Seven major anticorruption strategies implemented by NACC emerged from the 
collected data and were categorized into two groups: (a) strategies that reflected good 
governance principles and that could be enhanced for effective performance, and (b) 
strategies that were not properly formulated and, as such, performed poorly and needed 
complete reform if they were to be effective. The first category created opportunities 
whereas the second created challenges.  
According to the findings, the creation and institutionalization of NACC, with its 
major strategic objectives to instill respect to the rule of law and to give a legitimate 
voice to the people through public denunciations and whistleblowing, was a good first 
step taken in the right direction. Elahi (2009) argued that the materialization of 
sustainable human development in the developing world, which entails the curbing of 
corruption, was a byproduct of good governance principles. In a UNDP policy paper, 
Graham, Amos, and Plumptre (1997) identified five major good governance principles: 
legitimacy of voice, direction, performance, accountability/transparency, and fairness 
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(rule of equity and rule of law). The same argument is made in this study, that NACC 
could develop robust anticorruption strategies when its guiding policies are rooted in 
good governance principles and practices.  
Extending Elahi’s (2009) views to the creation of NACC, it could be said that the 
agency was created with a vision in mind, the population was given legitimacy of voice 
to participate in the policy of the agency through denunciations and whistle blowing, and 
the rule of law was envisaged for the system through the creation of special courts and 
specific institutional support systems to aid the overall NACC system. Participants 
corroborated Elahi’s views as they concurred that the creation of NACC was a positive 
step in the anticorruption struggle, and also ascertained the existence of the preceding 
good governance principles around NACC’s vision.  
The creation of NACC in 2006 was a positive and laudable initiative taken by the 
government of President Biya to address the chronic levels of corruption that had eaten 
deep into the roots of both the civil service and the private sector of the country. NACC’s 
signature program was significant in the operations and public identity of the agency. 
This program became famous among the Cameroonian population because it led to the 
incarceration of several top-ranking public officials within a short period time from its 
creation (Freedom House, 2011). Several billions of Francs CFA were equally recovered 
from the culprits, as seen in the work of Nguemegne (2011). But the momentum with 
which the fight against corruption was launched through NACC soon diminished, and the 
agency fell short of fulfilling its purpose (Nguemegne, 2011). This was likely due for the 




Haruna (2009) held the view that from decolonization to the second liberation era, 
Africa, and specifically Sub-Saharan Africa, suffered from leadership poverty. 
Cameroon, being one of the countries in this region, suffered from the same predicament 
(Haruna, 2009). According to Haruna, the predominance of dictatorial leadership in these 
countries created a leader-follower leadership perspective whereby the responsibilities of 
leadership are placed in the hands of the leader and then the followers are seen as passive 
people. NACC eventually suffered the consequences of these shortcomings, as leadership 
failed to provide a participative environment in which stakeholders and NACC could 
successfully put up a strong fight against corruption in the country.  
Leadership issues usually lead to managerial issues, and that was the case with the 
leadership of the Cameroon government and NACC. The president of the Republic of 
Cameroon, having been in power for the past 36 years, depicted the monopolistic 
leadership discussed by Haruna (2009). Being in power for such a long time without 
alternans could be one of the reasons why fewer opportunities for democratic principles 
were created, and consequently fewer good governance tools to combat corruption 
existed. Some participants in my study suggested a regime change to this effect, arguing 
that current government lacked the political will to initiate real change in the state of 
corruption in the country and as such could not furnish NACC with the tools it needed to 
perform effectively. They expressed the belief that many government officials benefited 
from the systematic corruption in place and were not ready to allow NACC to operate 
with success in their midst.  
The findings of the study also indicated that NACC fell short of major success in 
the fight against corruption in Cameroon because most of its strategies lacked the 
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institutional, structural, and interpretative instruments needed in order to assume the kind 
of authority, force, and meaning that would have helped enforce its values, principles, 
and findings in the system. The lack of independence and autonomy, absence of actual 
service decentralization, lack of police authority, negative influences of politics, and 
contextual challenges rendered NACC powerless (Fombad, 2000; Nguemegne, 2011; 
Tiky VI, 2010). Participants confessed that the agency was controlled from the 
presidency and usually could not carry out programs and projects freely without 
authorization from the presidency. The agency as such became limited as to the scope 
and means of what it could do. According to participants, the agency also investigated 
cases but could not initiate arrests on the spot for individuals caught committing 
corruption. Regular police officers who should enforce the laws were themselves often 
corrupt according to participants. But participants also believed that NACC would have 
been able to arrest culprits across all government departments without administrative 
impediments if it had been given the necessary autonomy and police authority.  
The significance is that because NACC lacked the administrative tools and 
political atmosphere needed to operate effectively from a neutral standpoint, it became a 
tool in the hands of politicians to settle their political scores. As posited by many 
participants, while those who were seen as opponents to the regime in place where being 
handcuffed and sent to maximum security prisons for embezzlement, their colleagues 
who found favor with the regime were left untouched even though they stole even more 
from government coffers and from the people. In the end, citizens of Cameroon were the 
ones who suffered from this broken system, as evidenced by the poor economic and 
social standards of the country and the overall poverty of the citizenry because a few 
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individuals decided to loot the country’s resources for their own private gain to the 
detriment of a great share of the population.  
This chapter contains my interpretation of data collected through interviews 
conducted on participants from NACC and information gathered through document 
review. In the conclusion of the chapter, I make recommendations on possible future 
studies on topics related to the subject matter of this study, and I strongly believe that 
some of the solutions recommended in this study would promote positive social change 
when implemented.  
Interpretation of the Findings 
Adaptation to policy context (Quah, 2008) established the conceptual framework 
for this study, whereas Santiso’s (2001), Rothstein’s (2007), and Elahi’s (2009) theories 
of universality of policy approaches, particularity of policy contexts, and good 
governance provided the underlying theoretical frameworks for the study. The 
discussions in this chapter focus on themes and patterns that emerged from data analysis 
conducted and described in Chapter 4. Twenty interviews were conducted with the help 
of 10 open-ended questions to gather information that was used to answer the research 
questions for this study. A detailed discussion and description of key outcomes of the 
data analysis is presented below. The findings of the study led to the conclusion that the 
creation of NACC as the central government organ to fight against corruption in 
Cameroon was well intended and received by the population, but fell short of achieving 
major success because some of its strategies were rooted in good governance principles 
and could be enhanced for better performance (findings for the first part of Question 1), 
but some were poorly formulated and implemented and, as such, needed complete 
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reformation for better performance (findings for the second part of Question 1; Questions 
2, 3, and 4) as analyzed with the help of the conceptual and theoretical frameworks stated 
above.   
NACC Strategies Rooted in Good Governance Principles  
This section covers discussions on findings for the first part of Question 1. 
Through this study, I uncovered three major strategies of NACC rooted in good 
governance principles. These strategies were seen as opportunities that the government 
could leverage through NACC to enhance the effectiveness of the anticorruption struggle. 
These strategies are described hereinbelow.  
The creation and institutionalization of NACC  
Generally, most countries that have emerged successfully from chronic systemic 
and public corruption have designated specific government organs charged with carrying 
out the anticorruption policy of the government, ensuring that corrupt officials are 
contested with all the tools possible and available. Examples seen in this study include 
Croatia, Hong Kong, Bulgaria, and most of the CEE countries that came out of 
communism and embraced democratic governance principles, institutions, and structures 
from the early 1990s (Beblavý, 2009; David, 2010; Grubiša, 2011; Smilov, 2010;). In 
Croatia, the government anticorruption agency was known as the Office of Combating 
Corruption and Organized Crime (Grubiša, 2011). In Hong Kong it was known as IACC 
(David, 2010). In Bulgaria, the agency was known as the State Agency for National 
Security and  in Albania, it was known as the Anticorruption Monitoring Group (Smilov, 




Creating a clear vision and direction for government is one of the principles 
identified by Elahi (2009) as a good governance principle. This study held the premise 
that if anticorruption strategies were formulated by NACC about good governance 
processes, they would stand a better chance to address the corruption issues plaguing the 
government. In this line of thought, actual work needed to be done after NACC was 
created to conceive a good vision and formulate effective to implement to obtain good 
results.  
Institutional and legal reforms by the government  
Institutional and legal reforms by the government introduced respect for the rule 
of law in the system This was another initiative by government through NACC to 
formulate anticorruption strategies based on good governance principles. Firstly, the 
government recognized the role of the judicial system in the anticorruption process and 
promoted cooperation between NACC and the legal system (Nguemegne, 2011). This 
policy ensured that anticorruption strategies were built on the rule of law (Elahi, 2009). 
Secondly, the observance of the law by public officials, especially Article 66 of the 
constitution which required public disclosure of private assets before and after taking up 
any government office, was part of NACC’s strategic recommendations to facilitate 
personal audits (Nguemegne, 2011).  
This was an attempt at good governance as described by some of the literature 
reviewed for this study, including Elahi (2009) and Graham, et al. (2003). Even though 
NACC intended to abide by the rule of law, it faced the challenge of enforcement as 
participants pointed out that corruption perpetrators were not ignorant of the law but were 
intentionally inspired to break it by the culture of systemic corruption which had been 
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established and practiced in the country for several decades. Good governance 
approaches require that NACC does not give up on these attempts but continues to press 
on the government to provide more effective legal tools, environment to formulate good 
anticorruption laws and sensitization of the people about lawful conduct. Countries of 
CEE that have emerged from corruption using good governance approaches, including 
the enforcement of the rule of law, could serve as good examples in public education.  
The implementation of whistleblowing and public denunciation 
This strategy brought legitimacy and voice to NACC’s anticorruption effort. 
Another significant good governance principle is giving the people legitimacy and voice, 
which entails freedom of speech and expression. Almost all participants identified the 
toll-free calling system instituted by NACC to enable whistle blowing and reporting of 
corruption cases as a plausible and effective strategy to enforce lawful conduct. It was 
thought that integrating a toll free calling system and whistle blowers against illegal 
conduct would enable NACC to develop a comprehensive monitoring system which is an 
example of good governance as seen in Elahi (2009). 
Giving the people a voice in the anticorruption process with protections is 
effective, as most participants indicated. This is particularly relevant when the 
perpetrators are managers and the whistle blowers are subordinates. Most participants 
pointed out that subordinates are normally intimidated in the work environment to remain 
silent or share in the proceeds of illegal acts. Participants suggested that NACC could 
work on ensuring a security system for individuals who made such denunciations, and 
this will encourage more people to testify against misappropriators and deter bad 
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conduct. These are some of the groundworks upon which NACC could continue to 
improve by adapting procedures learned from other systems.  
NACC Strategies with Less Success: Challenges and the Need for Reforms 
This section covers discussions on findings for the second part of Question 1, 
discussions on findings for Questions 2, 3, and 4. The second category of NACC’s 
strategies is considered to have provided less opportunities for a thriving anticorruption 
practice, and as such needed thorough reform which could also mean complete 
transformation or replacement. According to participants, these strategies were either 
poorly formulated or implemented. Four strategies were identified under this category, 
including decentralization, investigations, checks and audits, and intergovernmental or 
international cooperation. In order to capture the different sections of information derived 
from the analysis of data to the answers that emerged from further questions, the 
discussion in this section is organized under three major topics that capture these 
strategies, their challenges, and their corresponding reforms as proposed by participants.  
Political strategies, challenges, and reforms  
NACC strategies that had to do with reshaping the institution and giving it the 
legal scope and authority to perform could be seen as those directly linked to 
governmental politics. These included the politics of decentralization, intergovernmental 
or international cooperation, autonomy and independence, and the political will to 
change. NACC made few strides in these areas, especially by aligning itself to 
international anticorruption conventions and agreements and working in collaboration 
with other government departments that took part in the fight against corruption. NACC 
also decentralized its units into almost all government departments and agencies and 
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carried out probing activities under an “operation sparrow hawk” program that incarnated 
the government’s anticorruption mission in Cameroon. These attempts however, did not 
realize considerable success due to challenges within the system as pointed out by 
participants who also suggested reforms. 
The political strategies being discussed in this section, tie with the literature on 
the role of leadership as an instrument for anticorruption practice (Maxwell, 1999; 
Kpundeh, 1998; Burke, 2008; Elahi, 2009). The data reveals that the efforts made in this 
area failed the good governance test as postulated by Elahi (2009). Participants 
complained of government refusal to ensure that service decentralization occurred 
alongside structural decentralization. While NACC personnel were distributed to various 
departments, the services were still highly controlled and concentrated under a 
centralized power structure operated by fewer people with connections to the presidency 
of Cameroon. This made it easier for justice to be perverted along the chain of command 
as corruption cases initiated at the bottom, were usually dropped out by dishonest 
intermediaries before reaching the top state managers answerable to the .  
Participants confessed that the lack of honesty, autonomy and independence, 
absence of governmental will to change, incompetence in top-ranking government 
officials, lack of rigor were some of the challenges against NACC’s assignment. They 
therefore advocated for new legislation to free NACC from direct control by the 
presidency of the republic of Cameroon. The advocacy included a call for NACC to be 
independent of the executive and accorded police powers to pursue corruption suspects, 
arrest and file charges for prosecution in court.  
200 
 
According to Maxwell (1999), everything rises and falls on leadership. The 
president of the republic of Cameroon in his leadership capacity can initiate these 
political changes and give NACC the authority required to investigate and bring to justice 
all officials involved in corrupt acts. However, if the all-powerful president fails to 
empower this agency then it will continue to face challenges in fulfilling its role freely 
and confidently. The legislature could also pick up these signals and bring up appropriate 
changes through bills in parliament. Even though the day to day management of 
government agencies falls within the jurisdiction of the executive branch, policy changes 
for the same agencies could originate from the legislative branch. Kpundeh (1998) 
attributed the task to bring about political will for change to not only presidential 
leadership, but also to other elected or appointed leaders, civil society watch dogs, 
stakeholder groups and others.     
Institutional strategies, challenges, and reforms 
NACC put into place institutional strategies that also fell short of operational 
vigor, and thus could not create the expected impact. These are strategies that had to do 
with NACC’s daily operations and functional policies as an anticorruption agency. They 
included investigations, checks and audits, anticorruption campaigns and sensitization of 
the masses to create greater public awareness, identification of suspects to law 
enforcement and ensuring that they are prosecuted according to the law, setting up 
transparency, accountability, and integrity systems, and proposing public service reforms. 
These strategies tie with the literature on policy and legal instruments of anticorruption 
practice (Moroff & Schmidt-Pfister, 2010; Beblavý, 2009; Spector, 2016; Desta, 2006; 
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Nguemegne, 2011; McDermott, 2010; Barry and Stephens, 1998; Eliason, 2009; 
Kubiciel, 2009; Majila, Taylor, & Raga, 2014).  
Findings revealed that NACC carried out extensive sensitization campaigns on 
television, radio, and also made use of anticorruption posters posted on government and 
public offices, and billboards stationed in different cities and towns across the country. 
Participants identified this strategy but complained that the implementation was not done 
effectively due to lack of resources by NACC and poor educational methodology. 
Participants suggested that the communication of anticorruption ideals would yield better 
results if they were developed and added to school curriculum.  
The effectiveness of public policy depends on its formulation and 
implementation. When Moroff and Schmidt-Pfister (2010) conducted a study on the 
effectiveness of anticorruption campaigns, they found out that broad social support for 
anticorruption strategies remained essential for the success of any international and 
governmental initiative. NACC seems to comply with this strategy but for the fact that it 
lacks resources to multiply educative sessions across the country and in different 
governmental offices. Slovakia’s case was successful, as public sensitization and 
educational programs contributed significantly in transforming behavioral norms and 
corruption. The effect deterred people from corrupt practice (Beblavý, 2009). 
Findings also revealed that NACC was not sophisticated in its institutional 
strategies to build integrity systems and establish strong public performance standards. 
However, strides were being made in information technology to computerize services and 
processes for open government even though no major accomplishments were recorded. 
The legal department was ready to punish culprits through special and newly created 
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criminal courts to prosecute perpetrators of corruption, but participants argued that even 
with the measures in place, justice itself was corrupt due to the absence of an independent 
judiciary system. They therefore suggested that NACC advocates for institutional reforms 
if it were to function effectively and achieve meaningful results in its mission. The 
foundation of good governance as laid by Elahi (2009) is yet needed at this level to 
strengthen administrative procedures and give public managers at NACC the right policy 
tools to formulate strategies that will improve the performance of the institution.  
Conceptual and contextual strategies, challenges, and reforms  
The concept behind the idea of NACC is what gave the organization form and 
focus. The concept determined the agency’s founding principles and shaped its projects, 
programs and other strategies. Participants stated that NACC was an idea copied from 
other countries following the recommendations of TI. Nevertheless, the important 
question that should be asked is how the agency was conceptually established to address 
Cameroon’s problems in a Cameroonian way. It is by answering this question that 
contextual dynamics were visited through studies on the notion of policy context 
(Gephart, 2009; Quah, 2008; Rothstein, 2007; Santiso, 2001; Walton, 2016). 
Participants stated that NACC was not conceived as a judicial institution endowed 
with police authority compared to its counterparts in countries like Egypt and Kenya. 
Review of documents pointed out that the agency’s main functions included preventing 
corruption, research and as well as communication, cooperation and investigation 
measures. Essentially, it was conceived as a research and reporting agency under the 
executive branch of the government without any special privileges regarding autonomy 
and function. This kind of conceptualization gave the organization a weak base in law 
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enforcement and emasculated its prosecutorial abilities. Participants therefore suggested 
that the agency be reformed and given a judicial police status so that it could arrest 
suspects, especially those caught red-handed.  
Findings also revealed that NACC carried out strategies that were influenced by 
international actors. Participants expressed different feelings on the influence of the 
international community. Some stated that international cooperation and transplantation 
of strategies from foreign experiences to Cameroon had a positive impact on NACC’s 
efforts, meanwhile others saw the contrary, asserting that foreign actors did not do much 
to help apart from monitoring and reporting corruption perceptions just like TI did.  
These findings are tied to literature in this study through the works of the authors 
mentioned at the beginning of this section, and their works were used to establish the 
conceptual and theoretical frameworks that guided this study. For conceptualization of 
anticorruption strategies, authors held different perspectives. There were those who 
posited for a universal approach, which holds that the same anticorruption strategies 
could be implemented in different countries and would yield similar results (Santiso, 
2001). But others believe in a particularistic approach, where strategies should be 
conceived based on the specific characteristics of the policy context (Rothstein, 2007). It 
is this second dimension that gave birth to the concept of adaption to policy context 
(contextualization of anticorruption) (Gephart, 2009; Quah, 2008; Walton; 2016).  
According to Quah, 2008, when government policies are formulated based on the 
country’s policy context, they stand a greater chance to succeed when implemented. 
Having conducted a study on India, author identified key features of the policy context of 
a country to include geography, history, economic, demography, culture, politics, and 
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law, making up seven features of policy context. To the historical element, one could add 
religion as subsets. In the case of India, author explained that the country’s large 
population was not closely taken into account in implementing a broad base 
anticorruption program, reason why the program fell short of expected outcomes. In a 
similar case of Papua New Guinea, Walton (2016) found out that the country’s 
anticorruption measures also fell short of success due to the lack of a strong focus on how 
the measures addressed the country’s policy context. It therefore becomes imperative for 
NACC to look into the concept of adaptation of strategies to Cameroon’s policy context, 
irrespective of whether the strategies where formulated originally by the agency 
according to particularistic theories or were copied from other countries based on 
universalist theories.  
A typical example of contextualization of strategies would be the case for the 
computerization of all government services based on modern information technology to 
enhance accountability and transparency in the government. This strategy stands a greater 
chance of not succeeding in Cameroon with the same speed as it would in countries with 
populations that are advanced in information technology literacy. Therefore, if it were to 
be introduced, the process should preferably be gradual and monitored closely alongside 
traditional working procedures so that the system should not crash. Also, computer 
literacy must be taught in schools beginning at infancy level in preparation for improved 
services for future generations. Those already in service could be given special training to 
enable advancement and facilitate change.  
If the government indeed concerns itself with public performance, which equally 
satisfies good governance requirements according to Elahi (2009), these factors of 
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contextualizing anticorruption strategies would be considered in the process of 
conceiving and enacting policies that will impact and improve NACC’s performance.   
Limitations of the Study 
In addition to the limitations outlined in chapter 1 of this study, which are 
inherent to the study itself and tied to its generalizability, my inability to interview the 
main director of NACC and equally recruit participants from the presidency who oversaw 
all policies concerning the agency were additional limitations. Serving as critical 
stakeholders of the organization, their views could have helped provide clearer insights 
about the conceptual mindset of those who created the agency, explaining the original 
intent of NACC at creation. This would help understanding the successes and challenges 
of the agency from a stakeholder viewpoint. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
Findings of the study revealed that since its creation in 2006, NACC have not 
succeeded in achieving outstanding results in the fight against corruption in Cameroon. 
Corruption is still perceived to be on the rise in the country. Feedback from participants 
indicated that this was not totally the fault of the agency, rather several factors ranging 
from political to institutional and to conceptual challenges undercut the ability of the 
agency to curb corruption. Most strategies that the agency implemented as attempts to 
curb corruption in the country lacked good governance basis. As a result, strategies 
lacked the impetus to thrive. As such, another study that could focus on determining the 
importance of an institution like NACC in the fight against corruption in the country 
might be needed. This could foster or redirect government’s choice for this method.  
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Literature reviewed for this study revealed that in the past two decades, some 
Central Eastern European countries were able to curb corruption problems by employing 
some of the techniques and policies that NACC also implemented. I would recommend 
that a comparative study of systems and anticorruption models be conducted on NACC’s 
case vis-à-vis some of these countries that have recorded plausible successes in this area. 
Such a study will help NACC and the government of Cameroon identify the deeper 
features driving success in these models, and how to better design and implement in 
Cameroon for more successful outcomes.  
It is also recommended that a quantitative study be carried to calibrate the 
understanding of anticorruption appreciation by the population. Chronic corruption 
usually births a complacent culture in the population especially through systematic 
behavior. Participants pointed out the example of traffic police officers on the road. 
These officers collect bribes from motorists instead of issuing tickets for violations of 
traffic rules. Most often, the plunder is shared with police supervisors at remote offices. If 
anticorruption strategies must cure this corrupt practice, such strategies must be absorbed 
by the population transforming the people to act honestly. Feedback from a study that 
would focus on finding out how much the people understood and were involved in 
anticorruption practices, would help NACC improve on different methods to foster 
anticorruption awareness among the population.  
The need for contextualization of anticorruption strategies was also identified 
within the findings as a strategic approach that NACC could employ to adapt strategies 
learned from elsewhere, especially through interaction with the international community. 
It would be beneficial for future research and policy making in another study to 
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determine how NACC’s strategies interact with the policy context of Cameroon. For 
example, determining the relationship between poverty, corruption, and anticorruption. 
Such contextual studies might result in the discovery of other factors that need to be 
addressed in order to calibrate strategies to impact the anticorruption struggle.  
I further suggest that future researchers wishing to add to NACC and the fight 
against corruption in Cameroon, take into consideration factors such as access to 
potential participants and assurance of their security before embarking on related studies, 
so as to increase the chance of successfully carrying out the studies. Corruption is a 
highly politicized and security sensitive issue in the country, and public servants at lower 
levels hesitate to provide information that could implicate their superiors. This is 
pertinent especially if the researcher cannot guarantee the anonymity of personal identity. 
Trust building, clarifications, and assurance of the strict academic nature of the research 
are some of the tactics that the researcher employs to retain the confidence of 
participants.  
The findings of this study shall be disseminated through journal publications, 
seminars, workshops, presentation at conferences, and at NACC head office. I might 
further seek to carry out a phenomenological study on the dynamics of the concepts of 
corruption and anticorruption, to discover and define any specificities in the Cameroonian 
society. It is also an objective, to have the findings introduced in different curricula on 
corruption/anticorruption studies across the country in the form of pointers and simple 
definitions that could be understood even by the youths.   
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Implications for positive social change 
This study has several positive social change implications which I believe will 
increase the quest and attention paid to good governance by the government. The result 
would improve systems and institutions, democratic processes of governance, and 
government services to citizens. An improvement in NACC strategies would lead to 
effective anticorruption practice and reduced corruption levels in the public service and 
across the country. Another benefit is the improvement in government revenue, better 
investment budgets and greater economic activity to alleviate poverty.  
To deliver positive social change to the people, NACC would have to work in 
concert with the government and its other agencies, NGOs in place, and the international 
community. The concept of good governance is the cord that binds society and the 
government in a productive synergy. As posited by Elahi (2009) and supported in 
Graham, Amos, & Plumptre (2003), the control of corruption remains a significant 
indicator of good governance. As such, to curb corruption, good governance principles 
must be in play. If a government desires to see levels of corruption reduced in society, but 
negates transparency and honesty public services, the rule of law, freedom of speech 
(which means people being empowered to freely denounce corruption), public officers 
held accountable for bad acts, and building strong institutions in the place of strong 
individuals, then such a government would be making a serious mistake. This study like 
others, emphasizes the need for good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa (Agbiboa, 2010; 




Social change generally means the improvement of lives and the wellbeing of 
people in a place, and it is the utmost intention of public policy to fulfill social change. 
Improvement in public policy would therefore imply improvement in social change. This 
study is aimed at assessing public policy that surrounds anticorruption practice in 
Cameroon, with the hope that policy makers and other stakeholders would consult the 
findings to better understand how government anticorruption strategies in the country 
perform, and the areas in which reforms are needed. 
This study will also contribute to positive social change in the area of education 
and training, by recommending that further studies be conducted on the phenomena of 
corruption and anticorruption in Cameroon, with simple pointers and definitions 
developed and integrated in educational curricula across the country. If corruption is a 
habit that is learned by society (Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008; Crittenden, Hanna, 
& Peterson, 2009; Kingston, 2008; Balafoutas, 2011; Ocheje, 2017), then anticorruption 
would also be a habit that can be learned by society.  
Lastly the study potentially contributes to positive social change in infrastructural 
development. The recommendations from the findings of the study that government 
services be computerized could increase the need for government to build new 
infrastructure, to enhance new information technology systems and hardware that will 
accommodate the innovation.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to explore government anticorruption strategies in 
Cameroon as implemented by the government’s central anticorruption agency known as 
the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), and to understand how the said 
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strategies reflected fundamental good governance principles. Furthermore, this study 
addressed the policy context of the country as a quest for effectiveness in curbing 
systematic public corruption in the country.  
The study was guided by one overarching question and four sub-questions. The 
findings of the study added to the NACC anticorruption body of knowledge in the 
specific areas of good governance and contextualization of policies. Existing studies on 
anticorruption practice in Cameroon do not explore or focus on NACC as the 
anticorruption machinery of the government and the idea of good governance principles 
guiding strategy formulation and implementation, and as well as strategies being adapted 
to the policy context in place.  
Also, most past studies on corruption issues in Cameroon tend to focus on the 
causes of the problem, hoping that if all the causes are diagnosed properly, solutions 
could easily be attained. But this study took a different route, which was that of exploring 
the different solutions that are already out there, to see which ones best addressed the 
problem that has already been identified. It is like a doctor spending more time to test the 
efficacy of different drugs developed to cure a particular disease, rather than 
concentrating only on investigating the different manifestations of the same disease and 
failing to dedicate time to develop the medication for that disease.      
Systemic and public corruption in Cameroon is not a speculative phenomenon, 
rather it is a reality that’s common to the population. It would also take conscious 
systemic approaches to develop and administer cures to the problem. But the motivation 
to ignite change within the system must come from the people through some sort of a big-
bang intervention as seen in Rothstein’s (2007) Big Bang theory of change. I do 
211 
 
subscribe to the author’s approach of mustering forces from within to address the system. 
The people must desire change and engage in the change process. Such desire would then 
correspond with any government anticorruption effort to bring about positive results. The 
people make up the government. The same people work in public offices. Therefore, 
partnership between the government and the civil society becomes a necessity in the 
anticorruption struggle.    
To ensure credibility of the findings of this study, data collected for the study 
through interviews were triangulated with data from documents collected from NACC 
online information pool and from other professionals in this discipline who are based 
physically in the country. During the interviews, I used open-ended questions and gave 
the participants the opportunity to express themselves on the issues raised by the 
questions in the interview protocol. All facts and expressions gathered were paraphrased 
and reported accurately to ensure that the findings reflect the true perceptions of the 
participants. Not surprisingly, some aspects of the analysis of the study concurred with 
the findings of other previous studies on the subject. For example, the study revealed that 
some of the shortcomings of NACC as an anticorruption machine for the country came 
from institutional and operational weaknesses. On the same note, Nguemegne (2011) in a 
study on anticorruption in Cameroon, posited that the country’s anticorruption system 
failed because of numerous structural and functional weaknesses in the governance 
system.  
It will be in the best interest of the government and the population at large if 
NACC looks into these assessments and take further steps to conduct studies on how to 
develop solutions based on recommendations made in this study, in order to improve 
212 
 
anticorruption strategies. Senior level administration and the entire government system 
(legislative, executive, and judiciary) should collaborate to make the recommended 
reforms possible. Anticorruption laws, policies, and processes are connected to all 
government branches, and the executive alone cannot possibly initiate and lead an 
anticorruption system that will succeed significantly. In chronic and devastating 
corruption levels like that of Cameroon, the anticorruption slogan should be “all hands on 
deck”.  
Finally, I do hope and expect that NACC and other governmental authorities and 
institutions will welcome and embrace the good governance and contextualization bases 
for formulating and implementing anticorruption policies and strategies as a public policy 
and administration tool for approaching new policies moving forward. By so doing, 
anticorruption practice in the country will improve, corruption will reduce, money will be 
redirected to the right accounts, government will have more to invest thereby creating a 
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Appendix A: Corruption Perception for Cameroon 
Table A1: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): scores and 
ranking for Cameroon (1995-2017) 
YEAR RANK SCORE LAST RANK OF PARTICIPATING 
COUNTRIES (WORLDWIDE) 
1995 - - 37 
1996 - - 54 
1997 - - 52 
1998 85 1.4 85 
1999 99 1.5 99 
2000 84 2.0 90 
2001 84 2.0 91 
2002 89 2.2 102 
2003 124 1.8 133 
2004 129 2.1 145 
2005 137 2.2 158 
2006 138 2.3 163 
2007 138 2.1 179 
2008 141 2.3 80 
2009 146 2.2 180 
2010 146 2.2 178 
2011 134 2.5 182 
2012 144 26 174 
2013 144 25 175 
2014 136 27 174 
2015 130 27 167 
2016 145 26 176 
2017 153 25 180 
Note. Scores range from 0-10 (from 1995 to 2011) and from 0-100 (from 2012 to 2017), 
with 10 and 100 being the cleanest from corruption, while 0 is the most corrupt according 
to respective eras of scoring methods as seen above. Last rank of participating countries 
indicates the position occupied by the most corrupt country for that year globally, even 
though more than one participant occupied some of the ranks. (Source – Transparency 




Appendix B: Codes Represented in Iterations, Category Label, and Meanings   
Figure B1  
 
                       Iteration Level 1; Surface Content Analysis revealing Initial Codes 
1a Central 
1a Centralized 




1a Controlled  
 
1b Displeased 






1c Need for cure 
1c Need for 
change 





































campaigns    
3a Tribalism, Language barrier, 
Nepotism, Low salaries, Favoritism 
3a Disequilibrium – Victims as 
Fighters 
 
3b Openness to the public 
3b Patriotism 
3b Financial propriety 
3b Service loyalty 
3b Respect of rule of law 
3b Collaborative governments 
3b Checks and balances 
 
3c Lack of cordial relationship 
between government and the public 
3c Lack of fairness 
3c Lack of meritocracy 
 
3d Setting good examples at top 
levels 
3d Severe sanctioning of culprits 
3d Purposeful investigation 




3e Willingness to change 
3e System reform 
3e Incompetence in government 
3e Corruption of bottom level 











4b Lack of 








4b Inefficient and 
ineffective 
government  
4b Recurrent nature 
of corruption 
 
4c Political climate 




































2b Legality and 
meritocracy 
 





3b Elements of Good 
Governance  
 
3c Hindrances to 
Good Governance 
 






















                                             Iteration Level 3; Application to Data Set  
1. What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon’s NACC? 
Themes: 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e 
 
2. What can be learned from NACC’s past experience of working with 
anticorruption policies and programs? 
Themes: 2a, 2b, 2c 
 
3. What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the government to implement 
effective anticorruption policies? 
Themes: 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e 
 
4. How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially improve the 
development and implementation of anticorruption strategies at NACC? 
Themes: 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d 
  
Table B1: Category Labeling of Codes 
 




















2b Legality and 
meritocracy (LM) 
 
2c Instruments of 
combat (IC) 
 
3a Barriers (BR) 
 















4a Inertia (IN) 
 
4b Impact (IP) 
 










Table B2: Central Codes and Meanings    
        Code                                                                                 Meaning 
Central Anticorruption Organ NACC as central anticorruption agency for 
government strategy including institutional and policy 
strategies 
Problematic and Displeasing Public officials recognize corruption as a severe 
problem and are not pleased with the situation 
Change The need for a cure to the problem of corruption 
Insufficient Effort   Government is not putting in the amount of effort 
needed to combat and curb corruption 
Leadership Thoughts about what the role of leadership should be 
in this fight 
Inertia  Resistance to change; an attitude of government 
workers accepting the status-quo of things as the 
established rule  
Unqualified Civil servants/public officials accessing and occupying 
offices without respecting proper recruitment 
measures and the possession of required skills 
Legality and Meritocracy  Measures that ensure respect of the rule of law both 
for access into the civil service and stay in it   
Barriers Hindrances and obstacles to anticorruption efforts 
Mechanism  Government organizational and functional machinery 
of transparency, accountability, and public 
responsibility, believed to be the right setting in which 
corruption is curbed  
Elements Constitutive elements of Good Governance (respect of  
rule of law, financial propriety, openness to public, 
public-private collaboration, checks and balances, 
patriotism, morality, collaborative governments,…etc.  
Hindrances Difficulties in establishing and observing principles of 
good governance for effective anticorruption effort 




How government reacts generally to the pervasive 
state of corruption in the system 
The institutions in place and the organizational form 
of government and how they related to the problem of 
corruption 





Conceptual  How the government and public service has being 
conceived administratively and politically, and its 
relationship to corruption in terms of inhibition and/or 
habitation   
Managerial Issues Probing technical aspects of NACC as the government’s 
main organ for the combat against corruption 
Instruments  Steps and strategies taken and can be taken to combat 
corruption 
Loyalty Work-consciousness for civil/public servants  
Propriety  Proper handling of public finances and other responsibilities 
Collaborative Governments Effective communication and support among different 
levels and departments of government  
International Cooperation Government collaboration with international partners and 
organizations on issues of corruption and the fight against it 
Victims as Fighters The prevailing situation whereby those who supposedly 
should be fighting against corruption in the civil service and 
government at large, are corrupters themselves 
Cultural Influences  The link between the Cameroonian culture and the 
prevalence of corruption in the system 
System Reform Proposed solutions to the problem of corruption in the 
government of Cameroon and in the country at large 
Tribalism, Language Barrier, 
Nepotism, Low Salaries, 
Favoritism  
Causes of corruption easily identified, different from those 
that are latent  
Impunity  Government’s attitude of not punishing culprits of 
corruption 
Centralization Explains the concentration of government structures and 
activities in one specific location – capital city of the 
country 
Disequilibrium Natural dysfunction of the system, in terms of effort toward 
the combat of corruption compared to the toll of corruption 
Checks and Balances A governance technique of ensuring transparency, 
accountability, and public responsibility. 
Anticorruption programs and 
Campaigns 
Government’s anticorruption sensitization techniques  
Incompetency Civil servants/public officials not being able to do their job 
properly, due to lack of skills and means 
International Influence Contributions from the international community, either in 
the fight against corruption, or in its prevalence  
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Appendix C: Interview Protocol 
Assessing Governmental Anticorruption Strategies: The Case of the National 








Name of Interviewer: 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
Name of Interviewee: 
_______________________________________________________ 
 




1. Please describe what you feel about corruption in Cameroon and the fight against 
it, especially by the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC)? 
2. What are some of the anticorruption strategies and mechanisms you think 
government employs to combat corruption in Cameroon through NACC? 
3. What has been your experience working with NACC on different anticorruption 
programs and projects for the past years that you have been working with the 
agency? 
4. As a public servant working with the anticorruption commission, what do you 
think are some of the effective strategies to combat corruption in the context of 
Cameroon? 
5. How effective do you think the government’s strategies in combating corruption 
in the country have been? 
6. What are some of the things you think government could do to ensure effective 
anticorruption practice by NACC? 
7. What is your opinion about the role of the international community in the fight 
against corruption in Cameroon?  
8. What are some of the international anticorruption strategies adopted by your 
agency since you started working with them? 
9. What is your experience with working with any imported policy strategies, in 
terms of effective anticorruption practice and sustainability of positive results? 
10. In your opinion, why is Cameroon still ranking poorly on Transparency 




Appendix D: Summative Interview Table 
PA# 
 
Category  Status Source Saturati-
on 












Messaging   
Transcribed/ 
5 pages 
P2 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 






P3 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 






P4 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 






P5 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 






P6 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 






P7 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 











at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 






P9 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 






P10 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 






P11 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 






P12 None Conducted via Virtual Media 










P13 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 




















P15 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 






P16 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 






P17 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 






P18 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 






P19 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 






P20 None Conducted via Virtual Media 
Public Servant 
at NACC  
Yes Semi-structured 
interview 
2 hrs. 59 
mins. 
Word 
Messaging 
Transcribed/ 
5 pages 
 
